Dos Passos, John
(Chicago 1896-1970 Baltimore) : Schriftsteller, Künstler
Name Alternative(s)
Dos Passos, John Roderigo
Subjects
Index of Names : Occident
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Literature : Occident : United States of America
Chronology Entries (2)
| # | Year | Text | Linked Data |
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| 1 | 1903 |
Dos Passos, John R. The Anglo-Saxon century and the unification of the English-speaking people. IV. Russia, China, France – their relations to each other and to the world. [ID D33695]. …But the powers mentioned above [United States, Germany, England, Russia] must assume that her internal policy will succeed, and the probabilities of such success, at least for some years to come, make it important for them to act conjointly and promptly in matters pertaining to China, South-eastern Europe and Asia. No matter how they may diverge in other questions, upon the subject of China their true interests demand joint action. Under no circumstances, at least for many years, will Russia be a general commercial rival to these four powers. She has no ambition, for instance, in the direction of Africa, now covered by England, Germany, and France ; nor has she any present intention of exploiting the fields of South America or Mexico. The sphere of her external policy embraces South-eastern Europe, Asia, and China, and in these fields she has always met and been checked by Great Britain. It is an absolute, indisputable fact of history, that but for the predominating influence and power of England, Russia would to-day be the complete master of China, Turkey, Persia, and other parts of Asia — in fact, of all Asia. England, alone, might still continue to check Russia's designs on these countries, but in so doing she would be acting not only for Germany, but for the United States, hence the Eastern policy of England must be radically changed, or she must act co-operatively with the United States, France, and Germany, or with one or two of these powers. She cannot for ever continue in the unavowed invidious role of defender of Europe against this gigantic, ever-advancing, all-absorbing antagonist. But eternal gratitude is due to her from the United States and the other powers of Europe for what she has already done in this direction. Unless some general check, such as is suggested in these pages, be applied, the dream of Peter the Great would seem to be in a fair way of fulfilment. That dream was, first, the acquisition of all Asia; second, the conquest of all Europe — the latter by the instrumentality of its own dissensions, and the playing off of the rival interests, as Austria against France, afterwards France against Germany — a state of things which has an approach to realisation at the present moment. The royal dreamer did not embrace America within the scope of his vision, — a very important and ever-growing factor in the general problem, whether for good or evil. In the new diplomatic advent, the United States, Germany, England, and Russia, and, perhaps, France, must be the principal factors. What shall their policy be ? Undoubtedly England, the United States, and Germany would never consent to allow Russia to carry out her present ambition to become the owner of China and the other Eastern possessions, which every one knows she covets, and covets quite naturally, because her contiguity to these territories makes it of vital importance for her to obtain a predominating control there, when they pass from the weak hands in which they now rest. Moreover, the strong, despotic government of Russia is suited to Chinese education and intelligence, perhaps much more so than that which any European power could establish there. But behold the proportions and strength of the Russian Empire with China and the Chinese under her control ! Does any European power look with equanimity upon such a picture ? Naturally, Russia will hesitate long before she will consent to relinquish her cherished dream of eventually controlling these possessions. It has been manifest for years that China could not take care of herself, and what little diplomacy exists in modern times has been exercised in guarding the present and future integrity of that country from the grasp of rival foreign powers. Until the late war (if the anomalous events which recently transpired in China can be correctly called a war) these diplomatic questions had really involved only England and Russia. At present, the situation is as follows : China and the East must be opened to meet the increasing commercial growth of the United States, England, Germany, and France. There are not enough customers to go round; the domain of commercial activity is too narrow ; competition is becoming so close and hot, especially when the United States invades those grounds heretofore exclusively occupied by England Germany, and France, that new territories must be found, and fresh fields of trade exposed. The doors of China must be thrown wide open to the manufacturers of all these countries, on terms of equality. The policy of Russia is to delay the consummation of this event. She may at some future time be in a situation where she can occupy the disputed field against all comers. She is near the ground, and is becoming more powerful every day, in proportion as her internal policy is fixed, and her laws, religion, and government are made satisfactory to her subjects. If all these things turn out favourably for Russia, and she can secure the co-operation of China, it is not unlikely or improbable that she will one day say to the other powers, "Hands off!" and be prepared to enforce her words. Under these circumstances, it is the unquestionable policy of England, the United States, Germany, and France, at least so far as China is concerned, to have their relations with Russia settled at once. If Russia can maintain the status quo until events are ripe for her to act aggressively, it is her plain policy to do so. On the other hand, England, the United States, France, and Germany can gain nothing by the delay, but everything by quick, present, concerted action. The division of China once made, Russian ambition and diplomacy are for ever checked. Of course there is the Franco-Russian alliance. I pay no attention to it. It is a farce — a diplomatic paradox ; so suicidal to France's real interest that it is liable to drop to pieces at any change in the French Ministry. Another phase of the subject, i. e., the internal condition of China. In the aspect in which I am considering the subject, I do not think I am wrong in saying that China bears the same relation to the civilised world as the continent of America did to Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. There are, of course, great differences — China has more people — she has a more developed internal trade, her citizens have more intelligence and certain inventive and business qualities, and there are other very material features too obvious to, mention, which distinoruish the Chinese from the American aborigines, but in the sense in which I am speaking, the comparison is correct. China has made no distinct advance for centuries, in a civilising direction, in the sciences and arts, in commercial and manufacturing pursuits, to say nothing of political, religious, and moral improvements, schools and eleemosynary establishments. She has stood dead-still, if she has not actually taken a step backward. As a nation, China is oblivious to anything progressive. In fact, so low is she in the scale of modern civilisation, that the United States, whose commendable policy has been to invite immigrants to her shores, has deliberately shut her doors to China, and has unceremoniously refused to receive the latter's subjects either as citizens or as travellers. In ordinary circumstances, in the estimation of independent thinkers, this policy of exclusion would be intolerable, but its justification has been sustained upon the ground that the Chinese are not regarded as fit associates for American citizens, and no persons are wanted in this country who do not meet this requirement. In a word, China is out of harmony in her relations to the civilised powers. With but few exceptions her policy has been to close her doors to the outside world, to shut herself up in a shell upon the approach of strangers. China, in respect to modern development, must be opened by the corkscrew of progress. She does not respond with effervescence to the approaches of civilisation. The massacre of an ambassador of a great power, tile altogether unjustifiable slaughter of helpless missionaries, invited and induced to reside there by treaty, and the turbulent confusion which reigns inside of her borders, form complete evidence of the utter incapacity of the nation for respectable, stable government. She is old, childish, helpless, and if her territories are to be opened and developed, if her people are to be educated, enlightened and made prosperous, it must be by the strong hands of the civilised powers. Of course, touching and effective arguments may be made against the right of nations forcibly and bodily to take possession of Chinese soil, and intelligent and cultivated Chinese statesmen and gifted scholars like Wu Ting-Fang, the late Chinese Ambassador to the United States, may make pathetic appeals against such a movement, based upon the superior moral and legal right of the Chinese to their own soil and government. But we must look the question fairly in the face, undisturbed and unaffected by arguments which, ordinarily, would have preponderating weight. The Indians who occupied the soil of North America, the Britons who occupied the soil of England, had the same arguments. Nothing is finer than the pictured eloquence of the Indian chiefs as they spiritedly protested against the invasion of their soil and the dispersion and extinguishment of their tribal governments. But before the march of progress and the underlying necessities of civilisation, these cries of sentiment and sympathy will not long be heard. The invincible spirit of progress must go on. Like quicksilver, it will noiselessly run into every portion of the globe where voids created by political weakness and barbarism exist. Sympathy cannot be allowed for ever to block human advancement. In the contest between the higher and the lower order of things, it is impossible to adjust the details to our liking. There is always an intermediate period of partial injustice and confusion before the solution is reached. China can prove no exception to this view. Railroads will eventually appear in the highways of China in place of the ancient and worn-out methods of transportation which now prevail ; manufacturing and mining pursuits will be established, her fields will be opened, cultivated, and enriched by modern methods and implements of agriculture. It will be in vain for the Chinese to undertake to support their religion and methods of thought and life by appeals to Confucius and other teachers. These must give way under the influence of modern progress. Why ? Because they have produced no fruit. A tree that bears nothing is valueless. China's ethics, laws, religion, and philosophy are barren. Primitively and simply beautiful they may be, but they are without practical value except as historical monuments marking the advance of nations. Her present condition attests the value of her institutions: "By their fruits ye shall know them." In face of all these facts, it is hard to realise that the allied powers should precipitately have left China. Yet the reason is plain. England and the United States each had a war upon its hands. The Chinese difficulty happened at a most inopportune time, and when the United States inaugurated and persisted in a movement of abandonment of China, England was reluctantly forced to give up her convictions and to join in the retrograde march. Had England been entirely free to act, no doubt she would have forced a different settlement. The McKinley administration exhibited a natural weakness in its policy. It had to fight shy of the Imperialistic cry which had been dinned in its ears ad nauseam with respect to the Philippine possessions ; it feared another broadside from opposition newspapers, which was imminent if it pursued a strong policy in China, and hence one was hit upon of apparent magnanimity towards the Chinese, but which was at once superficial, weak, and misleading, and withal the worst measure for China which could be imagined. The allied powers entered China without a studied or concerted plan, and they left it without a clear solution or settlement of the questions involved. Their going in was as their coming out — hasty, ill-conceived, and impolitic. The commencement and the conclusion were both befogged. No sooner were the allied troops removed than internal dissensions appeared, and the weakness, wretchedness, and incompetence of the Chinese government was soon more plainly revealed than ever. By abandoning China, the United States played directly into the hands of Russia. England and Germany must have seen this, but they could not combat a plan of action which seemed on its face so magnanimous to a fallen people, especially with France co-operating with Russia. The whole business must be gone over again. The weakness of China will soon be revealed in plots and revolutions all over the Empire ; indignities will be again perpetrated upon foreigners, and armed intervention will follow… |
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| 2 | 1927 |
Dos Passos, John. Orient Express. (New York, N.Y. : Harper & Bros., 1927). "With the name of Allah for all baggage, you could travel from the Great Wall of China to the Niger and be fairly sure of food, and often of money, if only you were ready to touch your forehead in the dust five times a day and put away self and the glamorous West. And yet, the West is conquering." |
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Bibliography (5)
| # | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1903 |
Dos Passos, John R. The Anglo-Saxon century and the unification of the English-speaking people. (New York, N.Y. : G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1903). IV. Russia, China, France – their relations to each other and to the world. https://archive.org/stream/anglosaxoncentur00dosp/anglosaxoncentur00dosp_djvu.txt. |
Publication / Dos1 |
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| 2 | 1980-1985 |
Dos Passos, John Roderigo. Meiguo san bu qu (xuan ze). Yuehan Duosi Posuosi ; Dong Hengxun yi. Übersetzung von Dos Passos, John Roderigo. U.S.A. (New York, N.Y. : Modern Library, 1937). [Auszüge]. In : Wai guo xian dai pai zuo pin xuan. Vol. 4 [ID D16726]. 美国三部曲选择 |
Publication / YuanK2.77 |
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| 3 | 1988 |
[Dos Passos, John]. Bei wei si shi er du : Meiguo san bu qu zhi yi. Yuehan Duosi Basuosi ; Dong Hengxun, Zhu Shida, Xue Hongshi yi. (Shanghai : Shanghai yi wen chu ban she, 1988). (Er shi shi ji wai guo wne xue cong shu). Übersetzung von Dos Passos, John. 42nd parallel. (New York, N.Y. ; London : Harper & Brothers, 1930). 北纬四十二度 |
Publication / Dos4 | |
| 4 | 1990 |
[Dos Passos, John]. Yi jiu yi jiu nian. Boshuosi ; Zhu Shida yi. (Shanghai : Shanghai yi wen chu ban she, 1990). (Er shi shi ji wai guo wen xue cong shu). Übersetzung von Dos Passos, John. Nineteen nineteen. (New York, N.Y. : Harcourt, Brace and Co. ; London : Constable, 1932). 一九一九年南 |
Publication / Dos2 | |
| 5 | 1991 |
[Dos Passos, John]. Zhuan da qian. Boshuosi ; Yao Yongcai yi. (Shanghai : Shanghai yi wen chu ban she, 1991). (Er shi shi ji wai guo wen xue cong shu). Übersetzung von Dos Passos, John. The big money. (New York, N.Y. : Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936). 賺大錢 |
Publication / Dos3 |
Secondary Literature (1)
| # | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1946 |
Ye, Lingfeng. Du shu sui bi. (Shanghai : Shanghai za zhi gong si, 1946). [Abhandlung über Marcel Proust, André Gide, James Joyce, John Dos Passos, Aubrey Beardsley, Oscar Wilde]. 讀書嫈筆 |
Publication / Prou40 |