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“Uncertain paths to freedom : Russia and China, 1919-22” (Publication, 1920-1921)

Year

1920-1921

Text

Russell, Bertrand. Uncertain paths to freedom : Russia and China, 1919-22. Bertrand Russell ; edited by Richard A. Rempel, Beryl Haslam ; with the assistance of Andrew Bone, Albert C. Lewis. (London : Routledge, 2000). (Russell, Bertrand. Works ; vol. 15). (Russ6)

Type

Publication

Contributors (1)

Russell, Bertrand  (Trelleck, Monmouthsire 1872-1970 Plas Penrhyn bei Penrhyndeudraeth, Wales) : Philosoph, Logistiker, Mathematiker, Literaturnobelpreisträger ; Dozent Cambridge, Oxford, London, Harvard University, Chicago, Los Angeles, Beijing

Subjects

History : China : General / Periods : China : Republic (1912-1949) / Philosophy : Europe : Great Britain / References / Sources

Chronology Entries (58)

# Year Text Linked Data
1 1920.10.09 Bertrand Russell arrives in Hong Kong.
2 1920.10.12 Bertrand Russell arrived in Shanghai. Zhang Shenfu was on hand to welcome him to China. Zhang had, by that time, already made plans to go to France on the same boat as Cai Yuanpei. After the public meeting with Russell in Shanghai, Zhang and Russell continued conversation over tea in Beijing in November.
3 1920.10.12 Reception for Bertrand Russell by educational associations at Da Dong Hotel in Shanghai.
4 1920.10.15 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Principles of social reconstruction" in Shanghai.
5 1920.10.16 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Uses of education" to the Jiangsu Education Society.
6 1920.10.17 Bertrand Russell spends two days in Hangzhou to see the West Lake.
7 1920.10.19 Lecture by Bertrand Russel on "Problems of education" at Zhejiang Normal School in Hangzhou.
8 1920.10.20 Welcome party for Bertrand Russell by the Education Association at the Yipingxiang Restaurant in Shanghai.
9 1920.10.21 Lectures by Bertrand Russell on "Einstein's new theory of gravity" to the Science Society in Nanjing.
10 1920.10.22 Bertrand Russell takes the boat from Nanjing to Hankou.
11 1920.10.25 Lectures by Bertrand Russell in Hankou.
12 1920.10.26-27 Bertrand Russell arrives Changsha at the invitation of the General Education Association of Hunan. He gives four lectures : "The idea of Bolshevism", "Personal incidents in Russia", "The labour failures of Bolshevism", "Necessary elements for a successful communism".
13 1920.10.27 Bertrand Russell attends a governor's banquet in Shanghai and meets John Dewey and his wife Alice Chipman Dewey.
Russell departs for Beijing.
14 1920.10.28 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, 28. Okt. 1920. In : The Nation ; 8 Jan. 1921.
I wrote the following account on the Yiangtse : To Ottoline Morrell.
Since landing in China we have had a most curious and interesting time, spent, so far, entirely among Chinese students and journalists, who are more or less Europeanised. I have delivered innumerable lectures – on Einstein, education and social questions. The eagerness for knowledge on the part of students is quite extraordinary. When one begins to speak, their eyes have the look of starving men beginning a feast. Everywhere they treat me with a most embarrassing respect. The day after I landed in Shanghai they gave a vast dinner to us, at which they welcomed me as Confucius the Second. All the Chinese newspapers that day in Shanghai had my photograph. Both Miss Black and I had to speak to innumerable schools, teachers' conferences, congresses, etc. It is a country of curious contrasts. Most of Shanghai is quite European, almost American ; the names of streets, and notices and advertisements are in English (as well as Chinese). The buildings are magnificent offices and banks ; everything looks very opulent. But the side streets are still quite Chinese. It is a vast city about the size of Glasgow. The Europeans almost all look villainous and ill. One of the leading Chinese newspapers invited us to lunch, in a modern building, completed in 1917, with all the latest plant (except linotype, which can't be used for Chinese characters). The editorial staff gave us a Chinese meal at the top of the house with Chinese wine made of rice, and innumerable dishes which we ate with chopsticks. When we had finished eating they remarked that one of their number was fond of old Chinese music, and would like to play to us. So he produced an instrument with seven strings, made by himself on the ancient model, out of black wood two thousand years old, which he had taken from a temple. The instrument is played with the finger, like a guitar, but is laid flat on a table, not held in the hand. They assured us that the music he played was four thousand years old, but that I imagine muse be an overstatement. In any case, it was exquisitely beautiful, very delicate, easier for a European ear than more recent music (of which I have heard a good deal). When the music was over they became again a staff of bustling journalists.
From Shanghai our Chinese friends took us for three nights to Hanchow on the Western Lane, said to be the most beautiful scenery in China. That was merely holiday. The Western Lake is not large – about the size of Grasmere – it is surrounded by wooded hills, on which there are innumerable pagodas and temples. It has been beautified by poets and emperors for thousands of years. (Apparently poets in ancient China were as rich as financiers in modern Europe.) We spent one day in the hills – a twelve hour expedition in Sedan chairs – and the next in seeing country houses, monasteries, etc. on islands in the lake.
Chinese religion is curiously cheerful. When one arrives at a temple, they give one a cigarette and a cup of delicately fragrant tea. Then they show one round. Buddhism, which one thinks of as ascetic, is here quite gay. The saints have fat stomachs, and are depicted as people who thoroughly enjoy life. No one seems to believe the religion, not even the priests. Nevertheless, one sees many rich new temples.
The country houses are equally hospitable – one is shewn round and given tea. They are just like Chinese pictures, with many arbours where one can sit, with everything made for beauty and nothing for comfort – except in the grandest rooms, where there will be a little hideous European furniture.
The most delicious place we saw on the Western Lake was a retreat for scholars, built about eight hundred years ago on the lake. Scholars certainly had a pleasant life in the old China.
Apart from the influence of Europeans, China makes the impression of what Europe would have become if the eighteenth century had gone on till now without industrialism or the French Revolution. People seem to be rational hedonists, knowing very well how to obtain happiness, exquisite through intense cultivation of their artistic sensibilities, differing from Europeans through the fact that they prefer enjoyment to power. People laugh a great deal in all classes, even the lowest.
The Chinese cannot pronounce my name, or write it in their characters. They call me 'Luo-Su' which is the nearest they can manage. This, they can both pronounce and print.
From Hanchow we went back to Shanghai, thence by rail to Nanking, an almost deserted city. The wall is twenty-three miles in circumference, but most of what it encloses is country. The city was destroyed at the end of the Taiping rebellion, and again injured in the Revolution of 1911, but it is an active educational centre, eager for news of Einstein and Bolshevism.
From Nanking we went up the Yiangtse to Hangkow, about three days' journey, through very lovely scenery – thence by train to Cheng-Sha, the capital of Hun-Nan, where a great educational conference was taking place. There are about three hundred Europeans in Cheng-Sha, but Europeanisation has not gone at all far. The town is just like a mediaeval town – narrow streets, every house a shop with a gay sign hung out, no traffic possible except Sedan chairs and a few rickshaws. The Europeans have a few factories, a few banks, a few missions and a hospital – the whole gamut of damaging and repairing body and soul by western methods. The Governor of Hun-Nan is the most virtuous of all the Governors of Chinese provinces, and entertained us last night at a magnificent banquet. Professor and Mrs Dewey were present ; it was the first time I had met them. The Governor cannot talk any European language, so, though I sat next to him, I could only exchange compl8iments through an interpreter. But I got a good impression of him ; he is certainly very anxious to promote education, which seems the most crying need of China. Without it, it is hard to see how better government can be introduced. It must be said that bad government seems somewhat less disastrous in China than it would be in a European nation, but this is perhaps a superficial impression which time may correct.
We are now on our way to Peking, which we hope to reach on October 31st.
  • Document: Russell, Bertrand. Autobiography. Vol. 1-3. With an introduction by Michael Foot. (London : Routledge, 1967-1969). = (London : Routledge, 1998). Chap. 10 : China. [Text über Japan wurde ausgelassen. Briefe, die mit China zu tun haben sind chronologisch eingetragen]. (Russ9, Publication)
  • Person: Morrell, Ottoline
  • Person: Russell, Bertrand
15 1920.10.31 Bertrand Russell arrives in Beijing.
16 1920.11.07 Bertrand Russell gives the first lecture about "The problem of philosophy" to an audience of 1000 people at Beijing University He explained the meanings of the different symbols he would use, and then introduced both the calculus and algebra of propositions.
17 1920.11.09 Welcome party for Bertrand Russell in Beijing.
18 1920.11.11 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of mind" at Beijing University.
He meets Zhang Shenfu at the Continental Hotel in Shanghai.
19 1920.11.14 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The problems of philosophy" at the Normal School in Beijing.
20 1920.11.18 Banquet for Bertrand Russell in the Beijing Hotel.
21 1920.11.19 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Bolshevik thought" at the Women's Higher Normal School in Beijing.
22 1920.11.27 Bertrand Russell speaks to the Anarchist Mutual Aid Society in Beijing.
23 1920 Formation of the Bertrand Russell Study Group in Beijing.
24 1920.12.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Industry in undeveloped countries" to the Chinese Social and Political Association in Beijing.
25 1920.12.10 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on Albert Einstein at the Qinghua University in Beijing.
26 1920.12.16 Russell, Bertrand. First impressions of China. In : The Peking Leader ; 16. Dez. (1920).
He traveller arriving in China from Europe for the first time is struck to begin with by the great artistic beauty of all that is traditional, and the aesthetic ruin wrought by modern industrialism wherever it has penetrated. If he is a man whose main interest is art and beauty, he will probably continue to deplore the influence of Europe : he will observe the decay of Chinese painting and poetry, the substitution of (to him) commonplace Western furniture for the stiff tables and chairs of the old tradition. He will perhaps go even further, and carry his conservatism into the domain of ideas. He will find an old-world charm in Buddhist monasteries and Buddhist thought ; he will rejoice to find that there are men of high education in their own line, whose whole outlook and knowledge is utterly different from that of learned Europeans. And he will wish such peculiarities preserved, in order to increase the interest and diversity of the spectacle which the world offers to studious contemplation.
But if he takes the trouble to consider China in itself, not merely as a spectacle, hi is not likely to remain content with this conservative attitude. He will realize that the old beauty no longer has any vitality, and that it can only be preserved by treating the whole country as a museum. He will find that many of the most vigorous and intelligent of the Chinese are entirely unappreciative of all ancient excellence in China, and distinctly impatient when foreigners praise it. He will quickly discover that progress is only possible by abandoning the old, even when it is really good. Industrialism, democracy, science and modern education do not have the statuesque beauty of traditional and unchanging civilizations ; Europe at the present day lacks the charm which it had four or five centuries ago, yet hardly any European would wish to revert to the Middle Ages. And similarly what is most vital in China wishes to press forward, without too much tenderness for the aesthetic losses that must be involved.
One is struck, on arriving from Europe, by the tremendous eagerness for ideas, for enlightenment, for guidance, which exists among those who have lost faith in the old traditions. Something of the old Confucian's belief in the value of learning and the importance of the sage survives even among the most iconoclastic. China has been governed for many ages very largely by men chosen, at least nominally, on account of their literary eminence. There has come to be a scholarly caste, of whom the younger ones now look to America (or, in some cases, Europe) for intellectual guidance. Their desire is usually not for facts to much as for what may be called wisdom. It is impossible not to be surprised by the general belief that a sage must be able to give moral advice by which a nation's difficulties can be solved. We in the West have lost our belief in Wise Men. This is part of the general diminution of belief in the individual, which has been brought about by organization, by the vast size of our States, our business enterprises, and our political parties. But in China there is still an expectation that a wise man may play the part of Solon or Lycurgus. There is a willingness and desire to follow, but there is, apparently, no correlative ability to lead.
What China has achieved in the last twenty years is quite amazing. I have no doubt that the most important thing for China now is education, not only of the present class, but of the whole people. China is traditionally aristocratic in its social organization, and this tradition is still very dominant. Life in China reminds a European of the eighteenth century ; the cheapness and abundance of labour, the multitude of servants, the survival of handicrafts, produce and economic situation such as Europe experienced before the industrial revolution. And the mental atmosphere, too, is not dissimilar : the skepticism in regard to traditional beliefs, and the eager search after some new gospel, are just what was characteristic of France a hundred and fifty years ago. I do not think any new gospel which is to be of value to China is possible without a more democratic spirit, and I think this spirit will have to be displayed first of all in the provision of education for the working classes. I am of course very conscious of the difficulties and obstacles that stand in the way, but I believe they can be overcome in time by patience and determination.
The problem of relations with other Powers and with Western ideas and methods is obviously a very delicate one. If it were possible, I suppose a patriotic Chinese with a modern outlook would desire to have the greatest possible benefit from Western science and industrial methods, with the least possible political and economic domination by foreign nations. But probably the ideas and the domination are difficult to dissociate. Probably any steps that might be taken to resist foreign capital and foreign aggression would only be successful, at present, if they were part of a great patriotic campaign, which would inevitably extend also into the region of ideas and economic methods and social organization. Under these circumstances, it seems difficult to obtain the good without the bad. At any rate, a newly-arrived foreigner feels puzzled, and does not know exactly what he should desire.
It is clear, in any case, that industrialism must profoundly change China during the next twenty years. One could wish that industrialism might develop here without the bad features which have proved inseparable from its growth everywhere else, but perhaps that is too much to hope. I have no doubt that by foresight and method the transition to industrialism could be effected without any evils of a serious kind ; but no nation hitherto has shown foresight and method in the transition, and there is no reason to suppose that China will prove an exception.
The hopeful features in China, on a superficial acquaintance of only a few weeks, seem to me to be the great eagerness for ideas on the part of the educated minority, and the great willingness to accept leadership towards some better political and social system. I fully believe that, given patience and a willingness to traverse the necessary stages, these qualities can lead to a wonderful national awakening if wise leaders can be found. But I do not yet know what likelihood there is of these conditions being fulfilled.
One thing, at any rate, I can praise with complete confidence, and that is Chinese hospitality. I have been welcomed with a warmth which has surprised and touched me, and have been treated everywhere with a quite extraordinary kindness. It is natural to wish that I could make some return for this kindness in the form of help in China ; but I am impressed by the complexity and difficulty of these problems, and by the impossibility of understanding them when one is a recent arrival ignorant of the Chinese language. So long as this remains the case, anything that I may find to say must continue to suffer from superficiality and ignorance.
27 1920.12.18 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on Russia to the Learned Friends Society in Beijing.
28 1920.12.24 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Colette O'Niel. 24. Dez. 1920.
Letter from China (1920).
You say you find it difficult to imagine me here, so I will try to describe the world in which I am living. I have a Chinese house, built round a courtyard, with only the ground-floor. The front door opens into a small street ; as one walks along the street, one sees only one continuous wall with an occasional door, because the houses are hidden. Ten minutes' walk from my house are the City Walls, which go all round the City (fourteen miles). They are high and broad, and the best place for an afternoon walk, because one sees the whole of Peking and the Western Hills beyond. The region between Hankow and Peking, when I came through it in the train, seemed to me very like Southern Russia : vastness, unbounded plains, and primaeval peasants. Southern China, from the Yangtse to Hongkong, is utterly different – tropical or sub-tropical, very beautiful in a straightforward fashion, fertile, populous, and gay. But this northern land is tragic. The sand blows over from the desert of Gobi in great yellow storms, and makes moving sand-hills which engulf whole villages. The rivers are cruel, always either dried up or in flood. Owing to drought last summer, twenty million peasants are starving ; they offer their little girls for sale as slaves at three dollars, and if they don't get that price they bury them alive. The Chinese don't care ; whatever is being done for relief is European or American. There are many rich Chinese, but they won't lend to their government, because they know the money would be spent in corruption. The Chinese politicians take Japanese money, while Japan steals Shantung and behaves in Korea even worse than we are behaving in Ireland. Japan and England smuggle opium into the country by corrupting the customs officials. The provincial governors even each his own army, usually unpaid, but making money by looting unoffending towns, bayonetting shopkeepers who try to keep something back. Meanwhile the intellectuals prate of socialism or communism, pretend to be very advanced, and sit with folded hands enjoying inherited wealth, while the Japs, the Russians, the English and the Americans are all trying to get pickings off the corpse. There was until lately a native art which was very beautiful, and a native poetry of exquisite delicacy. But the palseying touch of industrialism has killed all that. The common people are the best ; they are good-natured children, full of laughter, physically tough, and mentally less effete than the people of inherited culture. I feel as if they would be quite good material for education, whereas the pupils I get are incurably lazy and soft. Peking is very beautiful, full of broad open spaces, trees, palaces, streets of water, and temples. The climate is delicious, bright and dry, always freezing in winter, but with almost no snow. Europeans dash about in motor-cars, Chinese men make a more stately progress in carriages with footmen standing behind, humbler folk go in rickshas, and your correspondent on his feet for the sake of exercise. Walking here has the drawback of the beggars : shivering men and women and children in rags which scarcely secure decency, who run after one for long distances repeating 'da la yeh' (great old sire !). Some are fat and evidently make a good living ; others look terribly poor and hungry and cold. There are many dogs in the streets, but they are despised ; some are covered with sores, others one sees dying in the ditch.
29 1921.01.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter" at Beijing University.
30 1921.01.06 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The essence and effect of religion" to the Philosophy Research Group in Beijing.
31 1921.01.09 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The problems of philosophy" in Beijing.
32 1921.01.11 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter".
Meeting for lunch with Vasilyevich Ivanov Razumnik of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Beijing.
33 1921.01.12 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter" in Bejing.
34 1921.01.13 Lecture by Dora Russell Black on "Political ideas as influenced by political conditions" in Beijing.
35 1921.02.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Principles of social organization" at the Beijing University.
36 1921.02.26 Bertrand Russell has lunch with Vasilyevich Ivanov Razumnik in Beijing.
37 1921.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Mathematical logic" at the Beijing University.
38 1921.03.10-11 Bertrand Russell visits the Great Wall.
39 1921.03.14-17 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Problems of education" at the Baoding Middle School in Baoding (Hebei).
He caught a severe cold which led to double pneumonia. Throughout the two weeks Russell suffered of extremely high fever and the physicians lost any hope. On March 27 a Japanese news agency bulletin reporting Russell's death went around the world. A Beijing newspaper wrote : "Missionaries may be pardoned for heaving a sigh of relief at the news of Mr. Bertrand Russell's death".
  • Document: Russell, Bertrand. Autobiography. Vol. 1-3. With an introduction by Michael Foot. (London : Routledge, 1967-1969). = (London : Routledge, 1998). Chap. 10 : China. [Text über Japan wurde ausgelassen. Briefe, die mit China zu tun haben sind chronologisch eingetragen]. (Russ9, Publication)
  • Document: Findeisen, Raoul David. Professor Luo : reflections on Bertrand Russell in China. In : Asian and African studies ; vol. 3 (1994). (Russ3, Publication)
  • Person: Russell, Bertrand
40 1921.07.01 Russell, Bertrand. China's road to freedom. In : The Peking Leader ; 7 July (1921).
http://russell.mcmaster.ca/volume15.htm.
[This
address was published in The Peking Leader, 7 July 1921, p. 3, where it appeared with the subtitle 'Bertrand Russell's Farewell Address in China'. It was delivered at the Board of Education, Beijing, on 6 July 1921. The first thirteen and one-fourth pages of Russell’s twenty-page manuscript are written in Dora Black's hand. Presumably they were dictated by Russell as he was still recovering from his illness and tired too easily to write himself, while the remainder is in Russell's hand. Russell wrote on the first page: 'Farewell Address, Peking, 5 July 1921'. The copy-text is a typescript emended by Russell.]
The foreigner who ventures to have an opinion on any Chinese question incurs a great risk of complete folly, particularly if, as in my case, his stay in the country has been short and his knowledge of the language is nil. China has an ancient and complex civilization, the most ancient now existing in the world. The traditions of China are quite different from those of Europe. China has in the past achieved great things in philosophy, in art and in music, but in all these respects, what has been done has been practically independent of European influence and widely different from all that issued out of the Hellenic culture. The mere effort to understand a society whose religion and morals have been framed in independence of Christianity requires for a European no small amount of psychological imagination. When one adds to all this the difficulty of ascertaining the facts concerning modern China, it is evident that any European is likely to go far astray in an attempt to lay down a programme of reform for the Chinese nation. For all these reasons, I am persuaded that those Chinese who have the welfare of their country at heart will have to frame their own programme and not rely too much upon the intellectual assistance of foreigners. Nevertheless, I am venturing to put before you some considerations as to the state of China and the way in which it might be improved considerations which have grown up in me slowly during my stay among you and were by no means present to my mind when I first landed. Two things of a very general nature seem to me evident: the first that it is not to be desired that China should adopt the civilization of Europe in its entirety; the second, that the traditional civilization of China is inadequate to present needs and must give way to something radically new. The evils of European civilization have been made obvious to all thoughtful observers by the great war and its outcome. In the early days of the war most Europeans imagined that these evils were not inherent in our system, but would be eradicated by the victory of one’s own side, whichever that might be. This has proved to be a delusion. The basis of our civilization is capitalistic industrialism, a system, which, though in its early stages it brings about immensely rapid technical and material progress, cannot but lead on to increasingly destructive wars, first for markets and then for raw materials. It is by no means improbable that our Western civilization may go under in the course of these wars and of the class conflicts due to the opposition of capital and labour. Even if our civilization should survive, it is to be feared that it will become increasingly mechanical, with a constantly augmenting disregard for the individual and his idiosyncrasies. From such a civilization little that is of value is to be expected. It is, therefore, not by mere imitation of Western ways that the Chinese can do most for the welfare of their own country or of the world. On the other hand, the traditional civilization of China based upon Confucianism tempered by Buddhism has worn itself out, and is no longer capable either of inspiring individual achievement or of solving the internal and external political problems with which China is beset. For the last thousand years or so this civilization has been decaying, slowly losing vigour as the Greco-Roman civilization lost vigour in the centuries preceding the barbarian invasion. I think these evils are inseparable from an ancient tradition which is greatly respected, no matter what that tradition may be. It is necessary for each generation to think and feel for itself, and not to seek wisdom in the utterances of ancestors, however wise their ancestors may have been in their own time. I hear it said by Europeans that China would go to pieces morally if respect for the teaching of Confucius were lost. Perhaps this might be the case if a mere vacuum were left in the mental region from which that teaching had been removed, but it would most certainly not be the case if a newer doctrine, more suited to modern problems, could inspire the same belief and the same enthusiasm as must have been inspired by Confucianism in its creative period. The Chinese reformer, therefore, if I am not mistaken, will be no more willing to uphold what is traditional in his own country than to seek novelty by slavish imitation of the West. I am convinced that China, in the future as in the past, has a distinctive contribution to make to civilization, and something more than mere quantity to add to the world's mental possessions. Passing from these generalizations to the actual state of your affairs, every reasonable man is convinced of the necessity of putting an end to the present condition of anarchic militarism. This is common ground among all reformers, from the mildest to the most extreme; but the method by which it is to be achieved is a matter of endless controversy. Among Europeans especially there is a tendency to favour restoration of the monarchy, but such a step can hardly be expected to appeal to the progressive Chinese. It is not by restoring old conditions that new problems can be solved. It is clear, of course, that a radical and permanent solution must depend upon education. But education is a somewhat vague word, and any education worthy of the name is difficult to secure under the present political conditions, as the course of the teachers’ strike has indicated. The education that China needs must be at once widespread and modern. It must not be, as in the past, the privilege of a favoured minority, nor the mere learning of ancient books and their commentators. It must be universal and must be scientific and the science must not be merely theoretical, but in close touch with modern industry and economics. So long as the bulk of your population is uneducated it will be incapable of supporting an industrial state or of resisting the ambitions of ruthless adventurers. But the building up of such a system of education in a country such as yours is an immense task, requiring a generation for its fulfilment, even with all possible good will on the part of the government. You would not, to begin with, have the necessary supply of teachers, nor would the State be able to support the expense without a much greater development of industrialism than has hitherto taken place in China. And until you have a better government than you have now, you will not be able to secure even the preliminary measures. All that can be done at present in the way of education is to the good, and is, as the mathematicians say, necessary, but not sufficient. Thus the need for education brings us back to economic and political problems as its pre-conditions. I think it must be taken as nearly certain that your industrial resources will lead in the near future to a great development of industrialism. I am by no means convinced that industrialism will be a boon to China, or can ever be anything but a misfortune to any country, but if, as I believe, industrial development is in any case inevitable, it is a mere waste of time to argue whether it is desirable or undesirable. The only problem of practical importance for you is the problem of developing industrialism with the minimum of attendant evils and the maximum of national and cultural advantage. All the Great Powers are anxious to secure a share in the exploitation of your resources, and unless you develop more national strength than you have hitherto shown, you will be unable to withstand aggressions fomented by foreign industrialists. I see that the American ex-Minister, Mr. Crane, has been advocating international control for China on the ground that the Chinese government cannot keep order, a prospect which grows not unnaturally out of the Consortium. There is much to be said for international control, not only in China but also in other countries. If England were subject to it, there would be an end of the reign of rapine and murder in Ireland. In America also Mr. Crane's proposal might be adopted with advantage. In that country there are constantly recurring Boxer risings—against the negroes. Under international control these risings might be put down by contingents of black troops drawn from all parts of Africa, and Fifth Avenue might be enlivened by memorial arches erected to the most prominent victims. International control of all nations must be the ultimate goal of all who wish to further the cessation of war which is only possible by substituting law for the present anarchy in relations between States. But international control, when it comes, must recognize the citizens of different states as equals, and not subject some of them to a despotism exerted by a league of certain others. No doubt the Chinese government is bad, but so are all other governments, and I doubt whether the Chinese government does as much harm as those of the Powers which were victors in the war. International control cannot, I am convinced, be a boon to China until the existence of a national State in China is fully assured, and until this State is strong enough to repel all attempts at exploitation by foreign capitalists backed by armies and warships. I think the most urgent need of China is the development of active patriotism, especially among those who, by their education, are the natural teachers of public opinion. Japanese aggression has begun to produce a movement of this kind, but something much more active, instinctive, and widespread is necessary if China is to be saved from subjugation. Your Empire subsisted for thousands of years without coming into contact with any really formidable enemies. Even the Tartars and Manchus who acquired dominion were few and made a comparatively small mark upon Chinese civilization. Consequently patriotism, which is chiefly evoked by the need of self-defence, plays little part in Chinese traditional morality. Its place was taken, more or less inadequately, by respect for the Emperor. And this substitute for patriotism has been destroyed since you became a Republic. Unfortunately you now for the first time in your history are faced with the danger of foreign aggression on the part of really formidable nations, and therefore the necessity of patriotism has become urgent. If your independence is to be preserved, it is necessary to transfer to the nation the kind of devotion which has hitherto been given to the family. The family is too narrow a group for modern needs, and a race which upholds the family as strongly as it is upheld in China, cannot develop that integrity and zeal in the public service without which no modern state can prosper. It would of course be absurd to hope that public spirit could in a short time be diffused among the bulk of the population, but this is by no means necessary for the beginning of regeneration. Ten thousand resolute men, inspired by an ideal and willing to risk their lives, could acquire control of the government, regenerate Chinese institutions, and institute an industrial development which should be free from the evils associated with capitalism in the West. Such men would have to be honest, energetic and intelligent, incapable of corruption, unwearying in work, willing to assimilate whatever is good in the West, and yet not the slaves of mechanism like most Europeans and Americans. The powers of evil in China are not strong; they only seem so because the opposition to them is too theoretical. There is one question which I find on the lips of almost all the thoughtful Chinese whom I have met and that is the question: 'How can we develop industry without at the same time developing capitalism and all its evils ?' This is a very difficult question, and I do not know whether you will in fact succeed in solving it. When I first came to China I thought it insoluble, but I am now of the opinion that if you could create such a band of resolute men as I have mentioned it would be possible to solve the problem. But it is useless in China to approach the economic problem directly; the political problem must be solved first. Until you have a strong and honest State, with able and incorruptible administration, you cannot institute any form of genuine socialism or communism. Suppose, for example, that your mines were now nominally nationalized; it is as clear as noon day that the profits to be derived from them would go to the Tuchuns and their armies, not to the people. Political reform must precede any desirable economic development in China. Political reform in China cannot for many years to come take the form of democracy after the Western model. Democracy presupposes a population that can read and write and that has some degree of knowledge as to political affairs. These conditions cannot be satisfied in China until at least a generation after the establishment of a government devoted to the public welfare. You will have to pass through a stage analogous to that of the dictatorship of the communist party in Russia, because it is only by some such means that the necessary education of the people can be carried through, and the non-capitalistic development of industry effected. The Russian Bolsheviks, as is natural to pioneers, have made many mistakes, more especially in the measures which antagonized the peasants. They are now, very wisely, repealing these measures, and those who follow them on the same road will be able to profit by their experience. When I was in Russia, I was much concerned with the Bolshevik attempt to introduce their methods and aims into Western countries. I believe this to be a quite useless attempt. Where there is already a developed industry and an educated proletariat, different methods must be adopted, and democracy must be preserved. But where, as in Russia and China, these conditions are absent, where there is a population which is neither educated nor accustomed to industrial processes, the methods adopted by the Russian
communists seem, in broad outline, the best possible. Various ways of organizing non capitalistic industry have been suggested by various schools. There is anarchist communism, where, as in ancient Poland and in the League of Nations, no decision can be taken unless it is unanimous. There is syndicalism, which is a kind of federation of trade unions; there is State Socialism, which is the system adopted in Russia; and there is Guild Socialism, which is a blend of syndicalism and State Socialism. Anarchist communism, syndicalism, and Guild Socialism all presuppose a developed industry and the habits of industrialism. They are therefore impossible as the first step towards socialism in an undeveloped country. The early developments of industry must—so it seems to me—be either capitalistic or state-socialistic. Accordingly, if I am confronted by the problem: 'How can China develop her industries without capitalism ?' I must reply: 'In the first instance only by State Socialism.' State Socialism has grave drawbacks, and in an undeveloped country reproduces many of the evils of capitalism. But I believe it is easier to pass from it to a better system, when industrial and educational progress makes it possible, than it is to eradicate capitalism when once it has acquired the hold it has in England and America. There is much that is not essential in the practice of the Bolsheviks, and in non-essentials I do not desire to see them imitated. The essential thing is the State ownership and exploitation of mines, railways, waterways, and all urban and industrial land. (Theoretically, agricultural land should also belong to the State, but this raises such difficulties with the peasants that in a country of small proprietors it is not politically feasible on any large scale.) If this system is to avoid the inequalities of wealth which are among the evils of capitalism, the officials who direct industry must not use their power, as capitalists do, to extort vast fortunes out of the workers. This requires a degree of self-denial which can only be secured by a great enthusiasm and a great devotion to an ideal. Further, if the system of State Socialism is not to remain a bureaucratic tyranny, those who carry it out must be imbued with the love of democracy and liberty, and must direct their efforts to the realization of these as soon as the people can be sufficiently educated. It is mainly in this that I think the Russian communist party open to criticism: a system which gives all power to the communist party seems to its members quite satisfactory, and they are in no hurry to pave the way for a greater freedom and a wider distribution of power. It is customary among communists to maintain that economic factors are the only ones of importance in the life of a community. This seems to me an entire delusion. I believe that ethical factors are at least as important. Consider the ethical qualities required of the men who are to bring about such an economic revolution in China as I have been suggesting. Such men, in the first place, will have to be intellectuals by training, but largely soldiers by profession. They will have to fight anarchic militarism within, and the whole might of capitalistic Powers without. What this means can be seen from what Russia has had to endure from the hostility of reactionary governments. In the course of the fighting, many will lose their lives, and all will have to endure hardships and the persecution of mankind. Assuming the victory won, the victors will be in a position to secure wealth and a long term of power for themselves; but they will have to forego wealth and prepare for the abolition of their power in favour of a more democratic system at the earliest possible moment. To pursue this course steadfastly to the end requires ethical qualities of the highest order. Especially rare is the willingness to abrogate power secured after a bitter struggle. The great difficulty of the Bolshevik method of introducing Socialism lies in the severity of its ethical demands. The Russian Bolsheviks seem, on the whole, successful in resisting the temptation to wealth, but likely to succumb to the temptation to prolongation of their power. All their talk against democracy and in favour of the dictatorship of what they call the proletariat is, in essence, merely camouflage for their love of power. In China, so far as I have been able to observe the national character, one might expect the opposite failure, because the love of money seems to be stronger than the love of power. The love of money is, I think, the greatest danger you will have to combat if you attempt a non-capitalistic development of industry. The ethical difficulties of the line of action I have been suggesting are so great that I cannot feel any confidence in its practicability. China is ruled at present by a set of Tuchuns whose dominant passion is money. You can only defeat them if you love the welfare of China more passionately and more energetically than they love money. This is a high standard, but what I have seen of Young China makes me not despair of its attainment. If you cannot realize a moral and economic revolution, the alternative is a gradually increasing foreign control, perhaps leaving China's nominal sovereignty intact, but securing all real power to foreigners through possession of economic resources. Such a system would produce a growth of industrial capitalism, and the training of a population accustomed to industrial work—at first only in its lower grades, but later on probably in higher grades also. This process might lead after about a century to a movement for national liberation. But the movement would find success just as difficult then as now, and a century would have been wasted. Meanwhile the habits of capitalism would have been acquired, and would probably prevent the establishment of socialism even if national independence were achieved. From every point of view, therefore, a vigorous movement in the near future is infinitely preferable to the policy of drifting while foreign nations act. Industry and the economic side of life have been thought of in the West too much as the ends of existence. They are not ends, but mere means to a good life. The ideal to be aimed at is a community where industry is the servant of man, not his master; where there is sufficiency and leisure for all; where economic aims are not dominant; where leisure is used for art and science and friendship, instead of being sacrificed to the production of an excess of commodities. China has many of the qualities required for realizing this ideal, particularly the artistic sense and the capacity for civilized enjoyment without which leisure has little value. These qualities make it possible to hope that China may lead the world in the next stage of development, and give back to the restless West something of that inner calm without which we must perish in frantic madness. In this way not only China, but the whole world, may be regenerated by your achievements.
41 1921.07.07 Farewell party for Bertrand Russell in Beijing.
42 1921.07.11 Bertrand Russell and Dora Black Russell left Beijing.
43 1921.07.24 Russell, Bertrand. To the Editor of The Japan Chronicle, Tokyo, 24. July (1921). In : The Japan Chronicle ; 26. July (1921).
Sir, In your issue of July 24th there is a leaderette with whose general scope I am in agreement, but ending in a suggestion which seems to me misleading and not wholly just, to the effect that 'Professor Dewey… is not a good authority or an unprejudiced witness'. I do not know that any one of us could claim to be an unprejudiced witness where national bias enters in. I have myself struggled against the distorting influence of nationalism on my own thoughts for many years, yet I am still conscious of being by no means unprejudiced in an issue between Britain and a foreign country. Doubtless Professor Dewey also may be described – along with the rest of the human race – as a prejudiced witness in this sense, but in this sense only. He favours the Consortium. I do not. He sees in the extension of America's influence on China the best hope of China's regeneration. I do not. But these are very difficult questions in regard to which either opinion may be held rationally.
As to the statement that Professor Dewey 'is not a good authority', he has been in Canton and seen the leading men, and is, no doubt, repeating what they told him. Nor is he the only authority for the statement in question, which is repeated with more detail by Mr. Philip Haddon in the 'Review of the Far East' for July 16th. And certainly some explanation has to be sought for the extreme hostility of Hongkong to the Government of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The favour shown to that Government by the Americans also needs explanation, which, I hope, will be provided by some American as 'unpatriotic' as myself.
44 1921.11.03 Russell, Bertrand. China and the powers. In : Foreign affairs ; 3. Nov. (1921).
China is by far the most important part of the earth's surface still unexploited and subject to a weak government. The Great Powers are determined to develop China, and the Washington Conference, if it succeeds, is to decide how the proceeds are to be shared. China has an ancient and valuable civilization, with a way of life far more humane than that of the white man ; this is to be destroyed. China wishes to develop her own industry, but not on the lines of private capitalism ; this must be prevented.
Four Powers are specially concerned with Chinese affairs : Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia. Let us leave Russia on one side for the moment. Japan is more hated in China than any other Power ; we come next, as the allies of Japan, the possessors of Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei (the latter in explicit contravention of our treaty rights), and the aggressors in China's first wars with modern nations. The interests of the English and Americans in China are, however, more capable of adjustment than either with the Japanese, because both desire commercial, financial, and industrial advantages, while the Japanese desire territory to live in. The Japanese therefore, wherever they acquire a secure hold, will keep the exploitation to themselves, even if the open door is nominally safeguarded by treaty.
There are two ways of sharing Chinese loot ; one is that of spheres of influence, the other that of the Consortium, according to which the whole of China is to be exploited jointly. The Americans, who claim a monopoly of high moral sentiment, consider the latter method morally preferable, presumably because it gives a prospect of opening to their enterprise regions now monopolized by the Japanese. Wherever the can, however, the Americans secure monopolies for themselves. They negotiated in Peking a wireless monopoly, and were indignant when they discovered that the Chinese (with their usual sly fun) had granted the same monopoly simultaneously to the Japanese. Liberal Americans, from Professor Dewey downward, have denounced us, very justly, for the iniquitous Cassel agreement with the former Canton Government ; but not one of them, so far as I know, has so much as mentioned the at least equally iniquitous Shank Agreement [negotiated by George H. Shank, gives a twenty years' monopoly to America of all the industrial resources of Guangdong] concluded by the Americans with the present Canton Government. American Liberalism is in the Palmerstonian phase, able to see the faults of all other nations, but blind to its own, at any rate in international affairs. The fact is, of course, that all capitalist nations are equally vile in their dealings with China. The notion that some are better and others worse is merely a nationalist delusion.
The situation to be dealt with by the Washington Conference may be regarded from two points of view : first, that of China's welfare ; secondly, that of the preservation of peace among the Great Powers. I do not know whether the Americans desire the latter, or trust to Japanese mistakes to give them a moral pretext for war while securing our neutrality. Japan is in a mood like that of Germany before the war, and America is in a mood very like that of England before the war. The Japanese are hysterical and terrified, not realizing how imperialistic they are, feeling that nothing they can do will enable them to escape war with America, that when that happens we shall desert them, and that only vigorous military and naval preparation can preserve their independence. The Americans, on the other hand, believe that their own intentions are wholly virtuous, and that Japan's fears must be hypocritical. A little self-knowledge on both sides would solve the difficulty, but neither side has any. Japan has a surplus population and wants territory for emigration. America and the British dominions being closed, it is natural to turn to the mainland of Asia. There is room for a great increase of population in Manchuria, but hitherto the immigration there has been almost wholly Chinese. And this Chinese immigration must be restricted if there is to be room for the Japanese, which is impossible by any measures which America is likely to tolerate.
Meanwhile there is the Far Eastern Republic which, being in effect Bolshevik, is the enemy of mankind, i.e. of big finance everywhere. Neither it nor Russia is to be represented at Washington ; therefore we may presume that the Japanese are to be bought off, if possible, by permission to wage a holy war in Eastern Siberia. Clearly the easiest way to secure peace among the imperialist Powers is at the expense of Russia. Meanwhile Russia has her own new-style imperialism on the borders of China, having recently conquered and Bolshevized Mongolia, formerly part of the Chinese empire. Russia has, of course, the ardent sympathy of all the young advanced people in China, and is the only Great Power having access to China by land. The Japanese in Vladivostok (which is part of the Far Eastern Republic) are perpetually intriguing against the Chita Government, and war between the two has often seemed imminent. But for American hatred of Bolshevism, it would be natural for America to support Chita [capital of Far Eastern Republic] against Tokyo, but self-determination has its limits, and does not operate in favour of people who determine to be Communists. Therefore it is probable that, if the Washington Conference succeeds in reaching an agreement, America will allow Japan a free hand against the Far Eastern Republic, which, of course, involves a war between Japan and Soviet Russia.
Thus from the point of view of the interests of China, the Far Eastern Republic, and Soviet Russia, it is to be hoped that the Washington Conference will fail. But if it fails, there is the certainty of a great increase in naval armaments, the probability of a long war between American and Japan, leading to the complete destruction of the Japanese civilization, and the by no means remote probability of a war between America and Great Britain, involving our downfall and the death by starvation of half our population. Whether the brigands agree or disagree when they assemble at Washington, the outlook is equally gloomy for the world. It is possible that before all these evils are realized some spark of humanity, justice, or even common prudence may enter into the policies of great nations ? I doubt is ; yet there seems no other hope for humanity during the next few centuries.
45 1921.11.10 Russell, Bertrand. The future of China. In : The Labour News ; 10. Nov. (1921).
Progressive China undoubtedly has great hopes of the Washington Conference. Hitherto, in all dealings with foreign Powers, America alone has been found friendly. As everyone knows, the American share of the Boxer indemnity has been spent in education Chinese students, both in China and in America. This was in itself a friendly act, and had the result that a large majority of young educated Chinese have an American outlook. Our Government, very shortsightedly, has not yet seen its way to a similar restitution.
Another great cause of Chinese friendship for America is the fact that America has always opposed Japanese aggression, and has, alone among Great Powers, shown no desire to acquire t4erritory on the mainland of Asia, or even concessions in the Treaty Ports. American ambitions in China are commercial and industrial, not territorial. And in addition to education, the Americans have done much good work in the way of hospitals, famine relief, etc.
The ambitions of the Japanese are not merely capitalistic, they are also militaristic and imperial. It is true that the Japanese desire raw materials for their industry, which are to be had in China but not in Japan. This desire, however, if it stood alone, would be capable of gratification without infringing the principle of the Open Door. What makes the Japanese desire more than the Americans claim in China is the love of empire, the desire for might based on armaments which led Germany to disaster. The Japanese expected Germany to win the war, and are still inclined to adopt pre-war Germany as their model.
There is in Japan a Socialist and Labour Party on European lines, and among its leaders are some of the finest men I have ever met. But they have no influence on Japanese policy, and cannot hope to have while only about four per cent of the population are industrial. Even moderate Liberalism has little practical influence, because the Army and Navy are directly responsible to the Mikado, and not in any degree subject to Parliament or the Cabinet, or even the Prime Minister. Thus the extreme militarists have a free hand.
During the last quarter of a century, the Japanese have acquired Korea, Manchuria, and Shantung, in each case with the help of Great Britain. Korea was only loosely connected with China by a traditional protectorate, and although the sufferings of Koreans at the hands of Japan have been very great, Korea is hardly a Chinese question. Manchuria, on the other hand, concerns China vitally.
The Manchu conquerors came from there in the seventeenth century, and from there it is easy still to exercise military domination over Peking. There is in Manchuria, under Japanese protection and influence, a Chinese reactionary viceroy, who is often able to overawe the Peking politicians and compel them to adopt a pro-Japanese policy. In this way all China north of the Yangtse is more or less terrorized.
And civil discord is kept alive by skilful loans from the Japanese to all parties in the strife of rival generals. So long as Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway remain subject to Japanese military control, it is not easy to see how this situation can be altered except for the worse.
The question of Shantung is, however, of still greater importance if China is to be saved from foreign domination. Shantung is as intimately Chinese as Kent is English ; the situation now is about what ours would have been if the Germans had held Dover and Folkestone and the South-Eastern Railway up to Sevenoaks.
Shantung interests the Chinese sentimentally, because it contains the birth-place of Confucius, and materially, because it has considerable wealth, which the Japanese are using for the subjugation of China. The Japanese announced in 1914 that they were attacking the Germans in Shantung with a view to restoring Germany's possessions to China, but they concluded secret treaties with England and France stipulating that they were to retain all they conquered from Germany.
These secret treaties were used to defeat President Wilson at Versailles. We forced China into the war as our ally, and rewarded her by robbing her of one of her richest provinces. And on account of the secret treaties, our emissaries at Washington will probably feel bound to support Japan in any resistance to restitution.
Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that the Shantung question may be satisfactorily dealt with at Washington, if the Powers succeed in reaching any agreement. America is not bound by the Treaty of Versailles, owing to the Senate's refusal to ratify ; and unless our support of Japan is more vigorous than it seems likely to be, fear of America may make the Japanese conciliatory to China, as it has made us to Sinn Fein.
If this should happen, however, it is by no means improbable that the Japanese will demand and obtain compensation in Siberia at the expense of the semi-Bolshevik Far-Eastern Republic.
It is not only by support of the Japanese that British diplomacy in China has been harmful. It has been almost invariably reactionary, supporting everything conservative against Young China, showing no understanding of the country's needs or desire for its regeneration.
A mere change of alliances without a change of outlook would not remedy our defects as regards China. So long as our diplomatic service remains what it is, every question not in the forefront of public interest will be decided by our diplomatists in an anti-progressive fashion. For example, when Yuan-shi-kai, in the early days of the Chinese Republic, was endeavouring to acquire arbitrary power without control from the newly-constituted Parliament, we hastened to conclude a loan which rendered him financially independent.
For the moment, America may prove useful to China, and Japan is certainly harmful. But in the long run China cannot be saved except by the Chinese. American imperialism is economic, not territorial ; but if it were firmly established it would involve a terrible suppression of liberty. It would soon be found, for example, that educated Chinese inclined to Socialism (as most of them are) would be unable to get employment.
The Chinese civilization, which is pacific and non-industrial, which cares more about beauty and truth than about railways or dividends, would be ruthlessly destroyed by apostles of 'pep'. The weakness of China in international affairs is due quite as much to Chinese virtues as to Chinese vices.
The Chinese have not that insane thirst for power and ruthless activity which characterizes the West, and especially America ; they were horrified by the war, far more than any European neutral. It is useless to hope that we shall acquire the Chinese virtues ; therefore, very patriotic Chinaman must endeavor to acquire our vices.
46 1921.11.24 Russell, Bertrand. A plea for China : her independence chief question. In : The Sun ; 24. Nov. (1921).
The great thing to be desired is the independence of China with help from friendly powers in quelling anarchy. I should rejoice greatly if Great Britain led the way in restitution by resoring Hongkong and Wei-Hai Wei. The latter is possible, the former I fear is not.
The Japanese must evacuate Shantung unconditionally. There can be no question about that. If this is not brought about the Washington Conference will fail as regards China.
China joined us in war and was rewarded by the loss of one of her best provinces. The former German position in Shantung was absolutely indefensible, but the Japanese claim even more than the Germans had. My sincere hope is that Britain will not support Japan at Washington in her Chinese contentions.
The proposed joint control of the Shantung railroads is not sound. It means, in practice, Japanese control. There is no doubt of that. It is vital that there should be exclusive Chinese control.
There is nothing in the Japanese pretence of a Pan-Asiatic movement. The feeling of antagonism upon the part of the Chinese is much more against the Japanese than any other foreigner. The Japanese position in Manchuria is a menace to Peking and prevents any genuine independence of the Chinese Government. The Chinese forces in Manchuria are compelled to serve Japan.
The Japanese control of the Chinese Eastern Railway prevents through traffic to the Siberian Railway which the Far East republic desires. This makes the journey to Europe six weeks in length, instead of fourteen days. Chinese independence requires control of all its railways. It also means autonomy as regards tariff, which now is fixed by treaties with thirteen States and requires unanimous consent of the thirteen before any alteration can be made.
One difficulty that faces China is honest administration. That has been solved in the customs service by employing foreigners appointed by China. This system is good in time of transition and might be extended with a time limit.
Military anarchy must be stopped, the Canton Government should be recognized on the condition of federal union with North China, provincial autonomy is necessary, private armies should be disbanded and private occupations found for the soldiers. All this should be offered China with a reconstruction loan and a restitution of stolen territory and abandonment of monopoly rights.
The reconstruction scheme could be drawn up in consultation with leading Chinese, excluding the military. The adoption of general principles only is possible at the Washington Conference. The details will require time.
The dangers to this programme are, of course, certain Japanese opposition. America wants Japan's consent to the naval programme. Perhaps Japan will consent only if allowed to keep all she has in China. The Washington Conference might easily lead to war if Japan is obstinate. I earnestly hope she will not be, both for the sake of Japan as well as of China. It is vitally important that England should not encourage Japan, first, because American friendship is necessary to us ; second, because the American policy in China is better than ours and better than Japan's ; third, because this is the last moment when Japan can avoid disaster my moderation.
If Japan does not moderate her demands she will sooner or later be smashed by America. I do not desire this. I hate war and wish the peaceful development of Japan.
The open door consortium and so forth are not enough for China. They only give the foreign nations equality in exploitation and do not give freedom to China. China should be allowed freedom for development even if it is slow.
The progress of modern education will make China a different country twenty years hence. China ultimately will be invincible and it will be disastrous if foreigners take temporary advantage of her present weakness. The Chinese civilization is quite as good as ours. We must not imagine ourselves as missionaries of a higher culture. The Chinese are more patient, philosophic, pacific, artistic and are only less efficient in killing. Why force them to learn this from us ?
It is a pity Russia is not represented at Washington. She has been and will be a great pacific power. She can dominate China from the north and already holds outer Mongolia. There is likely to be a conflict between Russia and Japan before long. I hope Japan will not be compensated in Eastern Siberia without Russian participation, as no such agreement will give China security.
Japan will not voluntarily adopt a generous policy towards China. She must be coerced. If England supports America diplomatic pressure will suffice. If not, there is a great danger of war between American and Japan soon or late. The British in the Far East are almost unanimous against the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The time for its usefulness is gone. A generous policy towards China is best for our interests as well as theirs. China's immense potential market requires a better government and foreign friendship for development.
Japan wants raw material for her industries and could get them with the 'open door'. She also wants territory for the glory of the empire. She must be thwarted in this. She does not want more territory for colonizing, as few go to Manchuria, Korea or Formosa. In Manchuria there are 100 Chinese immigrants to one Japanese. The Chinese are stronger in the long run because they are more patient, more populous, less ambitious and also are more genuinely civilized in their mental outlook.
The limitation of naval armament also is very important. I rejoice at the prospect of the Hughes plan being adopted. But the freedom of China is even important. The Chinese are one-fourth of the human race and the most ancient civilization now existing. It is different from ours, but it makes the Chinese happy. They are one of the happiest peoples on earth. All advanced nations are greedy for China's industrial resources. American capitalists are like the others, although the American Government is blameless. The Chinese mentality is not yet adapted to modern industrial methods, but perhaps in time they will develop better methods than ours.
The Chinese want to learn our science, which they think is good, but not our ruthlessness, our purposeless bustle or our indifference to individuals. Their civilization is gentler than ours, less persecuting and will remain so if they are not too much bullied. If forced to adopt our vices, they will become the strongest nation in the world, but lose those qualities which make them worth preserving.
The Washington Conference is the turning point in the world's history. If China is liberated she will develop freely and do great things towards founding a new civilization better than ours. If coerced, she ultimately will achieve freedom through war, then become imperialistic and be as bad as her present oppressors. All that is liberal in the world looks to America at this moment. Can America save other powers from their own egoistic follies ? And if so, will America in the long run escape similar follies on her own account ? The future of civilization depends upon the answer to these questions.
47 1921.11.29 Russell, Bertrand. China and Chinese influence. In : The Manchester Guardian ; 29. Nov. (1921).
There are many Europeans who view China simply as a diplomatic question, which the Powers must settle if they are not to fight. To such people, China seems analogous in this generation to Africa thirty or forty years ago. This analogy is profoundly misleading to all whom it influences. Africa is a continent of many races and many religions, with no indigenous civilization except to some slight extent along the Mediterranean. China is homogeneous (broadly speaking) in race and culture ; a great empire which has subsisted for thousands of years, and which is a definitely a civilizing influence in the Far East as ancient Greece was in Europe. The nearest analogue to present-day China is Rome at the time of the barbarian invasion. The Chinese Empire has been, until very recently, much greater in extent than the Roman Empire, and is still much greater in population. Its first philosopher, Lâo-tsze, who lived in the sixth century B.C., laments the hurry of modern life and the loss of that simplicity which was practiced by 'the pure men of old'. From his day to our own, China has been a highly civilized country in all that concerns art and literature, manners and government. For 2'000 years, officials have been chosen by competitive examination, and have had all the characteristics which that method of selection would lead one to expect.
Those who would see in its true perspective what is happening in China must learn to regard themselves as the analogues of the Chilperics, Theodorics, and Attilas who swooped down upon the Roman Empire when it had grown too civilized to fight. Where we differ from these worthies, we differ for the worse, since they at least revered the majesty of Rome even in decay, while we have no sense of the historical greatness of China, because our conventional culture still considers that no country is spiritually important unless it is near the Mediterranean. Those who destroyed Rome politically nevertheless allowed something of Roman culture to be transmitted to future ages ; but the armies which attack China from without and the missionaries and merchants who undermine Chinese civilization from within have no idea that there is anything of value to be preserved in a country which is bad at making munitions and a bit too provident in the use of soap. So long as this ignorance persists, it is impossible to understand the Chinese question.
The question 'What is China ?' which is being asked in bewilderment by those who would wish to help the Chinese, can be answered only by some understanding of the historical position of the Celestial Empire. The Chinese first appear in history along the banks of the Yellow River, a fierce unnavigable stream, constantly in flood and occasionally changing its course, spreading fertility and devastation by turns, tempting men to cultivation of the alluvial soil, and then drowning them by the hundred thousand. The earliest annals of China are concerned with attempts to curb the inundations of the Yellow River. In the time of Confucius, China was still confined to this region, embracing roughly the provinces of Shansi, Chili, and part of Shantung. The so-called First Emperor (ca. 200 B.C.) extended the empire to the Yangtze, while his successors of the Han dynasty conquered the south almost up to the boundaries of present-day China before the beginning of the Christian era. The empire of the Han dynasty, with a few additions, constitutes China proper in the narrowest sense, excluding Manchuria, consists of eighteen provinces, extending from Peichi-li (containing Peking) in the north of Kwang-tung (containing Canton) in the south, and from Shantung (containing the birthplace of Confucius) in the east to Sze-chwan on the borders of Tibet in the west.
The four hundred millions who are said to constitute the population of China are mainly concentrated in China proper, which is densely populated while its dependencies are but sparsely settled. There has never been an accurate census in China, but it is probably safe to assume that the number of inhabitants of China proper is between three and four hundred millions. Almost the whole of this area has had for 2'000 years a uniform administration, a uniform culture, a uniform written language, education, literature, and art. The spoken language differs greatly in different places – about as much as French differs from Italian – but owing to the non-phonetic character of the Chinese script, there is no corresponding difference in the written language. Educated people speak what is called the 'Mandarin language', which is approximately the dialect of Peking ; but knowledge of the Mandarin is by no means universal even among the most cultivated. There is strong provincial patriotism, sufficiently strong to make a federal constitution desirable ; but as against the foreigner the Chinese feel themselves very definitely one nation.
Outside China proper there are vast areas loosely connected with China. Burma, Annam, Korea and Japan all at one time or another acknowledged the suzerainty of China. (As regards Japan, the facts are briefly set forth in Putnam Weale's 'The truth about China and Japan', pp. 16-19.) From China the Japanese adopted their writing, art, and religion, and, broadly speaking, whatever civilization they had before 1868. Political relations with these countries, however, were at most times slight. Much closer and more interesting were the relations with Tibet and Mongolia. Buddhism, the one important foreign element in Chinese civilization, has, as everyone knows, a northern and a southern form, with Lhassa as the religious headquarters of the northern branch. Tibet and Mongolia are almost identical in matters of religion ; they both have Lamas, who hold all the power in Tibet and most of it in Mongolia. Both are fanatically religious. At times when the belief in Buddhism was increasing in China, the Lamas acquired considerable favour ; thus Lamaism has been an influence on China, as well as China on Lamaism. But the usual temperament of the Chinese educated classes is skeptical, polished and literary, more inclined to make epigrams about a religion than to believe it. The Mongolians are at a very much lower level of culture than the Chinese, being largely nomads and almost all sunk in superstition. There is in Peking a Lama temple, where Tibetan and Mongolian religious pictures and statues can be seen. They are dark and terrible, altogether unlike the gay, cheerful art of Chinese temples. One feels at once the hot breath of barbarian fierceness, the sort of spirit that one associates with the name of Attila. Moreover, the Mongolians have a strong though intermitted anti-Chinese nationalism ; they remember that Jenghis Khan was of their race, and they cherish the hope that some day they will repeat his conquest of China. They are described with affectionate humour by the Jesuit missionary M. Huc, whose 'Souvernirs d'un voyage dans la Tartarie et le Thibet pendant les années 1844, 1845, et 1846' is one of the most delightful books with which I am acquainted.
Mongolia is not really part of China, and in losing it the Chinese lose what they have always held by conquest only. It is divided into two parts, inner and outer, of which the former is more or less under Japanese control, while the latter has had, during the last twelve months, a series of adventures typical of the confusions existing in that part of the world. I must beg the reader not to disbelieve in these adventures merely because they sound romantic.
Soon after I arrived in Peking, the newspapers there were full of the new that Urga, an important town of Outer Mongolia, had been attacked by a certain leader of Russian White troops named Baron Ungern. The Chinese garrison resisted, but was overpowered. The Japanese were understood to be, as usual, supporting the Russian reactionaries. The Chinese refugees appealed to Peking, which paid Chang-tso-lin, Viceroy of Manchuria, several million tales to undertake the reconquest of Mongolia. Unfortunately, however, he lost the whole sum within a few days by gambling, and was forced to retire in Mukden to economize. Meanwhile the Mongolians, in alliance with the reactionary Russians, had started a religious and nationalistic revival, under the leadership of the Chief Lama of Urga, a living Buddha commonly known as the Hu-tuk-tu, although in fact are many other Hu-tuk-tus. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic (which is in effect Bolshevik) made many offers to the Chinese to help in expelling Ungern from Chinese territory, but Peking refused their help, from fear of offending the Powers, especially the Japanese.
Unfortunately for the Hu-tuk-tu, however, he had a wife. Living Buddhas used to be vowed to celibacy, but the Chinese Government, on rationalist grounds, issued orders, many years ago, that they were all to marry. They obeyed ; like the curate in the 'Bab Ballads', they 'did it on compulsion'. The Hu-tuk-tu was therefore married, and, what was more, his wife was (if report spoke true) a Bolshevik. As he was invariably drunk, she acquired control of policy. Accordingly – so a least the correspondent of the 'Times' in Peking reports – the Bolsheviks descended on Urga, captured Baron Ungern, sent him to Moscow, exhibiting him at every station as a monster, plied the Hu-tuk-tu with all the liquor he desired, declaring that when he dies of 'delirium tremens' he is to have no successors, and explained to the nomads and bandits that they were permitted by the doctrines of communism to take to themselves the flocks and herds hitherto belonging to the Mongolian Princes. Consequently Outer Mongolia, which is about half the size of India, is now part of the Bolshevik Empire and a firm believer in the religion of Karl Marx.
48 1921.11.30 Russell, Bertrand. The problem of China. In : The Manchester Guardian ; 30. Nov. (1921).
With the exception of America, all the Powers have a thoroughly discreditable record in China. But although the first and worst crime was ours (the Opium War of 1840), the chief offender at the present day is Japan, not because of any special depravity (Japan has merely been copying Christian morals), but because of propinquity and freedom from preoccupation with the war. It is a mistake to suppose that one nation is better or worse than another ; they merely differ as to the direction taken by their criminal tendencies. Americans vent their brutality on negroes and socialists, and their subtlety on business rivals, while the Japanese are brutal to the Koreans and subtle in their diplomacy ; neither side has any ethical superiority. I wish to emphasize this point, because I am firmly convinced that the belief in the moral superiority or inferiority of one nation to another is thoroughly mischievous, and a source of much futility in the efforts of reformers.
The two regions which the Japanese are specially engaged in absorbing are Manchuria and Shantung. Manchuria is not part of China proper, but is much more intimately related to China than Mongolia is. One might compare Manchuria to the Highlands of Scotland and Mongolia to Ireland ; the analogy must not be pressed, but will serve to give a rough idea.
As everyone knows, the Manchus differ from the Chinese in race, and originally in language ; they were a warlike northern tribe who conquered the Chinese throne in 1644, and retained it until the revolution of 1911. But in the meantime they had adopted the Chinese language and many Chinese customs ; immense numbers of Chinese settled in Manchuria, and are continuing to do so. Ever since 1644, Manchuria has been administered as an integral part of China, except in so far as foreigners have interfered. From the point of view of sentiment, language, customs, and even population (on account of immigration), Manchuria must now be reckoned as thoroughly Chinese. The Russians acquired Port Arthur and the railway rights as a reward for befriending China after the Sin-Japanese war of 1894-95 ; the Japanese acquired Port Arthur and the Russian rights in South Manchuria by their war against Russia in 1904-05, while they replaced Russia throughout the rest of Manchuria after the Bolshevik revolution – of course with the tacit approval of the Powers, as the champions of civilization against the Red Spectre. The Chinese still have the nominal sovereignty and the civil administration, but the Japanese have Port Arthur, the railway, control of all the industrial undertakings, the right to military occupation, and in short everything worth having.
Chang-tso-lin, the Chinese viceroy, has a Chinese army, and is nominally subject to Peking. But in fact whatever energy he can spare from serving his own ends has to be devoted to the interests of the Japanese, upon whom he is utterly dependent. He and his army are a constant menace to the Peking Government, upon which he descends from time to time to levy blackmail. (He was originally a bandit, and is now a government servant.) If the Peking Government did anything annoying to Japan, Chang-tso-lin's army could be used to cause repentance, without Japan's appearing in the business. So long as Japan retains her exclusive position in Manchuria, this situation is difficult to avoid unless the Chinese develop a strong patriotic army. It may be said : How can Chang-tso-lin get an army of Chinese to work against China ? One might as well ask : How can governments get armies of proletarians to shoot down strikers ? The answer is the same in both cases : ignorance. But there is a further factor in China. The immense majority of Chinese are peaceful and law-abiding ; the armies are a very small proportion of the population. Soldiers are despised, and are largely criminals and bandits. Does anyone doubt that if we went round the German prisons we should find men willing to 'maintain order' in return for liberty and pay ?
The question of Manchuria must be dealt with if China is to have any real independence. Except in the southern corner, the claims of Japan have never, so far as I know, been formally recognized by the Powers. Certainly America has never assented to them. It would probably be impossible to get the Japanese out of Port Arthur without a first-class war, which I fear is in any case very probable sooner or later. But outside Port Arthur and its neighbourhood, perhaps the Open Door and the rights of China could be insisted upon, and Japanese military occupation could be prevented. I doubt, however, whether, short of war, a virtual Japanese protectorate over Manchuria is now avoidable, until China becomes strong enough to fight her own battles. And the question of Manchuria, important as it is, is certainly not worth a first-class war.
Shantung is at once a more vital and a more hopeful question. The Washington Conference will have failed hopelessly as regards China if it does not secure the complete evacuation of Shantung by the Japanese and of Wei-hai-wei by ourselves. To begin with the latter : The lease of Wei-hai-wei to the British provides that we are to hold it as long as the Russians hold Port Arthur. The Russians lost Port Arthur sixteen years ago, but we still hold Wei-hai-wei. To all Chinese protests, we reply that the Japanese are just as bad as the Russians, implying that, in spite of the alliance, we regard a war with Japan as by no means improbable. We thus simultaneously display bad faith to the Chinese and show the Japanese how little we believe in the alliance. Our delegation at Washington ought at once to announce the unconditional return of Wei-hai-wei to the Chinese. We should then be in a better position to join America in insisting upon the Japanese restitution of Kiao-chow.
The history of Kiao-chow is briefly as follows : In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung, and the Germans made this an excuse for seizing the port of Tsingtau, and extracting by force from the Chinese a treaty which gave them (1) the right to use Tsingtau as a naval base ; (2) a lease of Kiao-chow for ninety-nine years ; (3) the right to construct certain railways and have a controlling interest in them ; (4) preference for German firms as regards all industrial undertakings in Shantung. (Shantung is a province, Kia-cho Bay a district in Shantung, and Tsingtau a harbor in Kiao-chow Bay. The text of the Sino-German Treaty of 1898 is given in George Gleason's 'What shall I think of Japan ? Appendix to Chap. IV). In 1914, the Chinese were willing to join the Allies and undertake, with Allied help, the reconquest of Kiao-chow ; but this did not suit the Japanese, who kept China neutral (till 1917), and themselves presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the cession of all that the Germans possessed in Kiao-chow 'with a view of eventual restoration of the same to China'. In 1915, after the Japanese had succeeded, Notes were interchanged between China and Japan, stipulating that 'when, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiao-chow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China' under certain conditions. In 1917, secret agreements were concluded by Japan with France and England, whereby those Powers undertook to support Japan's claims in Shantung at the Peace Conference. By the Versailles Treaty, 'Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, title and privileges' acquired by the treaty of 1898. This might be taken as an epitome of the Versailles Treaty : whatever iniquity Germany had committed in the past is henceforth to be committed by the Allies.
Fortunately, America is not a signatory of the Versailles Treaty, and is free to raise the Shantung question at Washington. The Japanese have lately been making efforts to secure a direct settlement with China, so as to prevent the raising of the question at Washington ; but the Chinese, very wisely, have rejected the Japanese proposals as containing merely illusory concessions, and have firmly demanded the unconditional retrocession of all the rights acquired by Germany in 1898, as well as those extensions subsequently acquired by Japan. In this America will no doubt support them, and I earnestly hope that we shall not support Japan.
49 1921.12.01 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Gilbert Seldes, editor of The Dial. In : vol. 71, no 6 (Dec. 1921).
Your letter of October 6 reached me in Peking, and before I had time to answer it I began to die. I have now finished with this occupation, although the Japanese journalists first announced my death and then tried to make the announcement true by mobbing me as I passed through Japan when I was convalescent.
50 1921.12.02 Russell, Bertrand. Is Chinese independence possible ? In : The Manchester Guardian ; 2. Dez. (1921).
It is common form for every Power to profess a desire for the integrity and independence of China. To preserve these is one of the purposes of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and as regards this purpose the Alliance has succeeded admirably, having enabled Japan to absorb Manchuria and Shantung and establish a virtual protectorate over North China as a result of the twenty-one demands presented by Japan to China in 1915. (For the text of these demands, in their original and revised forms, see George Gleason, 'What shall I think of Japan' p. 80ff.) The uninitiated require a dictionary in reading diplomatic documents. When A and B guarantee the independence and integrity of C, that means that they have agreed how C is to be partitioned. For example, England and France made a treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Morocco, with secret articles specifying the parts of Morocco which were to belong to France and Spain respectively. Ignorant people regarded the published articles as deceitful when the secret articles became known ; but those who understand the language of diplomacy could have inferred the secret articles from those which were published.
Accordingly the Chinese were justly alarmed when they learned that the Preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance mentions 'the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China' as one of the objects which the Alliance had in view. One of the most obviously legitimate of China's demands at Washington is that no treaties mentioning China shall be concluded without Chinese participation. We should certainly be surprised if we found that France and Italy had agreed to preserve the independence and integrity of Great Britain, especially if we had reason to think that France was going to preserve them in England and Italy in Scotland. Such agreements are an infringement of sovereignty, and are never concluded except as a prelude to interference.
I have considered the integrity of China in connection with Manchuria and Shantung ; I wish now to consider its independence. Apart from the military influence of Japan, all the powers except America have acquired rights which gravely limit the autonomy of China, and it is not easy to see how these rights are to be abrogated.
We may take as typical the question of the Chinese Customs. On this subject there is in 'The Times' of November 26 a leading article which is amazingly misleading, the writer of which (for the sake of his moral character) I presume to be profoundly ignorant. The facts are as follows : By the treaty of 1842, we stipulated with the Chinese that they were to impose a uniform duty of five per cent on all imports. By the treaty of 1858, it was agreed that this duty should be reckoned on a schedule of prices to be revised every ten years. It was, however, only revised twice, in 1901 and 1918, and on the latter occasion current prices were rejected as being inflated by the war, and the average prices of 1913-1916 were taken as the basis of the new schedule. In virtue of commercial treaties involving most-favoured-clauses, no alteration in tariff or schedule is possible without the unanimous consent of thirteen foreign Powers. Meanwhile the Customs receipts, while remaining essential for China's revenue, have become the security for the Boxer indemnity and for many loans. China is allowed by treaty to levy an export duty of not more than five per cent, and is compelled to do so, in spite of the bad effect on Chinese trade, because otherwise it would be impossible to raise sufficient revenue. It is obvious that this system constitutes at once a grave interference with Chinese independence and a serious drawback to Chinese industry, because all imports are charged at the same rate, whether they are raw materials or finished articles, necessaries or luxuries.
Quite distinct from this system, though also regulated by treaty, is the administration of the Customs. Ever since 1842, the collection of the duties has been under the control of foreigners. The system now in force for many years is that there is an Inspector-General, appointed by the Chinese Government, but bound by treaty to be British so long as the British Empire has a greater share of Chinese trade than any other Power. The Inspector-General has the appointment of his subordinates, and gives the higher posts to foreigners. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have figures) there were in the Customs administration 2'000 foreigners and 5'000 Chinese. The foreigners, from the inspector-General downwards, are responsible to China, not to their own governments. Sir Robert Hart, for many years Inspector-General, won universal admiration, and the Chinese themselves are quite content with the system for the present, since it affords a training-ground for more honest and efficient officials than those produced by traditional Chinese methods. Mr. Sih-Gung Cheng, M.A., B.Sc., in his book on 'Modern China' (an admirable work, published by the Clarendon Press), says :
'The foreign members of the staff have served China loyally, and have never shown any prejudice in favour of their own countries. They have maintained the standard of efficiency and vigilance set up by Sir Robert Hart, and have won the admiration of foreigners and the Chinese alike… So long as the loans and indemnities mortgaged on Customs receipts are not redeemed by China, it will be difficult to get the foreign Powers, who are distrustful of the Chinese on monetary matters, to consent to a restoration of the Customs Administration to the Chinese themselves. (Pp. 206-6).'
Reforming and patriotic Chinese desire fiscal autonomy for their country as regards the tariff, but are in no hurry to see a change as regards the administration of the Customs. Mr. Wellington Koo, at Washington, has issued a statement setting forth this point of view. 'The Times', in the leader mentioned above, assumes that it is the administration that he wishes to see in Chinese hands, and insinuates that the motive for this desire is the hope of corrupt pickings out of dishonest dealings with traders. The last two sentences deserve to be quoted :
'That the Mandarins would like to have the handling of the large sums receivable by the Customs is undoubted ; that the people would care to see it in their hands is very doubtful indeed. The eloquence of the Chinese delegates may delude the uninformed ; it can only serve to remind those who know Asiatics that the more an Oriental diplomatist is Westernized the less confidence does he command in the East.'
Was ever such an amazing insult of the Minister of a friendly Power ? Mr. Koo speaks throughout of the tariff, not of the administration. I do not know how long the writer of this tactful and polite article has spent in China, or how intimately he is acquainted with modern-minded reforming Chinese. Probably he only knows China through the reports of business men whom he has met in his club. I can assure him that 'those who know Asiatics', at any rate those who know them in China, do not take the view which he attributes to them. My own experience of the Chinese who have had a modern education was that they are as upright, as intelligent, as delicately considerate, and as free from national prejudice, as any set of men it has ever been my good fortune to meet. They have to contend against a mass of bad tradition in their own country, and they are intensely grateful for Western help in this struggle. But those who pretend that they are not to be trusted, and are only seeking to deceive the guileless Westerners, must be either very ignorant or very depraved. One is often tempted to think that Europeans wish China to remain weak and corrupt, in order that they may obtain such pickings as 'The Times' supposes Mr. Wellington Koo to hanker after. America has adopted a more enlightened policy, and there are signs that our Government intends to follow America's lead. Even Lord Northcliffe, since he visited Peking, has become a champion of China. But he has apparently not yet succeeded in impressing his new knowledge upon his organs at home.
I have no space to deal with various other issues, analogous to the tariff, involving China's legitimate claims to independence. In all these issues, men with financial motives which they dare not avow will mislead journalists and public opinion at home, if they can. It is therefore necessary to be very wary, and above all the remember that the Chinese are not an inferior race, but a great nation with a civilization at least as good as our own. Their only serious inferiority is in scientific homicide.
51 1921.12.03-1921.12.17 Russell, Bertrand. Sketches of modern China. In : The Nation and the Athenaeum ; vol. 30, 3, 10, 17. Dez (1921).
I. The East and the eclipse.
China is traditionally a land of leisure, but the visiting foreigner must not hope for much personal experience of this side of Chinese life. The busiest thirty hours I ever spent in my life were spent in Chang-sha, a city which is reached by travelling up the Yangtze for three or four days from Shanghai to Hankow, and then going south for another day across a vast lake. (In spite of its remoteness it is a Treaty Port.) When I arrived in Chang-sha, there was an educational Congress in session, at which all kinds of people lectured on all kinds of subjects. During my thirty hours, I gave four lectures and two after-dinner speeches, and attended a great reception at the American hospital. My lectures, which were on Russia, displeased the student by being somewhat critical of the Bolsheviks, whom almost all Chinese students passionately admire. I spent the night (in a Chinese hotel), as Saint Paul spent his time in Ephesus, fighting with wild beasts. So on the whole my impression of Chang-sha was lacking in Oriental calm.
The proceedings ended with a great feast given by the Tuchun, the military governor of the Province of Hunan. Most Tuchuns are wicked ; indeed they are the chief internal source of trouble in China. They intercept the provincial revenue and spend it on raising private armies ; they indulge in war, one against another ; and they practice depredations in the style of Verres. A British missionary for many years resident at Chang-sha assured me that the predecessor ou our host had, in two years, amassed a fortune of thirty million dollars, partly by downright robbery and partly by debasing the currency in his province. At the end of that time he had fled from popular vengeance, with his plunder, to Japan, where, I gathered, he is living happily ever afterwards. An Englishman not accustomed to China might expect to find, in consequence of this worthy's activities, such scenes of desolation as are now to be seen in Eastern Europe, but he would be agreeably disappointed. Chinese scoundrels have sill much to learn from the West as regards efficiency in evil, and it was clear that the absconding Tuchun had done far less harm than is done by the 'honest' governments of the Great Powers. The Chinese government does some harm to its own people, but none to anybody else ; from an international point of view, it is the best government in the world, because it is the most inefficient.
However, the Tuchun who was our host was an exception to the general rule, being perfectly virtuous and a great friend of education. (He fell a few weeks after my visit.) The guests were received in one vast hall, and banqueted in another. The food was European ; there was an endless succession of courses and an infinite variety of wines. Our host, through an interpreter, apologized to me for the frugal fare he was offering in his humble abode, but said he thought we would rather have a glimpse of every-day Chinese life than be treated to a display of pomp and splendor. I tried to remember quickly all I had read of Chinese etiquette, and mumbled something about my pigship being honoured that His Magnificence should deign to notice me ; but I fear I was not very adequate.
If the Tuchun displayed something of traditional Chinese manners, the after-dinner speeches differed from those of Europe in the opposite direction, by being free from make-believe and humour, very serious and very businesslike. Professor Dewey spoke of Chinese education and of the lines along which it should progress ; Mrs. Dewey informed the dignitaries of Chang-sha that in some provinces co-education had been adopted, and that Hunan ought to do likewise. To this the Tuchun made a statesmanlike reply, promising that the matter should receive his best consideration, and that action should be taken when the time was ripe. Various Chinese educationists, whose speeches were interpreted into English by Chinese interpreters, spoke of their aims and their efforts, and of what they hoped from their European and American guests. Reverence for sages is traditional in China, and many modern Chinese transfer this attitude to the educationists who come from foreign countries. Their expectations are so far beyond one's powers as to be often embarrassing ; it is very difficult to explain that one is not a sage without feeling that one is rather a fool.
The educationists and the students in China are extraordinarily keen, and there is no doubt that the movement for modern education represents the most solid advance that is being made. Chinese who have been at foreign universities do not become unbalanced, or unable to see what is good in China (except in art). Their native civilization is sufficiently strong and solid to enable them to assimilate what the West has to teach without becoming simply Europeans ; and, strange to say, they like our best better than our worst. They are, as a rule, less learned than Japanese professors, but more genuinely cultivated, more open-minded, more capable of a scientifically skeptical outlook. Nationalism and religion, the two great enemies of honest thought in the West, are absent from the educated classes in China ; respect for Confucius is not excessive among those who have assimilated Western culture. I was never conscious in China, as one almost always is in Japan, of a barrier to mutual comprehension. The Oriental is said to be inscrutable and remote, but this is certainly not true in China. I found the Chinese just as easy to talk to as the English, and just as easy (or as difficult) to understand psychologically.
But Young China has to contend against a terrible dead-weight of ignorance and superstition in the mass of the people. When I left the banquet to go on board the boat on which I was leaving Chang-sha, it happened that en eclipse of the moon was in progress. As in the earliest annals of Chinese history, the streets were full of people beating gongs to frighten away the Heavenly Dog who was supposed to be trying to eat up the moon ; little bonfires were being lit everywhere to rekindle the moon's light by sympathetic magic. The missionary whom I mentioned earlier told me that often, as he walked about, he had heard passers-by express astonishment that he could bend the knee, because he was a 'foreign devil', and devils have to keep their knees always straight. They also can only travel in straight lines, and therefore every Chinese house has the front door opening onto a blank wall, with the courtyard round the corner. Even within the courtyard, a screen provides other corners, so that at worst the evil spirits cannot get beyond the servants' quarters. Great care has to be taken in putting up telegraph wires to prevent them from pointing straight at any man's house, because if they did they would help devils to get at him. There are innumerable superstitions of this kind, some merely picturesque, others very inconvenient. Educated people do not believe them, but they have to be respected in any public undertaking. Until recently, no house could be built of more than one story, for fear of disturbing the spirits of the wind and the air.
The only cure for these superstitions is universal education, and for that, at present, there are not enough funds or enough modern teachers. But the love of education and respect for it are so great that one may hope to see it rapidly extended, provided political troubles can be sufficiently settled for the money to be forthcoming. I hope that, when education becomes more widespread, it will be in the hands of the Chinese themselves, not in those of missionaries, clerical or lay, who want to spread our civilization as the finest thing on earth. China has shortcomings, which to us are very obvious, but it also has merits in which we are deficient. What is to be hoped is not that China should become like ourselves, reproducing our Napoleons and Bismarcks and Eminent Victorians, but that a new civilization should be developed, combining our knowledge with Chinese culture. The Chinese are capable o this, if they are encouraged but not coerced. The methods of Europe and Japan would force them in time to become like Japan, militaristic, imperialist and brutal ; the methods of America would persuade them to become like America. But if their development can be left free, I think they can give the world a new civilization, to carry on the arts and sciences after Europe has perished in a sea of blood.

II. Chinese ethics.
The Chinese are more fond of laughter than any other nation with which I am acquainted. Every little incident amuses them, and their talk is almost always humorous. They have neither the grim determination to succeed which characterizes the Anglo-Saxon, nor the tragic self-importance of the Slav ; Samuel Smiles and Dostoevsky, the typical prophets of these two races, are both equally remote from the Chinese spirit. A Slav of Teuton believes instinctively that he alone is truly real, and that the apparently external world is merely a product of his imagination ; hence the vogue of idealistic philosophies. It follows that one's own death is a tremendous event, since it makes the universe collapse ; nothing short of personal immortality can avert this awful cataclysm. To the Anglo-Saxon, it is his own purposes rather than his own imaginings that are sacred, because he cares more for action than for thought ; but to him, as to the Slav, the ego is all-important, because the immutable principles of morality demand the victory of his volitions. And so he snatches a moral victory out of the very jaws of death by alliance with a Heavenly Will.
These solemnities are not for the Chinese. Their instinctive outlook is social rather than individual ; the family takes the place which for us is taken by the single personality. To us, self-development or self-realization is not a palpably absurd basis for ethics ; to the Chinaman, the development of the family is not a palpably absurd basis. Accordingly, when a Chinaman finds that he is dying, he does not take the event tragically, as we do ; he merely follows the rites. He assembles his sorrowing family (their sorrow is part of the rites) ; he makes an appropriate farewell speech to them ; he sees to it that his coffin is duly prepared, and that his funeral will be worthy of so important a family. When these duties are accomplished, his dead is an occurrence to which he resigns himself without any particular interest or emotion.
This absence of self-feeling produces and absence of pomposity ; Meredith's Egoist would be impossible in China. The Chinese, of course, are selfish, like other people, but their selfishness is instinctive, as in children and animals, not clothed in fine phrases as ours is. I doubt whether psycho-analysis would find much material among them. There is in Chinese no word for 'persecution' ; I forgot to ask whether there was any word for 'prig', but I doubt it. Barring Confucius himself, I cannot think of any Chinaman, either in history of among my acquaintance who could be described as a prig. The result of all this is a liberation of the impulses to play and enjoyment which makes Chinese life unbelievably restful and delightful after the solemn cruelties of the West.
It would, however, be misleading to suggest that Chinese conventional morality is less absurd, or demands less self-sacrifice, than that of Christian countries. While I was in Peking an old woman of no particular importance died, and her daughter died of grief immediately afterwards. (I heard of the case from the European doctor who was attending them, and who assured me that no ordinary cause of death could be found in the daughter.) To die of grief on the death of a parent is a supreme victory of filial piety, conferring great lustre upon the individual and the family. It is customary to put up memorial arches, nominally at the public expense, in some public place, to hand down to posterity the knowledge of such signal virtue. So far, so good ; but the sequel is not so pleasant. In the case in question, public opinion demanded that the family should provide a specially magnificent funeral for the mother and daughter, and in order to defray the expenses, the sons, who were moderately well-to-do, had to sell all they possessed and become rickshaw coolies. This is one concrete example of the harm done by making the family the basis of ethics.
The family is the source of a great deal of the corruption that vitiates Chinese public life. When a man is appointed to a post, filial piety demands that he should use his position to enrich his relations. As his legitimate salary does not admit of much being done in this way, he is compelled to eke it out by methods which we should consider dishonest ; if he does not, he is condemned by public opinion as an unnatural son or brother. Many returned students who begin with Western ideals find themselves caught in this net and unable to escape from its meshes.
The subjection of women is, of course, essential to a strong family system, and is carried very far by Chinese conventional morality, though not so far as in Japan. Old-fashioned Chinese women are not allowed to see any men except their husbands' relations, though they may go out (with a female attendant) for shopping or visiting other women. When a man marries, he takes his wife to live in his father's house, and she becomes, usually, the slave of her mother-in-law, who believes any slanders brought by the servants, and uses them to keep her daughter-in-law in subjection. The wife is not considered to have any ground of complaint if her husband takes a concubine, and she is censured if she marries again after his death. Betrothals are arranged by the parents of the young people, who do not meet until the wedding ceremony. Betrothals are often entered into in infancy, and are more binding even than marriage. There are recognized grounds for divorce, but there is no recognized way of escaping from a betrothal.
All this is, of course, very bad, and Young China reacts against it vigorously. I became acquainted with various married couples living in houses of their own, where the wife enjoyed all the liberties that an English wife would have. Many girls nowadays are well educated on Western lines in normal schools and afterwards in colleges or universities. They are admitted to Peking Government University, where quite a number attended my lectures. These girls, naturally, are not willing to enter upon the old-fashioned kind of marriage, and the men students whom I came across were quite at one with them on this point.
When I arrived in Peking, I said that I wished to have a seminar for the better students. Accordingly they organized what they called a 'Society for studying Russell's philosophy', which met one a week under the presidency of an Oxford philosopher, Professor Fu, who usually acted as interpreter. We met in the 'Returned Students' Club', the pupils seated at a long table and the professors at a smaller table with tea and cakes. The pupils asked questions and discussed our answers with great keenness and perfect candour. After spending some time on problems of pure philosophy, we began to consider social questions, which interested them far more. We had lively debates on communism and Bolshevism, most of the students taking the view that China could and ought to become communist tomorrow. But the liveliest evening of all was devoted to the family system. Afterwards I discovered that these youths, to whom a new intellectual and moral world was just opening, were most of them already married or betrothed, without their participation, to girls whom they did not know and who were presumably full of traditional prejudices. This presented an acute moral problem, upon which it was difficult for an outsider to offer an opinion.
It is clear that worship of the family in China is an evil comparable in magnitude to worship of the State or the nation among ourselves, though the nature of its bad effects is quite different. Most Europeans in China are ultra-conservative as regards Chinese institutions, and assert that without the family ethic all Chinese morality would crumble. I believe this to be a profound mistake. All progressive Chinese take the opposite view, and I am firmly convinced that they are right. All that is worst in Old China is connected with the family system. In old days, some degree of public duty was deduced from the system by the fiction that filial piety demanded service of the Emperor. But since the establishment of the Republic this fiction no longer serves, and a new morality is needed to inculcate public spirit and honesty in government. Young China fully understands this need, and will, given time, provide the new teaching that is required. But whether the Powers will allow enough time is very doubtful. Chinese problems are not capable of being satisfactorily settled by a mechanical imposition of order and what we consider good government. Adjustment to new ideas demands a period of chaos, and it is not for the ultimate good of China to shorten this period artificially. But I doubt whether this view will commend itself to the foreigners who think they know how to save China.

III. Chinese amusements.
One of the most obvious characteristics of the Chinese is their love of fireworks. On arriving at a Chinese temple, the worshipper is given a set of Chinese crackers to explode on the temple steps, so as to put him in a good humour. When I invited the most intellectual of my students to an evening party, they sent several days ahead extraordinarily elaborate 'feux d'artifice' to be let off in my courtyard. On the night of the Chinese New Year (which is different from ours) it is impossible to sleep a wink, because every household north, south, east, and west, spends the whole night sending off rockets and golden rain and very imaginable noisy display. I did not find any Chinaman, however grave, who failed to enjoy these occasions.
Chinese New Year is like our Christmas, or rather, what our Christmas would be if no one in the country were over ten years old, except the shopkeepers and confectioners. Everybody buys toys of one sort or another : paper windmills which go round and round in the wind as they are held in the hands of fat old gentlemen in rickshas ; rattles more rattling than any European baby enjoys ; gaudy paper pictures of all kinds ; Chinese lanterns with horsemen on the outside who begin to gallop round as soon as the lantern is lit. All these things are sold in the courtyards of temples, which take the place of Hampstead Heath on a Bank Holiday. I went on their New Year's Day to the 'Temple of the Eighteen Hells', where the posthumous tortures of eighteen kinds of sinners are depicted in the spirit of 'Ruthless Rhymes'. A vast crowd was going round, shouting with laughter at the various horrors, none of which were portrayed in any but a comic spirit. In the largest, gayest and most crowded temple, in the inmost court, I found the Salvation Army singing hymns to a brass band and preaching through an interpreter, assuring the Bank Holiday crowd that its amusements were idolatrous and must infallibly bring eternal damnation. The crowd enjoyed this even more than the eighteen native hells, laughed more vociferously, and applauded with vast good humour. I do not think it occurred to any of them that the Salvationists were in earnest, for if it had, good manners (never deficient in any class in China) would have demanded a different reception. I alone was left somewhat pensive, reflecting upon the benefits of the civilization we are bringing to the poor benighted heathen.
The educated classes, though they do not lose the capacity for childish pleasures, have also others of a more refined kind ; in fact the art of exquisite enjoyment has probably been carried to greater perfection than anywhere else in the world. In all the most beautiful places are Buddhist monasteries, to which scholars go when they desire a studious retreat. At any specially admirable point of view, one finds a pavilion, put up, not by a tourist agency, but by some Emperor of poet with a perfect appreciation of what the landscape needs. No sooner has one sat down in this astonishing summer-house than some kind person, like a genie in 'The Arabian Nights', brings tea in little cups – not the gross liquid that we call tea, but an amber-coloured nectar with an intoxicating fragrance, half aromatic, half like the meadows in June, combining the freshness of spring with the beauty of summer sunshine robbed of its dust and heat. One's Chinese hosts begin immediately to discuss some ancient philosophic theme : whether progress is rectilinear or cyclic; whether the perfect sage must be always self-sacrificing, or may on occasion consider his own interest; whether it is better to meditate on death or to ignore it. These subjects will he argued with a wealth of classical quotation and anecdotes of ancient philosophers. But presently some one will mention Japanese aggression in Shantung, or missionary education, or labour conditions in the cotton mills on the Yangtze. At once the delicate spell is broken, and one realizes that, willingly or unwillingly, one is part of the force that must inevitably destroy this beauty and peace inherited from a happier age.
The Chinese have a great aptitude for games of skill. They play a kind of chess which is far more complicated than ours, and needs a board of 256 squares. Those who subsequently learn our variety of the game find it exceedingly simple, and can soon beat quite good European players. They are also much addicted to various easier games, which they play for money. Gambling has always been a national vice, and is their principal vice now that the smoking of opium has been nearly stamped out except where Japanese pedlars can smuggle it in.
One of the less agreeable sides of Peking life is the enormous number of beggars. Even in the severest winter frosts, they are dressed in rags which let die air through; sometimes they have wounds or sores at which they point like the Saints in medieval pictures. As one goes through the streets in a ricksha, beggars run after one, calling out in a piteous voice: 'Da lao yeh!' which means 'Great old sire'. If one is on foot, they sometimes perform the kow-tow to one in the middle of the street. All this is embar¬rassing and painful, and at first one reacts with a C.O.S. emotion. But gradually one discovers that they have their beats and their office hours ; that well-to-do Chinese like giving to them, and that many of them are fat. When they are not at work, they congregate together under a sunny wall and smoke cigarettes. At these times they take a holiday from the pretence of misery, and talk and laugh with the utmost gaiety. I do not think any European tramp could endure the hardships they put up with, and live ; but there is no doubt that they preserve to the full that capacity for enjoy¬ing every pleasant moment which is the gift of the gods to the Chinese nation.
Educated Chinese derive considerable pleasure from gently pulling the foreigner's leg—but with such delicacy that no one could possibly be annoyed. I was taken one day by two Chinese friends to see a famous old pagoda, which was in a slightly ruinous condition. I went up the winding stairs to the top, and thought they were following; but when I emerged I saw them below me engaged in earnest conversation. On reaching the bottom again, I asked why they had not come up. Their reply was characteristic : 'We debated for a long time, with many weighty arguments pro and con, whether we should follow you or not. But at last we decided that if the pagoda should crumble while you were on it, it would be as well that there should be some one to bear witness as to how the philosopher died, so we stayed below.' The fact was that the weather was warm and one of them was fat.
The modernized Chinese, unfortunately, have mostly lost the power to appreciate native art; when I praised Chinese pictures, they invariably retorted that the perspective is wrong. I was assured by Europeans that good pictures in the old style are still being produced, but I saw none of them myself ; I was shown the imitations of our painting produced in the up-to-date art schools, but it was a devastating and horrible experience. The older Chinese still appreciate the old pictures, many of which are inconceivably beautiful. There is in China a much closer connection than in Europe between painting and poetry, perhaps because the same instru¬ment, the brush, is used for both. The Chinese value a good piece of calligraphy just as much as a good picture; often the painter will write a poem or sentiment on the margin of his picture, and the beauty of the writing will be as much admired as that of the painting. Pictures are not hung on walls, as with us, but kept rolled up, and treated like books, to be read one at a time. Some of them are so long that they cannot be seen all at once ; they represent, perhaps, all the scenery that you might see suc¬cessively during a long day's walk in the mountains. At the beginning of the picture you see two figures starting up a footpath from the plain, probably with a willow-pattern bridge in the foreground; presently you find the same figures ascending through strange gorges and forests, which are realistic though no one unacquainted with China would think so ; just as your legs begin to ache in sympathy, the friends arrive at some exquisite temple and enjoy tea with philosophic converse in a pavilion. From there the mountains rise vaster and more inaccessible, into dim regions where their shapes seem like misty epiphanies of something divine, and the spectator cannot tell where solid ground has passed into the cloud-shapes of mystical imagination. This is only one style of picture; there are many others, just as admirable. For my part, I derive far more pleasure from them than from even the best of European pictures; but in this I am willing to suppose that my taste is bad. I wish I could believe that some¬thing of the Chinese capacity for creating beauty could survive, but at the devastating approach of the white man beauty flies like a shy ghost. For us, beauty belongs to museums or to the final self-glorification of blatant millionaires ; we cannot regard it as a thing for every day, or as equal in importance to health or cleanliness or money. Chinese dealers, with whom avarice is a passion, will sacrifice large sums sooner than sell a beautiful thing to a person of no taste. But neither they nor anyone else can keep alive the ancient loveliness of China, or the instinctive happiness which makes China a paradise after the fierce weariness of our distracted and trivial civilization.
52 1921.12.16 Russell, Bertrand. How Washington could help China. In : The Daily Herald ; 16 Dez. (1921).
In international dealings it is useless to expect any nation to pursue any end which it does not believe to be in its own interest. No good to China could be expected to come out of the Washington Conference but for the fact that the interests of both England and Amer¬ica are, for the present, identical with those of China, except in a few points, such as our possession of Hong Kong. The immediate and pressing aims of any Chinese patriot must be two: to end the internal anarchy and to recover the independence and integrity of China. The aims of English and American statesmanship in China, from a purely selfish point of view, may be taken to be the extension of trade and the opportunity to exploit Chinese natural resources. Territorial ambitions have no place in America's programme, and ought to have none in ours; I believe that, in fact, our ambitions in that respect are limited (in China) to the retention of what we already possess, or rather part of it, for our Government seems to have realized that our true national interest would be furthered by the restitu¬tion of Wei-Hai-Wei. What both English and American interests most urgently require in China is stable government and the open door: that is to say, the ending of anarchy and of Japanese territorial aggression. Our interests are, therefore, for the present, almost completely identical with those of China.
The interests of Japan, at any rate as conceived by the militarists who control policy, are different from ours, and not compatible with the wel¬fare of China. Japan wishes to be a Great Power, in territory, population, and industrial resources. Japan has not much of the raw materials of in¬dustry, whereas China has them in abundance. If Japan is to be able to conduct a long war successfully, control of mines in some portion of China is essential. Moreover, Japanese statesmen have not merely eco¬nomic aims, but also the desire for dynastic grandeur and a vast empire. Psychologically, one of the fundamental causes of the whole situation is the Japanese inferiority-complex. At every moment they are afraid that they are being insulted or cold-shouldered on account of not being white, and this makes them aggressive and ill-mannered. This is by far the strongest part of the Japanese case. Europeans do not beat Japanese ricksha-drivers to make them hurry, nor do their chauffeurs dismount to cuff pedestrians who are slow in getting out of the way, as I have seen the chauffeur of an American do in Peking. The Japanese are not liked by either Europeans or Americans, but they are treated with a respect which few white men show to the Chinese. The reason is simply that Japan has a strong army and navy. White men, as a rule, only respect those who have power to kill them or deprive them of their means of livelihood ; and as wealth depends upon success in war, skill in homicide is, in the last analy¬sis, the only thing that secures tolerable courtesy from a white man. If the Japanese are defeated in war by the Americans or by an Anglo-American alliance there will be a setback for the coloured races all over the world, and an intensification of the intolerable insolence displayed towards them by white men. There will be an immediate catastrophic destruction of the Japanese civilization, which still has many merits that our civilization lacks. And following upon this there will be a slow destruction of the civilization of China, not by war, but by Americanization. The big towns will become like Chicago, and the small towns like 'Main Street'. Ameri¬cans would feel that they were conferring a boon in effecting this trans¬formation, but no person with any receptivity or aesthetic sense would share their view.
We may, therefore, diagnose the situation as follows: Japan is in a bad mood, and is more immediately dangerous to China than any other nation; but England and America—especially the latter—are, by the very nature of their civilization and outlook, destructive of all that is best in the Far East, and doomed, nolens volens, to be oppressors if they have the power. Under these circumstances the worst thing that could happen would be a Japanese-American war, leading to the destruction of everything distinc¬tive in the civilization of the yellow races, the increase of white tyranny, and the launching of America upon a career of militarist Imperialism. On the other hand, the best thing that could happen would be a diplomatic humiliation of the Japanese military party, causing Japan itself to become less aggressive and less anxious to subjugate the adjoining mainland. The difficulty is that Japan will not yield except to the threat of war. If England and America, at Washington, join in insisting upon acceptance of the naval ratio and evacuation of Shantung, one may presume that Japan will give way sooner than face a war against both combined. If America alone threatens, Japan will probably choose war, and be destroyed.
What is, of course, to be expected is that America will give way, in sub¬stance though not in form, about Shantung, in return for Japanese acceptance of the naval ratio; that after a few years American spies will report (truly or falsely) that Japan is building secretly; that in the meantime America will have fortified naval bases in the neighbourhood of Japan; and that then America will proceed to destroy Japan with a good con¬science. I do not see any issue from this cycle of disaster except a change of heart in Japan. Of course, a change of heart in America would be just as good, but nothing will convince Americans that they need a change of heart.
China, unfortunately, cannot escape being industrialized. It would be far better for China to develop her industries slowly with native capital; but they will, in fact, be developed quickly with foreign capital. So much, I fear, is independent of the issue at Washington. For the immediate inter¬ests of China it would be well if America and England combined to force Japan by diplomatic pressure, not by war, both to accept the naval ratio and to evacuate Shantung. This would also be good for Japan, since it would be a blow to the military party, and perhaps introduce a much more liberal régime. (Evacuation of Vladivostok and friendly relations with the Far Eastern Republic should also be insisted upon.) But in the long run it is not in the interests of Asia that the one genuinely independent Asiatic Power should be crushed. England and America can, if they choose, exer¬cise despotic sway over the world. There is much good that they might do in that case. They might curb the ambitions of France and Japan, make all nations except themselves disarm, undertake the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Russia for the sake of their own trade, and liberate China from the fear of Japan. But if they were able to accomplish all this they would also acquire the habit of bullying, and become confirmed in the ruthless certainty of their own moral superiority. They would soon come to display an economic and cultural despotism such as the world has never known—always, of course, in a missionary spirit. From such a tyranny the world could only escape by a universal rebellion, possibly with Great Britain at the head of the rebels.
From the alternative of tyranny or war there is, so far as I can see, no escape while the industrial nations continue their system of capitalist exploitation. Nothing offers any real escape except Socialism—i.e., in this connection, production for use instead of production for commercial profit. America is still in the phase of Liberalism which more experienced nations have outgrown since the war. President Wilson attempted to save the world by Liberal ideas, and failed ; President Harding is making a second attempt, and will fail even if he seems to have succeeded. He will fail, I mean, as a humanitarian, not as the champion of American capital. The existing capitalist system is in its very nature predatory, and cannot be made the basis of just dealing between nations. So long as America draws nearly all the dividends derived from Capitalism, she will continue to think the present system heaven-sent, and will employ Liberal futilities which will delude fools into supporting knaves.
But in all this I am speaking of the future, not of the immediate situ¬ation. For the moment, Anglo-American cooperation at Washington can secure two important things: (1) the naval ratio, (2) a breathing space for China by a curbing of Japanese ambitions. If these ends are achieved the Washington Conference will have been useful. If it leaves Japan's activities in China unchecked, it will have been futile ; but if it leads to war with Japan it will have been immeasurably harmful.
53 1922.03.08 Russell, Bertrand. As a European radical sees it. In : The Freeman ; vol. 4 (8. März 1922). [Betr. China].
Many Americans not unnaturally think that the good record of America hitherto is a reason for expecting a good record in the future. I think those who take this point of view do not quite understand the new temptations to which America will henceforth be exposed.
I know there is in America a great deal of what is called 'idealism'. But what are its manifestations ? Prohibition certainly is due to 'idealism'. Now there are many good arguments in favour of prohibition, and I am not myself prepared to oppose it, but no student of modern psychology will suppose that these arguments were what persuaded the nation. Apart from the interests of those who make non-alcoholic drinks, and the hopes of employers that their men would work harder, it must have been the case that there were more people who found pleasure in preventing others from drinking than people who found pleasure in drinking themselves. Take another exhibition of 'idealism' : the treatment of Maxim Gorky in the United States. I know there were journalistic reasons for inflaming opinion against him, but these could not have operated unless opinion were ready to be inflamed. In America divorce is easy ; in Tsarist Russia it was almost impossible. Consequently the law had not sanctioned a union far more stable than many American marriages; therefore Gorky was 'immoral' and must be hounded out of the country. Again : the Bible says 'Thou shalt not steal', but Socialists believe that civilization can only be preserved by confiscation of private property. Therefore they are immoral men, who must not be allowed to sit in a Legislature to which they have been duly elected, and whose heads may be bashed in by loyal mobs who invade their houses. Sacco and Vanzetti are accused of a murder, and there is no conclusive evidence that they committed it ; but their political opinions are undesirable, so that no one is interested in the mere question of fact: Did they, or did they not, commit the murder? The moral repro¬bation of these men on account of their opinions is, no doubt, another case of 'idealism'.
So far, 'idealism' may be identified with love of persecution. If I were concerned to analyse its unconscious psychological sources, I should say that this form of it results from a conflict between the Christian duty of loving one's neighbour and the natural man's impulse to torture him. A reconciliation is effected by the theory that one's neighbour is a 'sinner', who must be punished in order to be purified. People cling to the con¬ception of 'sin', because otherwise they would have no moral justification for inflicting pain. 'Idealism', in this form, is moral reprobation as a pretext for torture.
I do not suggest that America is the only country where there is 'idealism'. All the belligerents were full of it during the war, and is still rampant everywhere. But it is only in America, and to a lesser extent in England, that it still deceives the people who are trying to think out the prob¬lem of creating a happier world. Is it not clear that a happier world will not be generated by hatred, even if the objects of hatred are 'sinners' ? Do any Christians, I wonder, ever read the Gospels ?
'Idealism' has, however, a wider scope than persecution. It may be defined generically as the practice of proclaiming moral motives for our actions. After America's entry into the war, President Wilson became idealistic in our former sense; before that, when he was 'too proud to fight', he was idealistic in a wider sense. The objection to proclaiming moral motives for one’s actions is twofold: first, that no one else believes what one says; and secondly, that one does believe it oneself. I have no doubt that many Americans believe in the unselfishness of America’s motives, first for neutrality and then for belligerency. People who are not Americans, however, cannot be persuaded to adopt this view. They think that America intervened at the exact moment most favourable for Ameri¬can interests, and that America would not have become either so rich or so powerful as she is if she had intervened sooner or had remained neutral to the end. They do not blame America for this, but they are somewhat irritated when they find that Americans will not admit it, but claim to be made of nobler stuff than the rest of humanity.
I suppose few things have done more to disgust Americans with the Old World than the secret treaties. I am not, of course, a defender of the secret treaties, but I think it is worth while to understand how a man like Lord Grey came to agree to them. I took and still take the view that the issues in the war were unimportant, that it did not matter which side won (though a draw would have been best), and that the most important thing was that the war should end quickly. This was not the view of the belligerents. The British Government took the view—to which America was converted in the end—that the defeat of Germany was vital. We could not defeat Germany without the help of nations having no direct interest in the struggle, and we could not get their help without buying it. By the time America came in, we had built up such a strong alliance that America's strength turned the scale ; but it must be admitted that America profited by our sins. Our people did not know of the secret treaties ; the sins were only those of the Government. And when President Wilson declared in the Senate that he did not know of the secret treaties, the American Govern¬ment showed that it shared the guilt.
I come now to China. It is in China that American policy has been seen at its best. America alone has not sought concessions, has returned the balance of the Boxer indemnity, has stood for the Open Door, and has championed the independence and integrity of China. All these things arc admirable, but they show wisdom rather than unselfishness ; they are all strictly consonant with American interests. The Washington Conference has provided a good deal of rather painful evidence that the interests of China receive little consideration when they are opposed to those of America. Up to the present (January 26), it is doubtful whether anything effective is going to be done about Shantung, but that may be excused on the ground of Japanese obduracy. The more serious matter is the Ameri¬can attempt to secure international control of China by means of the Consortium. China is in financial difficulties, partly owing to the anarchy which has been carefully fomented by Japan, partly owing to the withhold¬ing of the Customs Revenue by the British Inspector-General of Customs. The London 'Times' of 14 January says :
It is curious to reflect that this country [China] could be ren¬dered completely solvent and the Government provided with a substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy pure and simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the Customs Rev¬enue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a Government to which to entrust it. Yet the 'Times' foams at the mouth when the Chinese say they would like to recover control of their own customs. As a consequence of foreign control the Chinese Government has failed to meet an obligation of $5,500,000 due to a Chicago bank. The resulting action of America is set forth in 'The Freeman' for November 25 (p. 244), as follows : American financiers and politicians were at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; having cooperated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government would only enter into relations with the Consortium, and thus prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American financial protectorate.
In the 'Japan Weekly Chronicle' for November 17 (p. 725), in a telegram headed 'International Control of China', I find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the Philadelphia 'Public Ledger': 'We suspect the motives which led to the suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly oppose any conference-plan to offer China inter¬national aid. ' He adds : 'International control will not do. China must be given time and opportunity to find herself. The world should not misin¬terpret or exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing through.” These are wise words, with which every true friend of China must agree. In the same issue of the 'Japan Weekly Chronicle'— which, by the way, I consider one of the best weekly papers in the world— I find the following (p. 728) :
Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: 'The international bankers have a scheme for the international control of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese Govern¬ment refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the Morgan Company, should be paid out of it.' Mr. Lamont, on hearing this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying : 'Simpson's statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks about resisting the control of the international banks he is fantas¬tic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the conference result in such a solution as will furnish full opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny.'
Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and one of China’s best friends as 'this man Simpson'.
I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, and I have not space here to set it all forth, but to any European radical Air. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a Government which, if it is let alone, will go bankrupt, must aim at control, for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago bank, it would be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan and Company are so purely philanthropic as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though this were the case.
While I was in China recently, the consortium, which is theoretically international but practically American, offered a loan to China on condi¬tion that China made certain internal reforms. China rejected the offer, rightly as I thought, since it involved international control. Shortly before my departure from Peking, Mr. Crane, who had just ceased to be Ameri¬can Minister to China, was reported in the 'Peking Leader' (a paper owned by Chinese but edited by an American) to have stated in an interview that he was in favour of international control of China. I mentioned this inter¬view in a farewell address. To my amazement, there was an uproar among the very Americans who had advocated the Consortium. The editor of the 'Peking Leader', in whose paper the interview had appeared, seemed aston¬ished that I could have believed it to be genuine, and made difficulties about permitting my address to be reprinted. I left China immediately afterwards, and do not know what subsequently occurred, except that the Peking Leader published an editorial criticizing my work as a professor. All this shows the curious confusion of mind which enables people to advocate a loan on condition of internal changes, and yet to imagine them¬selves opposed to international control.
In the 'New Republic' for November 30, there is an article by Mr. Brailsford entitled 'A New Technique of Peace', which sets forth an analysis with which I find myself in complete agreement. If the Conference is suc¬cessful, I expect to see China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign commerce and industry; a government such as the West will consider good substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy ; a gradually increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the chief of which is America; the development of a sweated Chinese proletariat; the spread of Christianity ; the substitution of the American civilization for the Chinese ; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such objets d’art as millionaires may think it worth while to buy ; the gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret society.
All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be told that it is done in order that China may have 'good' government. The definition of the word 'good' is difficult, but the definition of 'good government' is as easy as A.B.C. : it is government that yields fat dividends to capitalists.
The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce something im¬measurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her sal¬vation; all great nations need such a period from time to time. When America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of intervening to insist on 'good government', but fortunately abstained. Nowadays, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but many of them are smitten with blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank God that they are not as this publican.
I hope no reader will think that my outlook is that of a cynic. Whoever will read the third Book of Spinoza's Ethics will find there a view of human nature identical with my own ; whoever will read the fourth and fifth Books will see how little cynicism this view implies. The two qualities which I consider superlatively important are love of truth and love of our nieghbour. I find love of truth obscured in America by commercialism, of which pragmatism is the philosophical expression ; and love of our neighbor kept in fetters by Puritan morality. Faults at least as bad as those of America exist in all countries ; but America seems as yet somewhat more lacking than some other countries as regards a self-critical minority. This minority exists ; and there is notable proof that it is not silent. I fear that some of the things I have said may cause irritation, but that is not their purpose ; I wish only to promote mutual understanding. I wish also, if I can, to do something to save China from a slavery more complete than any that Japan could impose.
54 1922.03.09 Russell, Bertrand. China's entanglements. In : Foreign affairs ; vol. 3, no 9 (March 1922).
Review of Reid, Gilbert. China, captive or free ? (London : G. Allen & Unwin, 1922).
Among all the many recent books on the Far East there are extraordinarily few that are tolerably free from national bias. The British bias is familiar to readers of Mr. J.O.R Bland and The Times. In Chinese internal affairs it is reactionary, sneering at Young China, exalting the virtues of the old-fashioned mandarins, and desiring to uphold the traditional family ethics. At bottom, this attitude is usually, though not always, inspired by the fear of seeing China become strong enough to stand alone. It goes with an admiration for Japan, which takes the form of assurances that Japan's misdeeds have been due to a small military clique and will soon be ended by the victory of some imaginary Liberal Party in Japanese politics. There is, of course, a Liberal Party as regards home affairs, but in foreign affairs all Japanese are united except the small band of Socialists and Labour leaders. The American bias is different from the British, and politically less nox¬ious. Almost all Americans are friendly to Young China and inclined to side with Canton as against Peking. They have no doubt that it would be for China's good to be developed commercially and industrially, and they do not wish to see this done by Japan alone. So far I think we ought to agree with them. But their dislike of Japan makes them hardly just to that country, and their fanatical belief in capitalistic enterprise makes them perhaps blind to the dangers of international exploitation.
Dr. Reid is that rare exception, a truly just man. The faults of Japan are told, but not exaggerated ; the faults of America are not passed over. One of the most interesting portions of his book deals with the injury done to China by the Allied and Associated Powers when they induced China to participate in the war. In inducing a severance of diplomatic relations, America took the lead; in inducing the declaration of war, Japan was foremost. The intrigues and faction fights required to bring about the result caused the failure of parliamentary government and of the all-but successful attempts to unite North and South. No one supposed that the participation of China would help to win the war ; the sole object of the European Allies, especially Great Britain, was to capture German trade and German property, both public and private. This laudable object was achieved. After the armistice, the Germans in China were sent home at twenty-four hours' notice, in crowded ships through the tropics, with confiscation of everything belonging to them except their clothes. This policy was mainly British. The British were inexorable, even in the case of delicate women holding medical certificates to the effect that they would probably die on the voyage; but the Chinese often managed to hide away their German friends until passions had cooled. I know of nothing in the whole war so sordidly and inhumanly money-grubbing as our behaviour in China in 1918. Although Dr. Reid is a Doctor of Divinity, his book com¬pels the conclusion that Christian nations are more degradedly cruel than the heathen Chinese. From the opium war onward, our record is one of shame and infamy.
55 1922.10.16 Bertrand Russell speaks on "Young China" to the Political Union of the University College Cardiff.
56 1922.12.20 Bertrand Russell attends a meeting of Chinese students at Connaught Rooms in London.
57 1942 Zhang, Shenfu. Luosu : xian dai sheng cun zui wei da de zhe xue jia. [Bertrand Russell, the greatest philosopher alive in the Modern age]. [ID D28407].
Russell, the great scholar of enlightenment realism is the most well-known modern thinker in the world of Western philosophy. Russell's works have been translated into more foreign languages than that of any philosopher alive today. Russell's philosophy is complex and cannot be explained in a few simple terms. The source of his original contribution must be traced to his masterwork, the Principia mathematica, which opened up a new page in both mathematical logic and philosophy. Russell has often said, and I always agreed with him : 'No problem in philosophy can be truly solved unless there is a breakthrough in mathematical logic'. Currently Russell is working on an autobiography that is eagerly awaited by readers all over the world. His thought, like his personal demeanour, is thoroughly revolutionary. He is capable of evoking intense admiration. This can be seen in the powerful loyalties he has generated among the women who have shared his life. Since Russell is a powerful and attractive personality, he has been, naturally, envied, and even hated by some people. His commitment to science and democracy have not always received a supportive response. Some people hate him, just because others love him too much, especially women.
58 1942 Zhang, Shenfu. Zhu Luosu qi shi. [Bertrand Russell zum 70. Geb.]. [ID D28408].
Bertrand Russell is the greatest philosopher of mathematical logic. He is a veteran soldier of the new enlightenment trand that has brought science to the study of human nature. Every new philosophy has its own methodology. Russell's pathbreaking method is that of logical analysis. If you want to truly understand Russell's philosophy, you have to understand the tradition of British empiricism out of which Russell emerges. His goal was to set mathematics on a firm foundation of logical proof. In this he succeeded admirably.

Sources (2)

# Year Bibliographical Data Type / Abbreviation Linked Data
1 1942 Zhang, Shenfu. Zhu Luosu qi shi. In : Xin hua ri bao ; 21. Mai (1942). [Bertrand Russell zum 70. Geb.] Publication / Russ283
2 1946 Zhang, Shenfu. Luosu : xian dai sheng cun zui wei da de zhe xue jia. In : Xin wen ping lun ; 12. April (1946). [Bertrand Russell, the greatest philosopher alive in the Modern age]. Publication / Russ282

Cited by (1)

# Year Bibliographical Data Type / Abbreviation Linked Data
1 Zentralbibliothek Zürich Organisation / ZB