China and the West

Russell, Bertrand. The problem of China. In : The Manchester Guardian ; 30. Nov. (1921).
With the exception of America, all the Powers have a thoroughly discreditable record in China. But although the first and worst crime was ours (the Opium War of 1840), the chief offender at the present day is Japan, not because of any special depravity (Japan has merely been copying Christian morals), but because of propinquity and freedom from preoccupation with the war. It is a mistake to suppose that one nation is better or worse than another ; they merely differ as to the direction taken by their criminal tendencies. Americans vent their brutality on negroes and socialists, and their subtlety on business rivals, while the Japanese are brutal to the Koreans and subtle in their diplomacy ; neither side has any ethical superiority. I wish to emphasize this point, because I am firmly convinced that the belief in the moral superiority or inferiority of one nation to another is thoroughly mischievous, and a source of much futility in the efforts of reformers.
The two regions which the Japanese are specially engaged in absorbing are Manchuria and Shantung. Manchuria is not part of China proper, but is much more intimately related to China than Mongolia is. One might compare Manchuria to the Highlands of Scotland and Mongolia to Ireland ; the analogy must not be pressed, but will serve to give a rough idea.
As everyone knows, the Manchus differ from the Chinese in race, and originally in language ; they were a warlike northern tribe who conquered the Chinese throne in 1644, and retained it until the revolution of 1911. But in the meantime they had adopted the Chinese language and many Chinese customs ; immense numbers of Chinese settled in Manchuria, and are continuing to do so. Ever since 1644, Manchuria has been administered as an integral part of China, except in so far as foreigners have interfered. From the point of view of sentiment, language, customs, and even population (on account of immigration), Manchuria must now be reckoned as thoroughly Chinese. The Russians acquired Port Arthur and the railway rights as a reward for befriending China after the Sin-Japanese war of 1894-95 ; the Japanese acquired Port Arthur and the Russian rights in South Manchuria by their war against Russia in 1904-05, while they replaced Russia throughout the rest of Manchuria after the Bolshevik revolution – of course with the tacit approval of the Powers, as the champions of civilization against the Red Spectre. The Chinese still have the nominal sovereignty and the civil administration, but the Japanese have Port Arthur, the railway, control of all the industrial undertakings, the right to military occupation, and in short everything worth having.
Chang-tso-lin, the Chinese viceroy, has a Chinese army, and is nominally subject to Peking. But in fact whatever energy he can spare from serving his own ends has to be devoted to the interests of the Japanese, upon whom he is utterly dependent. He and his army are a constant menace to the Peking Government, upon which he descends from time to time to levy blackmail. (He was originally a bandit, and is now a government servant.) If the Peking Government did anything annoying to Japan, Chang-tso-lin's army could be used to cause repentance, without Japan's appearing in the business. So long as Japan retains her exclusive position in Manchuria, this situation is difficult to avoid unless the Chinese develop a strong patriotic army. It may be said : How can Chang-tso-lin get an army of Chinese to work against China ? One might as well ask : How can governments get armies of proletarians to shoot down strikers ? The answer is the same in both cases : ignorance. But there is a further factor in China. The immense majority of Chinese are peaceful and law-abiding ; the armies are a very small proportion of the population. Soldiers are despised, and are largely criminals and bandits. Does anyone doubt that if we went round the German prisons we should find men willing to 'maintain order' in return for liberty and pay ?
The question of Manchuria must be dealt with if China is to have any real independence. Except in the southern corner, the claims of Japan have never, so far as I know, been formally recognized by the Powers. Certainly America has never assented to them. It would probably be impossible to get the Japanese out of Port Arthur without a first-class war, which I fear is in any case very probable sooner or later. But outside Port Arthur and its neighbourhood, perhaps the Open Door and the rights of China could be insisted upon, and Japanese military occupation could be prevented. I doubt, however, whether, short of war, a virtual Japanese protectorate over Manchuria is now avoidable, until China becomes strong enough to fight her own battles. And the question of Manchuria, important as it is, is certainly not worth a first-class war.
Shantung is at once a more vital and a more hopeful question. The Washington Conference will have failed hopelessly as regards China if it does not secure the complete evacuation of Shantung by the Japanese and of Wei-hai-wei by ourselves. To begin with the latter : The lease of Wei-hai-wei to the British provides that we are to hold it as long as the Russians hold Port Arthur. The Russians lost Port Arthur sixteen years ago, but we still hold Wei-hai-wei. To all Chinese protests, we reply that the Japanese are just as bad as the Russians, implying that, in spite of the alliance, we regard a war with Japan as by no means improbable. We thus simultaneously display bad faith to the Chinese and show the Japanese how little we believe in the alliance. Our delegation at Washington ought at once to announce the unconditional return of Wei-hai-wei to the Chinese. We should then be in a better position to join America in insisting upon the Japanese restitution of Kiao-chow.
The history of Kiao-chow is briefly as follows : In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung, and the Germans made this an excuse for seizing the port of Tsingtau, and extracting by force from the Chinese a treaty which gave them (1) the right to use Tsingtau as a naval base ; (2) a lease of Kiao-chow for ninety-nine years ; (3) the right to construct certain railways and have a controlling interest in them ; (4) preference for German firms as regards all industrial undertakings in Shantung. (Shantung is a province, Kia-cho Bay a district in Shantung, and Tsingtau a harbor in Kiao-chow Bay. The text of the Sino-German Treaty of 1898 is given in George Gleason's 'What shall I think of Japan ? Appendix to Chap. IV). In 1914, the Chinese were willing to join the Allies and undertake, with Allied help, the reconquest of Kiao-chow ; but this did not suit the Japanese, who kept China neutral (till 1917), and themselves presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the cession of all that the Germans possessed in Kiao-chow 'with a view of eventual restoration of the same to China'. In 1915, after the Japanese had succeeded, Notes were interchanged between China and Japan, stipulating that 'when, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiao-chow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China' under certain conditions. In 1917, secret agreements were concluded by Japan with France and England, whereby those Powers undertook to support Japan's claims in Shantung at the Peace Conference. By the Versailles Treaty, 'Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, title and privileges' acquired by the treaty of 1898. This might be taken as an epitome of the Versailles Treaty : whatever iniquity Germany had committed in the past is henceforth to be committed by the Allies.
Fortunately, America is not a signatory of the Versailles Treaty, and is free to raise the Shantung question at Washington. The Japanese have lately been making efforts to secure a direct settlement with China, so as to prevent the raising of the question at Washington ; but the Chinese, very wisely, have rejected the Japanese proposals as containing merely illusory concessions, and have firmly demanded the unconditional retrocession of all the rights acquired by Germany in 1898, as well as those extensions subsequently acquired by Japan. In this America will no doubt support them, and I earnestly hope that we shall not support Japan.