China and the West

Russell, Bertrand. The future of China. In : The Labour News ; 10. Nov. (1921).
Progressive China undoubtedly has great hopes of the Washington Conference. Hitherto, in all dealings with foreign Powers, America alone has been found friendly. As everyone knows, the American share of the Boxer indemnity has been spent in education Chinese students, both in China and in America. This was in itself a friendly act, and had the result that a large majority of young educated Chinese have an American outlook. Our Government, very shortsightedly, has not yet seen its way to a similar restitution.
Another great cause of Chinese friendship for America is the fact that America has always opposed Japanese aggression, and has, alone among Great Powers, shown no desire to acquire t4erritory on the mainland of Asia, or even concessions in the Treaty Ports. American ambitions in China are commercial and industrial, not territorial. And in addition to education, the Americans have done much good work in the way of hospitals, famine relief, etc.
The ambitions of the Japanese are not merely capitalistic, they are also militaristic and imperial. It is true that the Japanese desire raw materials for their industry, which are to be had in China but not in Japan. This desire, however, if it stood alone, would be capable of gratification without infringing the principle of the Open Door. What makes the Japanese desire more than the Americans claim in China is the love of empire, the desire for might based on armaments which led Germany to disaster. The Japanese expected Germany to win the war, and are still inclined to adopt pre-war Germany as their model.
There is in Japan a Socialist and Labour Party on European lines, and among its leaders are some of the finest men I have ever met. But they have no influence on Japanese policy, and cannot hope to have while only about four per cent of the population are industrial. Even moderate Liberalism has little practical influence, because the Army and Navy are directly responsible to the Mikado, and not in any degree subject to Parliament or the Cabinet, or even the Prime Minister. Thus the extreme militarists have a free hand.
During the last quarter of a century, the Japanese have acquired Korea, Manchuria, and Shantung, in each case with the help of Great Britain. Korea was only loosely connected with China by a traditional protectorate, and although the sufferings of Koreans at the hands of Japan have been very great, Korea is hardly a Chinese question. Manchuria, on the other hand, concerns China vitally.
The Manchu conquerors came from there in the seventeenth century, and from there it is easy still to exercise military domination over Peking. There is in Manchuria, under Japanese protection and influence, a Chinese reactionary viceroy, who is often able to overawe the Peking politicians and compel them to adopt a pro-Japanese policy. In this way all China north of the Yangtse is more or less terrorized.
And civil discord is kept alive by skilful loans from the Japanese to all parties in the strife of rival generals. So long as Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway remain subject to Japanese military control, it is not easy to see how this situation can be altered except for the worse.
The question of Shantung is, however, of still greater importance if China is to be saved from foreign domination. Shantung is as intimately Chinese as Kent is English ; the situation now is about what ours would have been if the Germans had held Dover and Folkestone and the South-Eastern Railway up to Sevenoaks.
Shantung interests the Chinese sentimentally, because it contains the birth-place of Confucius, and materially, because it has considerable wealth, which the Japanese are using for the subjugation of China. The Japanese announced in 1914 that they were attacking the Germans in Shantung with a view to restoring Germany's possessions to China, but they concluded secret treaties with England and France stipulating that they were to retain all they conquered from Germany.
These secret treaties were used to defeat President Wilson at Versailles. We forced China into the war as our ally, and rewarded her by robbing her of one of her richest provinces. And on account of the secret treaties, our emissaries at Washington will probably feel bound to support Japan in any resistance to restitution.
Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that the Shantung question may be satisfactorily dealt with at Washington, if the Powers succeed in reaching any agreement. America is not bound by the Treaty of Versailles, owing to the Senate's refusal to ratify ; and unless our support of Japan is more vigorous than it seems likely to be, fear of America may make the Japanese conciliatory to China, as it has made us to Sinn Fein.
If this should happen, however, it is by no means improbable that the Japanese will demand and obtain compensation in Siberia at the expense of the semi-Bolshevik Far-Eastern Republic.
It is not only by support of the Japanese that British diplomacy in China has been harmful. It has been almost invariably reactionary, supporting everything conservative against Young China, showing no understanding of the country's needs or desire for its regeneration.
A mere change of alliances without a change of outlook would not remedy our defects as regards China. So long as our diplomatic service remains what it is, every question not in the forefront of public interest will be decided by our diplomatists in an anti-progressive fashion. For example, when Yuan-shi-kai, in the early days of the Chinese Republic, was endeavouring to acquire arbitrary power without control from the newly-constituted Parliament, we hastened to conclude a loan which rendered him financially independent.
For the moment, America may prove useful to China, and Japan is certainly harmful. But in the long run China cannot be saved except by the Chinese. American imperialism is economic, not territorial ; but if it were firmly established it would involve a terrible suppression of liberty. It would soon be found, for example, that educated Chinese inclined to Socialism (as most of them are) would be unable to get employment.
The Chinese civilization, which is pacific and non-industrial, which cares more about beauty and truth than about railways or dividends, would be ruthlessly destroyed by apostles of 'pep'. The weakness of China in international affairs is due quite as much to Chinese virtues as to Chinese vices.
The Chinese have not that insane thirst for power and ruthless activity which characterizes the West, and especially America ; they were horrified by the war, far more than any European neutral. It is useless to hope that we shall acquire the Chinese virtues ; therefore, very patriotic Chinaman must endeavor to acquire our vices.