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Year

1921.12.02

Text

Russell, Bertrand. Is Chinese independence possible ? In : The Manchester Guardian ; 2. Dez. (1921).
It is common form for every Power to profess a desire for the integrity and independence of China. To preserve these is one of the purposes of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and as regards this purpose the Alliance has succeeded admirably, having enabled Japan to absorb Manchuria and Shantung and establish a virtual protectorate over North China as a result of the twenty-one demands presented by Japan to China in 1915. (For the text of these demands, in their original and revised forms, see George Gleason, 'What shall I think of Japan' p. 80ff.) The uninitiated require a dictionary in reading diplomatic documents. When A and B guarantee the independence and integrity of C, that means that they have agreed how C is to be partitioned. For example, England and France made a treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Morocco, with secret articles specifying the parts of Morocco which were to belong to France and Spain respectively. Ignorant people regarded the published articles as deceitful when the secret articles became known ; but those who understand the language of diplomacy could have inferred the secret articles from those which were published.
Accordingly the Chinese were justly alarmed when they learned that the Preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance mentions 'the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China' as one of the objects which the Alliance had in view. One of the most obviously legitimate of China's demands at Washington is that no treaties mentioning China shall be concluded without Chinese participation. We should certainly be surprised if we found that France and Italy had agreed to preserve the independence and integrity of Great Britain, especially if we had reason to think that France was going to preserve them in England and Italy in Scotland. Such agreements are an infringement of sovereignty, and are never concluded except as a prelude to interference.
I have considered the integrity of China in connection with Manchuria and Shantung ; I wish now to consider its independence. Apart from the military influence of Japan, all the powers except America have acquired rights which gravely limit the autonomy of China, and it is not easy to see how these rights are to be abrogated.
We may take as typical the question of the Chinese Customs. On this subject there is in 'The Times' of November 26 a leading article which is amazingly misleading, the writer of which (for the sake of his moral character) I presume to be profoundly ignorant. The facts are as follows : By the treaty of 1842, we stipulated with the Chinese that they were to impose a uniform duty of five per cent on all imports. By the treaty of 1858, it was agreed that this duty should be reckoned on a schedule of prices to be revised every ten years. It was, however, only revised twice, in 1901 and 1918, and on the latter occasion current prices were rejected as being inflated by the war, and the average prices of 1913-1916 were taken as the basis of the new schedule. In virtue of commercial treaties involving most-favoured-clauses, no alteration in tariff or schedule is possible without the unanimous consent of thirteen foreign Powers. Meanwhile the Customs receipts, while remaining essential for China's revenue, have become the security for the Boxer indemnity and for many loans. China is allowed by treaty to levy an export duty of not more than five per cent, and is compelled to do so, in spite of the bad effect on Chinese trade, because otherwise it would be impossible to raise sufficient revenue. It is obvious that this system constitutes at once a grave interference with Chinese independence and a serious drawback to Chinese industry, because all imports are charged at the same rate, whether they are raw materials or finished articles, necessaries or luxuries.
Quite distinct from this system, though also regulated by treaty, is the administration of the Customs. Ever since 1842, the collection of the duties has been under the control of foreigners. The system now in force for many years is that there is an Inspector-General, appointed by the Chinese Government, but bound by treaty to be British so long as the British Empire has a greater share of Chinese trade than any other Power. The Inspector-General has the appointment of his subordinates, and gives the higher posts to foreigners. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have figures) there were in the Customs administration 2'000 foreigners and 5'000 Chinese. The foreigners, from the inspector-General downwards, are responsible to China, not to their own governments. Sir Robert Hart, for many years Inspector-General, won universal admiration, and the Chinese themselves are quite content with the system for the present, since it affords a training-ground for more honest and efficient officials than those produced by traditional Chinese methods. Mr. Sih-Gung Cheng, M.A., B.Sc., in his book on 'Modern China' (an admirable work, published by the Clarendon Press), says :
'The foreign members of the staff have served China loyally, and have never shown any prejudice in favour of their own countries. They have maintained the standard of efficiency and vigilance set up by Sir Robert Hart, and have won the admiration of foreigners and the Chinese alike… So long as the loans and indemnities mortgaged on Customs receipts are not redeemed by China, it will be difficult to get the foreign Powers, who are distrustful of the Chinese on monetary matters, to consent to a restoration of the Customs Administration to the Chinese themselves. (Pp. 206-6).'
Reforming and patriotic Chinese desire fiscal autonomy for their country as regards the tariff, but are in no hurry to see a change as regards the administration of the Customs. Mr. Wellington Koo, at Washington, has issued a statement setting forth this point of view. 'The Times', in the leader mentioned above, assumes that it is the administration that he wishes to see in Chinese hands, and insinuates that the motive for this desire is the hope of corrupt pickings out of dishonest dealings with traders. The last two sentences deserve to be quoted :
'That the Mandarins would like to have the handling of the large sums receivable by the Customs is undoubted ; that the people would care to see it in their hands is very doubtful indeed. The eloquence of the Chinese delegates may delude the uninformed ; it can only serve to remind those who know Asiatics that the more an Oriental diplomatist is Westernized the less confidence does he command in the East.'
Was ever such an amazing insult of the Minister of a friendly Power ? Mr. Koo speaks throughout of the tariff, not of the administration. I do not know how long the writer of this tactful and polite article has spent in China, or how intimately he is acquainted with modern-minded reforming Chinese. Probably he only knows China through the reports of business men whom he has met in his club. I can assure him that 'those who know Asiatics', at any rate those who know them in China, do not take the view which he attributes to them. My own experience of the Chinese who have had a modern education was that they are as upright, as intelligent, as delicately considerate, and as free from national prejudice, as any set of men it has ever been my good fortune to meet. They have to contend against a mass of bad tradition in their own country, and they are intensely grateful for Western help in this struggle. But those who pretend that they are not to be trusted, and are only seeking to deceive the guileless Westerners, must be either very ignorant or very depraved. One is often tempted to think that Europeans wish China to remain weak and corrupt, in order that they may obtain such pickings as 'The Times' supposes Mr. Wellington Koo to hanker after. America has adopted a more enlightened policy, and there are signs that our Government intends to follow America's lead. Even Lord Northcliffe, since he visited Peking, has become a champion of China. But he has apparently not yet succeeded in impressing his new knowledge upon his organs at home.
I have no space to deal with various other issues, analogous to the tariff, involving China's legitimate claims to independence. In all these issues, men with financial motives which they dare not avow will mislead journalists and public opinion at home, if they can. It is therefore necessary to be very wary, and above all the remember that the Chinese are not an inferior race, but a great nation with a civilization at least as good as our own. Their only serious inferiority is in scientific homicide.

Mentioned People (1)

Russell, Bertrand  (Trelleck, Monmouthsire 1872-1970 Plas Penrhyn bei Penrhyndeudraeth, Wales) : Philosoph, Logistiker, Mathematiker, Literaturnobelpreisträger ; Dozent Cambridge, Oxford, London, Harvard University, Chicago, Los Angeles, Beijing

Subjects

Economics and Trade / Philosophy : Europe : Great Britain

Documents (1)

# Year Bibliographical Data Type / Abbreviation Linked Data
1 1920-1921 Russell, Bertrand. Uncertain paths to freedom : Russia and China, 1919-22. Bertrand Russell ; edited by Richard A. Rempel, Beryl Haslam ; with the assistance of Andrew Bone, Albert C. Lewis. (London : Routledge, 2000). (Russell, Bertrand. Works ; vol. 15). Publication / Russ6
  • Source: Zhang, Shenfu. Zhu Luosu qi shi. In : Xin hua ri bao ; 21. Mai (1942). [Bertrand Russell zum 70. Geb.] (Russ283, Publication)
  • Source: Zhang, Shenfu. Luosu : xian dai sheng cun zui wei da de zhe xue jia. In : Xin wen ping lun ; 12. April (1946). [Bertrand Russell, the greatest philosopher alive in the Modern age]. (Russ282, Publication)
  • Cited by: Zentralbibliothek Zürich (ZB, Organisation)