2005
Publication
# | Year | Text | Linked Data |
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1 | 1923 |
Knight, Nick. The dilemma of determinism : Qu Qiubai [ID D19698] / Marxist philosophy in China [ID D20184]. The initial theoretical preoccupation of theorists to the early Chinese communist movement was with the materialist conception of history and in particular the issue of the problematic relationship between the economic base and the politico-ideological superstructure. This preoccupation resulted from a concern over the implied deterministic tendency within Marxist social theory and a desire for some reassurance that human action, whether in the political, legal or ideological realms, could exert some influence on the course of history. What early Chinese Marxist theorists, such als Li Da discovered, when they turned their attention to the Marxist classics and the writings of contemporary European Marxists, was that Marxism was not a mechanistic theory insisting on a uniformly economisitc reading of the historical process. Rather, Marxism conceived of a dialectical interaction between economic base and politico-ideological superstructure, an interadction within which the economic base nevertheless retained causal dominance. It was not until 1923 that Qu Qiubai, the pioneer of Marxist philosophy in China, applied his formidable intellect to an attempted philosophical resolution of the dilemma of determinism within Marxism, and an explication of related issues such as materialism, logic, and epistemology. Qu's motivation for broaching this difficult theoretical exercise was twofold. The first was the need to dissemiante Marxist philosophy to members and supporters of the Chinese communist party. He was at that time the only theorist in the party, capapble of explaining Marxist philosophy. Qu was involved 1923 in the planning and establishment of Shanghai University, at which Marxist philosophy and social theory were to be taught. His lectures to two courses (Introduction to the social sciences, Outline of social philosophy) [ID D19717] represent the first concerted attempt to introduce Marxist philosophy to a Chinese audience and demonstrate a familiarity with the arcane terminology and subject matter of dialectical materialism quite lacking in the writings of other early Chinese Marxist theorists. His lectures formed the basis of several books and introduced a range of vocabulary, concepts, theoretical problems and modes of understanding to Marxist theory in China which laid the formation for the development of future philosophical discourse within the CCFP. The conclusion of Qu's inquiry into the dilemma of determinism was that Marxism is a determinist, not a fatalisitc theory. The martial character of the universe and society, whose existence and development were governed by natural laws, precluded the possibility of unconstrained voluntarism : humans could not act as they wished ; neither could they compel history in directions or at a speed contrary to its materialist structural constraints. Only through a scientific undertstanding of these constraints could the limited sphere of human agency be exploited ; and exploited it shoud be, for whatever could be done by humans to faciliate the social changes anticipated by Marxist theory had to be done. Qu's search in 1923 for a solution to the dilemma of determinism is significant as it indicates that the theoretical level of the early communist movement in China was not as low as some scholarly accounts have suggested. It also demonstrates, that interest in Marxist philosophy in China was genuinely motivated by personal interest and intellectual curiosity, and not just by the need to provide a philosophical nationale for the political struggles within the CCP. |
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2 | 1924 |
Qu, Qiubai. She hui ke xue jiang yi [ID D19717]. Nick Knight : Qu's initial foray into Marxist philosophy concentrated on its critique of the history of Western philosophy, although there are occasional references to other philosophical traditions, including China's. The purpose of his exploration into Western philosophy was to construct and map the historical development of the two great rival camps of philosophical thought : materialism and idealism. In Outline of social philosophy Qu considers why philosophy should have emerged at all, and why certain tendencies within it - idealism and materialism - should have become pronounced. He argues that philosophy developed as human knowledge became more complex, this giving rise to a variety of different sciences and the gradual specialisation of philosophy itself into methodology and epistemology. The root of philosophy was a concern with the nature of the universe. Materialism sets out from the objective (or nature, reality) and regards the subjective (or thought, mind) as built on objective reality. Idealism proceeds from the subjective, and perceives the objective as constructed on the basis of the subjective. Qu argues that the spiritualism of religion, which was inevitably in opposition to materialism, resulted from the attempt by 'primitive peoples' to explain their natural environment. The result was animism, a belief that natural phenomena were not themselves the result of natural causes, but of spirits residing within them. Qu employed the logical tensions within the philosophies of individual philosophers to prosecute his critique of idealism. In particular, he was sensitive to the way philosophers sometimes unwittingly incorporated both materialist and idealist elements within their largely idealist philosophies. The result was eclecticism, something that indicated an advance over pure idealism, but which nonetheless was tainted by its retention of idealist themes. Examples of such eclecticism are the philosophies of Brekeley, Voltaire, Kant and Huxley. Qu gives the example of Hegel and Schelling, both of whom believed in an 'absolute spirit' that supposedly incorporated both the subject and object, the spiritual and natural worlds. He does come to the defence of Spinoza, and argues that he is often incorrectly identified as an idealist philosopher. He concurs with Fauerbach that Spinoza's philosophy was actually a manifestation of the materialism of his time, although he was not able to escape the influence of the 'spirit of the age', and his materialism consquently assumed a theological garb. Qu consequently repudiates the idealists and neo-Kantians who accuse materialism of reducing psychological phenomena to material phenomena, for the distinction is a false one. He gives the exemple of Friedrich Lange who posed materialism a question to which it supposedly could not respond. Qu approvingly quotes Diderrot, a member of the neo-Spinozan school : "There is only matter in the universe and it can possess sense perceptions ; the existence of matter thus explains everything". Qu refers in passing to the realms of freedom and necessity. Freedom, he argues, is based on necessity, a knowledge of necessity. If humans know the natural laws of the universe, this will allow them freedom ; but the laws orf nature come first. |
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3 | 1924 |
Qu, Qiubai. Xian dai she hui xue [ID D19717]. Nick Knight : For Qu, the 'vexing problem' of the relationship between mind and matter had implications that extend beyond philosophy to the social sciences ; it was therfore essential to get a precise understanding of this relationship. The phenomena of the universe can be divided into two categories. The first (matter) has the capacity of 'extension' ; in other words, matter is all those things that exist in space, are in motion, and that can be experiences with the human senese. These are material phenomena. The second (mind) does not exist in space, and cannot be seen or experiences in the same way as material phenomena. Examples are human thought, will and feelings. Qu cites Descartes' aphorism - "I think, therefore I am" - to support the proposition that thoughts and feelings do have existence even though they are not material objects in the conventional sense. Qu's cirtique of social theory focused on three schools - Enlightenment, utopian socialist, and Hegelian - and employs these, supposedly incorrect, theories as foils to establish the objective correctness of Marxist social theory. Qu responds to these fine ideals dismissively : "We of the twentieth century understand that the supposedly rational world painted by Enlightenment philosophy was nothing more than a rationalisation of an emerging boureois society, in which perpetual justice became bourgeois laws, equality became formal legal equality, and the rational state became the bourgeois democratic republic". The Hegelian philosophy was quite different. Qu explains that Hegel had recognised that the universe is in a process of perpetual motion, change and devlopment ; and he sought the 'inner connections' of this motion, change and development. He recognised that history becomes the real process of the development of humankind, and that philosophy's task was to examine the way in which humans developed out of nature, and to discover laws from the myriad 'accidents' within this process. For Qu, these Hegelian postulates represented a significant achievement. Hegel's major failing was his idealism. Qu argues that, if the causal relationship articulated by Hegel was reversed, and based on a materialist premise, the positive, dialectical, dimension of his philosophy could be incorporated within scientific socialism. But for this to eventuate, fundamental change had to have occurred in social reality, and in particular the reality of capitalism. Qu moves with facility through the philosophies of some of the most difficult of Western thinkers : Plato, Socrates, Kant, Fichte, Berkeley, Voltaire, Hume, Huxley, Descartes, Diderot, Feuerbach, and Marx, as well as many lesser philosophical luminaries. He illustrated his materialist social philosophy by reference to Durkheim, James Mill, Comte, Spencer, Owen, Saint-Simon, and Fourier. His view on quantum mechanics, cosmology and evolution were reinforced by reference to Laplace, Darwin, Rutherford, and Moseley, amongst others. |
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4 | 1924 ca. |
Qu, Qiubai. Makesi he Engesi [ID D20185]. Nick Knight : It was Lenin's achievement that he had been able to correctly discern and explain the development of capitalism to its imperialist stage, and to read the tendencies of social development and exert his own revolutionary will in a way which exploited the potential for change evident in the 'objective environment'. Qu's depiction of Lenin as the 'instrument of history' is certainly not one of a figure overawed into passivity by the immensity of historical forces; indeed, there is not the slightest suggestion of fatalism in Qu's positive reading of Lenin's character or political career. By the same token, it is quite evident that Qu did not accept that Lenin, as an individual human, made history purely through the force of his intellect or the steely determination of his political will. These undoubtedly were significant factors, but quite secondary to the objective context within which Lenin found himself. Lenin, like all historical leaders, might find ways to redesign the stage settings; but the stage on which he played was itself inherited from the past, and not of his own choosing or making. Similarly, while Marx was a product of his historical environment, his greatness derived from his capacity to comprehend the historical changes set in motion by the emergence of industrial capitalism and articulate these in a manner which could inspire in the working class a widespread desire for change. Qu's biographical sketch of Marx and Engels stresses the historical context of their youth and the influences exerted on their families by the fact that Rhineland was comparatively underdeveloped industrially, and consequently influenced the more of ideals of the French Revolution ; indeed, their fathers and uncles were contemporaries of the French Revolution and had grown up in its shadow. While Marx, like Lenin, was a product of his historical environment, his greatness derived from his capacity to comprehend the historical changes set in motion by the emergence of industrial capitalism and articulate these in a manner which could inspire in the working class a widespread desire for change. |
# | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
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1 | 1924 ca. |
Qu, Qiubai. Makesi he Engesi. (1924). In : Qu Qiubai wen ji ; vol. 7 (1987-1995). [Marx und Engels]. 马克思和恩格斯 |
Publication / QuQ10 |
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# | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
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1 | 2007- | Worldcat/OCLC | Web / WC |
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