2007
Publication
# | Year | Text | Linked Data |
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1 | 1900-2000 |
John Dewey and China : general. 1956 Michael, Franz H. ; Taylor, George E. : John Dewey's message was that democracy could be achieved only through a slow process and that social objectives were relative. He was particularly interested in the scientific approach which he described as the search 'for concrete methods to meet concrete problems according to the exigencies of time and place'. In contrast to the apparent indefiniteness of his general social philosophy, the Communist theory provided the Chinese intellectuals with a system which also claimed to be scientific and to be based on a materialistic and antimetaphysical interpretation of human life… The pragmatists helped to prepare the way for the spread of materialism in the next decades. By joining in the attack against Confucianism they discredited the traditional value system, but themselves offered no system of values. They proposed solutions to the problems of the day according to what Dewey called 'exigencies of time and place'. Because the pragmatists themselves tend toward a materialistic and utilitarian interpretation they offered little resistance to communist doctrine. 1960 Thomas Berry : Dewey's influence in the philosophical order might be described as a further development of the positivism that began to dominate the intellectual life of China after Yan Fu published his translation of Thomas Huxley's 'Evolution and ethics' in 1898. We can follow the later development of this positivism, especially in the years just preceding Dewey's arrival, in the pages of the periodical Xin qing nian. Hu Shi from his earliest years as a student was responsive to the attraction of Western materialist philosophy. He saw in science and technology something more spiritual than material. He developed the religious enthusiasm for Dewey's pragmatism. Hu was in close contact with the intellectual life of China during the critical years of its transition. Through him the new conception of the human mind as the instrument of pragmatic adaption to reality was transplanted to China. Hu sought especially to relate Chinese philosophical systems to their historical and social setting. In the field of philosophy, other traditions have been stronger than that of Dewey and Hu Shi. As a special school of philosophy pragmatism was vigorous for only a few years. Since the middle 1920's, pragmatism as a system has been overshadowed by other Western philosophies. Pragmatists, including Hu, turned their attention to educational reform, social reconstruction and political revolution. The philosophical arena was taken over by neo-Realism, rationalistic and idealistic neo-Confucianism, and finally by Marxism. The Marxist challenge to Dewey proved to be more effective than the Confucian or the idealist. Marxism began to awaken in the Chinese a response of very great depth and enthusiasm. Positivism and Hegelian idealism, with their insistence on the progressive stages of development in the mind of man, had prepared the way. Neither Dewey nor his followers realized how powerful and influence Marxist-Leninist Communism would become. During the two years of his venture in China, Dewey made the greatest single effort ever made to bring China into the new age of Western liberalism in political life, of radical empiricism in philosophy, and of progressivism in education. Most important was the philosophical weakness of his position. It offered no satisfactory alternative to the traditional humanism that in former centuries had fashioned the Confucian virtues in the individual person and which had given inner vitality to the social structure. His educational program contained some excellent ideas which could be most beneficial in the training of the young, but only within a more adequate philosophical and religious context which his philosophy could not supply. His cause was in trouble from the lack of strength in the existing Chinese government. Liberalism can grow and develop only within an ordered society. Liberalism supposes order, it does not create order. His cause was in trouble from the existing antagonism toward the West rising from resentment against the colonial systems that had been imposed on so many Asian peoples. The greatest influence of Dewey in China has been in the field of education. An ideal situation existed for his work as educator, a situation much more favorable, than the situation in America, for Chinese students had a sense of political and social involvement lacking among students in America. Detached intellectual speculation was as impossible and as undesirable for them as for Dewey. 'Education for living' had a welcome meaning to students anxious to make their contribution to the welfare of their society. Dewey constantly encouraged the Chinese to take the initiative in bringing their nation into its proper place in the modern world. Dewey's confidence in the power of the human mind to find its own way and his opposition to indoctrination of though upon the mind of other persons were embodied in his insistence that the Chinese should administer their own affairs. The achievement of Dewey was to strengthen the bonds of American-Chinese association. After his visit, other professors from America, particularly educators, were invited to China to assist in establishing training centers for teachers and to develop research program to guide and promote the new effort at the universal education of the Chinese people in accord with modern standards. Three achievements of Dewey should be balanced against a consideration of the detrimental effects of his influence : 1) In accenting the positivistic approach in communication between China and America, Dewey created further difficulties in spiritual communication between the two countries. 2) In encouraging the Chinese people to an immediate and thorough adaptation to the modern age, he helped to turn them further dependence on the West. 3) In fostering a closer association between China and America on the philosophical basis of pragmatism, he helped to alienate the more humanistic forces of China and thereby created an area of antagonism as well as an area of agreement. 1960 Chow, Tse-tsung [Zhou, Cezong]. The May fourth movement : Intellectual revolution in modern China. (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1960). Chow notes on John Dewey : When Dewey classified in his lectures all social problems into three categories – economic, political, and intellectual – Dewey pointed out that economic problems were the most important, because, as he said, 'economic life is the foundation of all social life'. But the significant economic problem discussed by Dewey did not attract enough attention from his Chinese students and friends and other Chinese liberals. Chinese liberals at this time were preoccupied with educational reform, academic research, and the reevaluation of national classics. Few of them considered seriously the problem of the application of democray in China in terms of economic organization and practice. This was undoubtedly one of the major causes of their waning influence on the public following their dramatic role in attacking the traditional ideology and institutions. 1972 Ou Tsui-chen : For China, Dewey suggests some practical measures to realize the ideal of democracy. He does not think it necessary to follow the Western pattern to go through self-seeking individualism and then employ the power of state to equalize society. She may, he thinks, amalgamate these two steps at one stroke. Since in China political individualism has not made headway, traditional paternalism can be turned into the protection of its citizens by a democratic government. In dealing with cultural problems, Dewey proposes to attach great importance to the authority of science instead of the authority of tradition. He pleads for free thinking and free expression of thought. In addition to a prosperous material life, he advocates a free intellectual life. To fulfill this ideal, he stresses the importance of using education as an efficient tool. As the lectures were delivered shortly after the New Culture Movement had begun in Beijing and Chinese traditional morality was under severe criticism, Dewey's lectures often refer to the Movement and particularly to Chinese morality. Contrary to what might be expected, Dewey never advances any extreme view with regard to the then prevailing moral revolution. He takes a middle-of-the-road position vis-à-vis the conflict between the moralities old and new. At the end of his lectures, Dewey makes an excellent comparison between Eastern and Western ethical thought. He first states that morality is a function of the environment and varies with it. So it is difficult to judge which morality has more value than another. There is no doubt whatsoever that of all Western educators Dewey most influence the course of Chinese education, while his influence on Chinese thought, politics, and society in general is a controversial question difficult to resolve. A number of educational reforms and practices were introduced in China which reflected Dewey's influence : 1) Chinese educational aims were reconsidered in the light of Dewey's thought. 2) The national school system was reformed according to the American pattern. 3) Child-centered education was faced in the revision of the curriculum. 4) The new method of teaching according to the pragmatic theory was promoted. 5) Experimental schools were multiplied. 6) Student government as a mode of school discipline was promoted. 7) Literary reform and the adoption of textbooks for elementary schools written in the spoken Chinese language were encouraged. 1973 Robert W. Clopton ; Tsuin-chen Ou : Dewey's stay in China was one of the most significant and influential events in recent Chinese cultural history, but the Chinese have been so familiar with Dewey's influence that they have not bothered to analyze it, nor even to write extensively about it. Americans, on the other hand are largely unfamiliar with Dewey's impact on Chinese thought. In view of the reputation he established throughout the world, it is scarcely surprising that special attention to Dewey's Chinese sojourn should have been delayed. Yet there can be no doubt that China was the one foreign country on which Dewey exercised his greatest influence, particularly in the field of education. When we consider Dewey's impact on Chinese thought and education, we think first of the warmth of his reception in China. All who met him were impressed by his personality, his intellectual honesty, his enthusiasm, his simplicity of nature, his friendliness, and his sympathetic understanding of the Chinese people and their problems. All these characteristics contributed to his popularity both among the intellectuals and among the common people. On one occasion Cai Yuanpei, chancellor of National Beijing University, even likened him to Confucius. Another factor which contributed to Dewey's popularity among the Chinese was that, as an American, he represented the one great nation friendly to China and opposed to its partition by the great powers. Two important institutions were the main centers of Dewey's influence in China, both during his stay and after his departure. These were the National Beijing University and the National Nanjing Teachers College. Both had at their head men who had been Dewey's student : Chiang Monlin in Beijing and P.W. Kuo in Nanjing. Hu Shi involved Dewey in the New Culture movement. The other important institutions of higher learning helped to extend Dewey's influence throughout China : Beijing Teachers College of which Li Jianxun was president, and Nankai University in Tianjin, of which Zhang Boling was president. Dewey's impact was primarily on political and social trends. In his lectures he advocated democray – social, political, and economic. He opposed both laissez-faire individualism and Marxist Communism. While he proposed a general ideal, he refused to advocate any all-embracing ism or any concrete program for action. His principle of the primacy of method also dominated his social and political thinking. Dewey took an unequivocally anti-Communist position, severely criticizing and pointedly repudiating Marxism. In a speech delivered in Fujian he blamed the Communists for neglecting critical thought and for their blind obedience. Dewey most influenced the course of Chinese education, both in theory and practice. His philosophy of education dominated the teaching of educational theory in all teachers colleges and in university departments of education for many years. His textbook 'Democracy and education' was used everywhere, either as a text or as a work of reference. Dewey's disciples Dao Jixing and Chen Heqin (1892-1982) were the most responsible for spreading his influence in China. They developed her own system, taking Dewey's educational theory as her starting point. Dewey's influence in Chinese thought and education was dominant from1919 until1920. His influence first began to diminish after the May 30 incident in Shanghai in 1925. After the Nationalists came to power in 1927, Dewey's influence was seriously undermined. After 1949, the Chinese communists followed Soviet authorities and educators in their denunciation of Dewey and his followers. 1977 Barry Keenan : The most characteristic aspect of Dewey's lectures in China was his insistence that the fields of philosophy, education, and political theory incorporate modern science. He meant in particular the methodological importance of testing hypotheses with verifying evidence, and the implications of the Darwinian theory of evolution. The democratizing of society was linked by Dewey directly to the scientific revolution. His audiences in China were introduced to democracy and the philosophy of experimentalism, with both portrayed as related developments in the history of Western thought. Dewey's explanation of the role of the development of modern science in the West emphasized some points that were particularly designed for his Chinese audiences. One of these was the effect of science on human values and temperament. Dewey felt that the two or three hundred years in which the West had materialistically and morally undergone the effects of science accounted for the most evident differences between the East and West. Dewey's discussion of values extended to some criticism of the way ethics was taught in Chinese schools. In China the school system provided set course on 'ethical education' at the primary and secondary levels. Dewey attacked the theory behind such course, namely, that morality could be presented as a body of facts and knowledge. In his China lectures, Dewey felt it important to emphasize the child-centered curriculum – a turning away from classroom emphasis on subject matter to emphasis on the growth of the child. He dedicated one of his first lectures in Beijing to a discussion of the natural instincts and inherent dispositions of a child, which he considered 'the natural foundation of education'. Child-centered education should be a priority for China, Dewey felt, as a departure from the stratified society or authoritarian tradition that tended to promote the 'pouring in' of accepted subject matter as education. In the democratic society Dewey was told China was trying to create, there had to be equal opportunity for each child to develop his potentialities and become a participating citizen. It was important during a period of rapid social change, Dewey noted, that the younger generation be able to adapt to new conditions. Dewey's comments on reform in China were undoubtedly guided by his coaches and spokesmen, Hu Shi and Chiang Menglin. Many references appear in his lectures relating his educational ideas to social change and 'modernization' in China. Socialization of the child should not only give him or her a critical attitude toward tradition, but also develop his or her critical judgment about contemporary social and political conditions. Dewey and his followers in China felt that the school should be the basic unit in the reconstruction of China. Other institutions of social reform and betterment such as law and political parties, lacked the power of education to carry out deep and lasting change. The experience of going to school gave a child his first daily contact with an environment broader than the family. Dewey pointed out that it was the role of the school to present the world of human knowledge in order to extend the limits of the child's environment. Dewey's discussion of the nature of democracy in his China lectures were a kind of final equilateral component in the triangular connection of democracy, the experimental method, and the democratic education. The democratization of knowledge by science had led historically to an increase in the role of the common people in society, as Dewey saw it, and the connection between scientific knowledge and democracy remained close. As he said soon after arriving in Beijing : 'A person in a democratic country must have the power of independent judgment, the power to think freely, and the actual opportunity to experiment. He must be able to use his own ability to choose the direction of his ideas and his behavior.' In the process of formulating a pragmatic philosophy of politics Dewey discussed rugged individualism, Marxism, and socialism. He warned China to avoid the dangers of rugged individualism. Throughout his lectures he endorsed the idea that individuals should be able to develop themselves to their full potential. The dangers of uncontrolled individualism were emphasized by Dewey because he feared China, in the throes of liberating itself from the authority of the state and the family system, would be prone to fall into its opposite extreme of radical individualism. Dewey was critical of Marxism in his lectures. He pointed out that Marxian theory had failed on two counts : 1) although capital squeezed out competition as predicted, the workers came to fare better and better- the poor did not become poorer and poorer ; 2) the prediction regarding industrial nations being the first to change to socialism was erroneous and shed doubt on the rest of the theory. The question of labor discontent was taken very seriously by Dewey, but he addressed himself critically to Marx's theory of alienation. Dewey was not so critical of some non-Marxian types of socialism. Guild socialism in particular had several points Dewey thought appropriate to China's needs. The existence of guilds in China – for railroads, mines, forests, and roads – provided a natural organizational unit which could be useful in China's transformation from a handicraft to an industrial economy. Dewey called for Chinese reformers to retain a direct connection between the past and change. Dewey's views called for a re-evaluation of traditional customs and institutions, but not for their rejection. Intensive study of the past were encouraged, so that the indigenous cultural traits and institutions relevant to contemporary needs could be discovered and conserved. Dewey's lectures gave many liberal Chinese reformers an unusual opportunity to study and apply an extremely up-to-date and philosophically reliable formulation of the modern democracy. What Dewey said in these lectures, was his own first-draft attempt to see how well pragmatism might be applied to politics. 1995 Su Zhixin : Deweyan experimentalism – as a way of thinking, as a way of acting politically, and as a component of democratic education – offered no strategy Dewey's followers could use to affect political power. Without such a strategy, failure was the main consequence of his followers' pragmatic reform efforts. Their reformism was paralyzed by dilemma. Dewey himself recognized this failure after his visit to China, writing, "The difficulties in the way of a practical extension and regeneration of Chinese education are all but insuperable. Discussion often ends in an impasse : no political reform of China without education ; but no development of schools as long as military men and corrupt officials divert funds and oppose schools from motives of self-interest. Here are the materials of tragedy of the first magnitude". The experimentalist philosophy, conceiving in a rich, literature, industrial, and relatively serene America and propagated by well-intentioned, but somewhat sheltered, Chinese intellectuals, was finally not appropriate for a huge, varied, agricultural, particularistic country. Maybe this is an important reason for Dewey's silence about his historic visit to China, and his views on educational development in China in his later years. The American scholars conduct their evaluation in a purely academic manner, and they are not personally affected by the consequences of what they say or write because they are far detached from the Chinese reality. The Chinese scholars, on the other hand, have to pay attention to the political climate while conducting their evaluation of Western influence because what they say will directly affect their academic careers and personal lives – being 'politically incorrect' in academic discourse could result in the loss of jobs and alienation of families. In general, the Chinese do not differ from their American counterparts in their acknowledgment of the strong and widespread influence of Dewey's ideas on Chinese educational theory and practice. While the Americans do not question Dewey's sincerity in promoting the development of a democratic society or the worthiness of Dewey's ideas for Chinese schools and society ; some praise him as a saint, while others condemn him as an enemy. In many ways, it has been an ideological struggle between Dewey's pragmatism and experimentalism and Marxist-Leninist Communism. Deng Xiaoping's political and economic pragmatism paved the way for Chinese intellectuals to become infatuated once again with Western pragmatism. Under these circumstances, a serious reevaluation of Dewey's influence on Chinese education has begun to emerge among Dewey scholars and concerned educators in China. Some critics suggest that the worthiness of certain elements in Dewey's educational philosophy and its status in the history of philosophy should be reevaluated. They recommend that instead of totally denying Dewey, the Chinese should critically borrow and make use of Dewey's ideas in Chinese educational practices. 1999 David L. Hall ; Roger T. Ames : The New Culture Movement was initially anti-Confucian, and Dewey's thought was seen to be in radical opposition to traditional Confucian ideas. When Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang promoted a return to many of the traditional Chinese values and institutions, Dewey's thought was deemed unacceptable due to its foreign origin. When the communists came to power, Dewey's thought was roundly condemned as an expression of Western imperialism. After the establishment of the People's Republic, a purge of Deweyan pragmatism was begun. Literally millions of words were written refuting Dewey's works. The reasons for Dewey's failure finally to influence China were largely associated with his refusal to take a wholesale approach to social problems. Always warning the Chinese against the uncritical importation of Western ideas, as well as the uncritical rejection of traditional Chinese values, Dewey, in spite of his radical reconstruction of the popular democratic ideal, was simply too moderate for a China in search of revolution. It was practically inevitable, that Marxism's wholesale ideology would replace Dewey's decidedly retail philosophy. Dewey's educational reforms, badly misunderstood and only partially applied from the beginning, have long since been effectively abandoned. His understanding of democracy was never altogether in the mainstream. In many ways, the opportunity to introduce a reconstructed idea of democracy seems to have been lost as surely in America as it was in China. 1999 Kim Bong-ki : Dewey traf in China zu einem Zeitpunkt ein, als sich das Land in nahezu allen Bereichen in einer Phase des Umbruchs befand, dessen Ursache externer wie interner Natur war. Die Probleme rührten vornehmlich von der Begegnung mit dem Westen her, der die wissenschaftliche Revolution und die darauf folgende industrielle Revolution früher in Gang gesetzt hatte. Hinzu kamen innere Schwierigkeiten in Form einer prekären Wirtschaftslage, grassierender Korruption und eines in weiten Teilen der Bevölkerung als ungerecht empfundenen Steuersystems. Angesichts der Vielzahl und der Schwere der Probleme erstellte Dewey auf der Grundlage seiner pragmatistischen Gesellschaftstheorie eine konkrete Diagnose und entwickelte Reformvorschläge für die Erneuerung der traditionellen chinesischen Gesellschaft. Die – in Deweys Sicht – hinreichende Ausstattung der chinesischen Kultur mit demokratischen Elementen : Abschaffung der Feudalherrschaft in der Antike, prinzipieller Zugang zur Bildung für alle, besondere Betonung der Erziehung führt ihn zu der Erwartung, China könne den Übergang zum Industrialismus noch kreativer und effektiver durchführen, als der Westen dies geleistet habe. Dewey These von der Verankerung demokratischer Elemente in der chinesischen Tradition findet ihre Bestätigung in den Konzeptionen des 'tian-ming' (Mandat des Himmels) mit einer verbindlichen Tugendlehre für die Herrscher, ihrer Machtbegrenzung und Fürsorgepflicht für das Volk, und des 'yanlu' (Wege der Kommunikation), eines Bestandteils der konfuzianischen Staatsauffassung, in dem Missstände der Beamtenschaft bis hin zur Kritik am Kaiser verzeichnet waren. Was den Erfolg im Sinne Deweys um eine Transformation Chinas anbetrifft, wird man, aufs Ganze gesehen, sagen können, dass der Pragmatismus sich nicht dauerhaft durchzusetzen vermochte, dass er am ehesten noch in der Erziehung zum Tragen kam. Wenn es überhaupt zu positiven Ergebnissen gekommen ist, lässt sich dies darauf zurückführen, dass Dewey die von ihm selbst vorgegebene Prämisse der Vermeidung eines geraden westlichen Transfers nach China ernstgenommen hat. Das amerikanische Konzept der Progressiven Schule wurde von Dewey modifiziert und auf die chinesischen Bedürfnisse zugeschnitten. So war zwar die 'Progressive Education' darauf gerichtet, den in der veränderten Lebenswelt aufgetretenen neuen Herausforderungen zu begegnen, die bewahrenswerten Elemente der chinesischen Tradition sollten aber für die Gegenwart fruchtbar gemacht, die spezifischen Bedingungen und Erfordernisse Chinas in das Bildungssystem eingebracht werden. Als größter einleitender Schritt für eine allgemeine elementare Erziehung kann die unter Deweys Einfluss von Hu Shi vollzogene Einführung einer an der Umgangssprache ausgerichteten Schriftsprache - 'baihua' - gelten, die seither landesweit im Gebrauch ist. Weitere erfolgversprechende Ansätze erbrachten die Schülerselbstverwaltung und die Dezentralisierung der Schulkontrolle und Schulsteuerung, derzufolge den Erfordernissen der örtlichen Umgebung besser entsprochen werden konnte. Deweys Pragmatismus hat es als einzige westliche philosophische Strömung unternommen, Reformvorschläge für die Behebung der chinesischen Kulturkrise in der Zeit nach dem ersten Weltkrieg auszuarbeiten. In zeitlicher Parallelität zur Rezeption und der Interpretation der Ideen Deweys durch die chinesischen Pragmatisten verlief die gesamte Reformbewegung, wobei der Themenkreis die Kritik an den traditionellen Wertmaßstäben, Gebräuchen und Institutionen, die Ordnung des nationalen Erbes durch kritische Interpretation der überlieferten Geschichte, Literaturkritik und die Sprachreform umfasste. Hinsichtlich des Versuches der Schüler Deweys, seine politischen Ideen in die Praxis umzusetzen, muss gesagt werden, dass es bei dem Versuch geblieben ist. Im Sommer 1919 brach eine In zeitlicher Parallelität zur Rezeption und der Interpretation der Ideen Deweys durch die chinesischen Pragmatisten verlief die gesamte Reformbewegung, wobei der Themenkreis die 'Debatte über Probleme und Ismen' bzw. 'Reform und Revolution' auf, die für die folgenden 30 Jahre der politischen Entwicklung Chinas von Bedeutung war, weil sie in der Öffentlichkeit eine intellektuelle Spaltung der Liberalen und Linken hervorrief, die nicht rückgängig gemacht wurde. Während Li Dazhao, Gründer der KPCh, die marxistische Theorie als Alternative zur grundlegenden Lösung für alle gesellschaftlichen Probleme befürwortete, lehnte Hu Shi einen allumfassenden Ismus oder ein konkretes Programm für Aktionen ab und plädierte nachdrücklich für die Reformidee des Pragmatismus, der wegen seiner kritischen Potenz und des Fehlens dogmatischer Züge von einer anderen Qualität ist: die gesellschaftliche und politische Erneuerung durch schrittweise Progressivität, den einzigen in seiner Sicht gangbaren Weg. 2001 Martina Eglauer : Die Wissenschaft stellt nach Deweys Auffassung für China während der Umbruchsphase eine wichtige, ja sogar die einzig mögliche konstruktive Hilfe zur Umgestaltung der Gesellschaft dar. Die solle die neue 'Autorität', im Sinne von 'any thought or belief which directs human behaviour', sein und die zukünftige Orientierung liefern. Die Wissenschaft könne in Zukunft die Rolle übernehmen, die die Tradition in der Vergangenheit einnahm. Seine radikaldemokratische Auffassung, die die Entwicklung und Förderung des wissenschaftlichen Geistes in einer demokratischen Gemeinschaft verankert, versucht Dewey auch in China zu vermitteln, denn wissenschaftliche Erziehung ist für ihn gleichzeitig auch demokratische Erziehung. Nachdem die Wissenschaft jedermann zugänglich sein solle, sei eine Erziehungs- und Bildungsreform erforderlich, welche die traditionellen Lehrmethoden durch neue Methoden ersetzt. Wissenschaft könne nur auf dem Boden intellektueller Freiheit optimal gedeihen. Dewey verweist darauf, dass Wissenschaft nicht einfach mit Technologie identifiziert werden dürfe. Im Hinblick auf den 'wissenschaftlichen Geist', der für die Entwicklung der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft eine wesentlich fundamentalere Rolle spiele, als einzelne Technologien und Errungenschaften, diagnostiziert Dewey einen Aufklärungsbedarf für China. China könne bei der Entwicklung der wissenschaftlichen Methode von den Erfahrungen des Westens profitieren, und gleichzeitig aus den Fehlern des Westens lernen. Dewey bescheinigt China zwar ein mangelndes Bewusstsein im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung des wissenschaftlichen Geistes, er geht aber von einer grundsätzlichen, verbindenden Rationalität aus. Der wissenschaftliche Geist gilt für ihn nicht als westliches Spezifikum, sondern als unviersales Vermögen, das allen Menschen zu eigen ist. Aus pragmatistischer Sicht ist die Situation in China stark veränderungsbedürftig. Das geistige Klima, welches Dewey vorfindet, ist noch vorwiegend von den alten Traditionen und Strukturen verhaftet und die traditionellen Werte und Gewohnheiten erweisen sich als gesellschaftsbestimmende Konstanten. Für das Reformprojekt in China übernimmt Hu Shi ungebrochen das pragmatistische Wissenschaftsverständnis seines Lehrers Dewey, das er als wirksame Methode für die kulturelle Erneuerung vorstellt. Umgekehrt wirken seine, unter pragmatistischer Perspektive getätigten Analysen auf die Diskussion in der westlichen Philosophie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte zurück. 2002 Jay Martin : After his trips to Japan and China, Dewey had become a changed person, an evolving person. His educational vision and his political understanding had broadened beyond American boundaries to include the world. Dewey was indeed transformed by his trip to the Far East from U.S. philosopher to a transnational philosopher. In addition, after his visit to China, Dewey maintained his noninterventionist approach to international politics. Dewey's visit to China and his efforts to help modernize China's schools, which were widely reported and recognized, led to many invitations from other foreign governments to inspect their education systems. 2003-2004 Sor-hoon Tan : Hu Shi was promoting Dewey's philosophy while he was still developing it. Hu's pragmatist work in China, his promotion of vernacular literature, was an important contribution because it made possible 'the means of communication and publicity required for democracy'. Dewey's views on the process of thought were extremely important in the development of Hu's intellectual method. And much of Hu's life was devoted to the social inquiry that Dewey argued has to be at the center of democratic life, even though the inquiry was necessarily imperfect given the circumstances, and Hu was inclined to a more individualistic view of inquiry than was warranted by Dewey's conception of democracy. Hu Shi, explaining Dewey's views on thinking, singles out 'the cultivation of creative intelligence' as 'the greatest aim of Dewey's philosophy ; it is creative intelligence that will enable human beings to respond satisfactorily to their environments, both physical and social. In his own way, Hu tried to realize Dewey's scientific method as intelligent practice, to transform his own experience and his country's. Hu believed that science could solve moral and political problems. These sentiments echo those in Dewey's 'Reconstruction of philosophy'. Dewey also believed that philosophy has much to learn from modern science, and that the lesson would improve philosophy's ability to handle what should be its central task, solving the problems of humanity, especially moral and social problems. Hu Shi was not misreading or misapplying Dewey when he defended the relevance of science to life, including its moral and political aspects ; but he was less sensitive than Dewey to the dangers of worshiping the achievements of the physical sciences, because he believed that China's backwardness rendered it much more in need of the benefits of science than at risk from science's evils. This does not mean that he would not have agreed with Dewey's clarification that there are important differences between physical sciences and social sciences. Hu's interpretation of pragmatism as method has considerable support from Dewey's writings, he sometimes exaggerated Dewey's own emphasis on method. Referring to Dewey's 1907 'What pragmatism means by practical', he claimed that 'Dewey, from beginning to end, only recognized pragmatism as a method'. Hu borrowed from Dewey much more than the mere formulation of an intellectual methodology. While he pointed out that Dewey's visit to China gave his Chinese audience 'no specific proposals such as communism, anarchism, or free love [but] a philosophical method which enabled [them], through its use, to solve [their] own special problems'. In Dewey's theory and practice, politics and education are integrated in the endeavor to bring about democracy. Dewey endorsed Hu Shi's strategic exclusion of political involvement only to the extent that the politics in question was of a variety that sill awaited reconstruction if it was to contribute to democratization. While Hu and Dewey were not against radical changes, they did not believe in 'revolutionary changes' that break completely with the past. The misplaced denial of the inherent continuity of experience even in the midst of the most drastic discontinuities would only lead to the destruction of not only obsolete customs and institutions but also the values those customs and institutions were originally intended to serve, values that may still be relevant to the new situation. What Dewey's experimentalism led Hu Shi to reject was an undemocratic power struggle that might ensure short-term political victory only at the cost of the eventual defeat of democracy. Hu's attempt to realize Dewey's pragmatism in China may not have succeeded in bringing about democracy, but we should not overlook the democratic significance and far-reaching effect of certain aspects of the education and cultural reforms he and other initiated. If Hu Shi seems a little selective in his presentation and interpretation of pragmatism, we must remember that he was promoting Dewey's philosophy even as Dewey was still developing it. Moreover, from a pragmatist perspective, his mentor's views are not absolute truths ; they are tools to be used appropriately in the circumstances. 2007 Jessica Wang : Many know that Dewey went to China to teach, but few know that he went because he wanted to learn. Dewey taught the Chinese a lot about the West and learned a great deal about China. Even though he may have had some exposure to Chinese culture through his Chinese students at Columbia University, it was not enough to prepare him to be a China expert. Most of Dewey's writings about China are the result of his own observations, assisted by his conversations with various people – his own students and translators, travel guides, missionary friends, academic acquaintances, and institutional hosts – and, most important, by his own study of Chinese history. In his sojourn, Dewey learned about the Chinese social psychology and philosophy of life. At the same time, he also came to understand the West and to question its Eurocentric worldviews. His presence in China opened his eyes to the dark realities of international politics, it also sheltered him from criticism for his idealistic support for the war. Coinciding with the well-known May fourth movement, Dewey's two-year visit demarcated a significant episode in the history of intellectual exchange between China and the United States. One of the most important episodes in the history of intellectual exchange was to grow out of the effort of the U.S. government to promote the education of China's young elites. The encounter between Dewey and China in the 1920s was characterized by ambivalences, uncertainties, and changes on both sides. Faced with challenges from the West, Chinese intellectuals had initially sought to acquire Western technology and implement Western institutions. Later, they realized that they had to study the ideas that inform Western development and practice. During the two years of his stay, Dewey came into contact with these contending ideologies. Although Chinese intellectuals had ambivalent attitudes toward the West, Dewey had his doubts about how the United States should respond to China, or rather, how the United States could help China. Dewey was trying to understand China and its precarious position in the international world, while Chinese intellectuals were trying to understand Dewey and his position in their ideological battles. In the 1920s, Chinese opinions of Dewey reflected their own vexed interests in liberalism, neo-traditionalism, and Marxism. In the 1930s and 1940s, as China underwent a series of domestic and international wars, a natural eclipse of interest in Dewey occurred. Since the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, the dialogue between Dewey and China took a drastic turn. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese Communist government launched a large-scale campaign to purge the pragmatic influences of Hu Shi and Dewey. During this period, pragmatism was eschewed as an evil influence of Western imperialism and capitalism. In the 1980s, due to the reform and open door policy of China, the dialogue about Dewey was revived. Since then, Chinese scholars have started to reevaluate Dewey and pragmatism. Dewey's experimental theory of inquiry made him qualified as 'Mr. Science'. His promotion of democratic ideals earned him the legitimate title of 'Mr. Democracy'. His concerns for the education of the masses contributed to his reputation as the common people's educator. The three topics on science, democracy, and education are chosen for many reasons. First, they constitute the major themes of Dewey's lectures ; second, they reflected the interests and concerns of his Chinese hosts ; and third, they evoked considerable responses and criticisms from his audience. Dewey knew that in their attempt to emulate Western technology, the Chinese tended to espouse a one-sided, mechanistic view of science, paying attention merely to the products, not the process of science. Therefore in his lectures, Dewey stressed science as a method of thinking, knowing, and acting that has a positive impact on morals and values. During his visit, Dewey was often asked about ways China could avoid the pitfalls of Western materialistic culture. He admitted that love of money, cruelty in military battles, and contention between capital and labor accompanied material progress in the West. He hoped that the Chinese would come to appreciate science as a method of intelligence for coping with problems and difficulties in ordinary life, rather than as a collection of objective truth. Knowing that such a view of science was not even widely shared in the West, he somehow hoped that the Chinese would consider his suggestions, particularly when they planned for education reform. Dewey was aware of the increasing trend toward individualism in China and was wary of its concomitant problems. He advised the Chinese not to follow the same path Western nations had taken – namely, going through a stage of self-seeking individualism to the next stage in which state power had to be used to ensure social equality. He believed that Chinese culture was endowed with democratic elements that would enable her to carry out the transition to industrialism more creatively and effectively than the West had done. Even though Dewey had great sympathy for the struggles of the Chinese and admired many unique qualities of Chinese culture, he was not uncritical of their weaknesses – their passivity and reliance on authority. Therefore, in his lectures, he often stressed the importance of spontaneity, creativity, and initiative, reminding his audience that they needed to reconcile partisan disputes and undertake practical tasks that demands large-scale organization and cooperation. Knowing that the Chinese had learned to organize themselves to operate on a national level, Dewey suggested that schools should cultivate a sense of public spirit extending beyond the students' immediate environments. Dewey's political activism often runs a sharp contrast to Hu Shi's conservatism. Dewey exerted little influence in Hu's pragmatist experiment in China, even though Dewey was also a participant. Dewey was aware that Hu's reform approach was not very practical, that intellectual, attitudinal changes still depended on concrete changes in economic and social conditions, but Dewey was in no position to intervene. Dewey acknowledged the New Culture group Hu led and was willing to 'give face' to their liberal ideals. 2007 Ding Zijiang : Dewey's philosophy was very attractive to Chinese intellectuals because he seemed to give them an 'easygoing' and also 'efficient' way to deal with many current issues. He taught the Chinese people (1) to pay more attention to practical effectiveness rather than man's knowledge of transmaterial being or all former illusions about transcendent truths ; (2) to concern themselves with those immediate problems of individual and social life rather than the past heritage of culture, which had limited the country's development, and any abstract and all-embracing 'ism' which was not urgent for today's actual life, and (3) to consider intelligence as an instrument for meeting and mastering the new social environment. Dewey's pragmatism was suitable for a certain aspect of Chinese thought patterns. Dewey's pragmatism as a method is congenial to the practical mentality and disposition of the Chinese people, and it is also a factor of fundamental importance among those that contributed to Dewey's popularity. The Chinese tradition, unlike the Greek one, has never exalted knowledge for its own sake, but rather for its usefulness to morality, society, politics, and culture. For this reason, leading Chinese intellectuals used Dewey Dewey's pragmatism was suitable for a certain aspect of Chinese thought patterns. Dewey's pragmatism as a method is congenial to the practical mentality and disposition of the Chinese people, and it is also a factor of fundamental importance among those that contributed to Dewey's popularity. Dewey's pragmatic experimentalism with telling effect as a weapon with which to criticize Chinese culture and the traditional value system. One of the reasons for Dewey's influence on China is the 'holistic' nature of his thought, which was thoroughly in tune with a similar position found in Chinese thought. For example, Chen Duxiu's totalistic attack on Confucianism resulted, among other factors, from his conception of the Confucian tradition as fundamentally a holism that rigidly directed all later developments of Confucianism. Dewey's real success in China was his educational thought. Dewey emphasized that there was nothing which one heard so often from the lips of representatives of Young China today as that education was the sole means of reconstructing China. Dewey's theories, such as the 'own experience-centered principle', the 'teaching-learning-doing combination principle', the 'school as a society principle', and the 'education for living principle' were extended and advances by his Chinese disciples, such as Tao Xingzhi, one of the most influential Chinese educators. For the new Chinese intellectuals, Dewey's leading principle was that education is an instrument of social change and development. Accordingly, students who have grown politically aware under the new educational regime can be considered as a force, who will in the future make politics of a different sort. The most important aspect of 'Deweyanization' is education. Dewey was a teacher of teachers. Teaching people how to life and think in the new age of science, technology, democracy, and social development was his mission. His School of education (1889) and Democracy and education (1916) were well known by Chinese edcators and intellectuals. Hu Shi accepted Dewey's idea that education is life and school is society. Importantly, political reform can only be achieved after a social and cultural transformation, which must be promoted by way of education. Dewey himself systematically explained the same views as Hu Shi's in his articles on China. As he correctly pointed out, since 'democracy was a matter of beliefs, of outlook upon life, of habits of mind, and not merely a matter of forms of government', it demanded 'universal education', and the first step towards achieving universal education was to establish the spoken language as a written literary language. In the 1920s, with Dewey's visit, the entire American educational system was transferred to China, and American aims, methods, and materials became dominant. Deweyanized experimental schools and training programs were popularized. Even the purpose of Chinese education was redefined according to Dewey's progressivism, such as learning by doing, developing abilities by capacities, and students themselves running schools. Dewey's educational influence on China : (1) Chinese educational aims were reconsidered in light of Dewey's thought ; (2) the national school system was reformed according to the American pattern ; (3) child-centered education predominated in the revision of the curriculum ; (4) new methods of teaching in accordance with Dewey's pragmatic theory were initiaded ; (5) experimental schools were expanded ; (6) student government, about which Dewey made a number of speeches, was widely extended as a mode of school discipline ; (7) literary reform was encouraged, and elementary school textbooks written in the vernacular were adopted. |
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2 | 1920-1921 |
Bertrand Russell in China : 8. Okt. 1920-10. Juli 1921 : Allgemein 1982 Suzanne P. Ogden : Chinese students flooded abroad for advanced education, while Chinese educational institutions were remodeled to serve better the goals of modernization. Bertrand Russel's visit produced rapid disillusionment for many Chinese, widespread confusion among others, and a kind of half-hearted admiration on the part of a few, which seemed to spring as much from intertia, embarrassment, or the wish to be polite, as from intellectual or political commitment. To many Chinese intellectuals, Russell appeared as a man who, because of his intellectual power and because of his commitment to social change, would have unusually valuable insights into the problems besetting the Chinese people at that time. That the Chinese seriously considered Russell's ideas for institutional and societal change in China indicates the inherent problem of assuming that a leader in one field will be equally well qualified to speak on totally unrelated topics. A foreign philosopher, a scientist turned ideologist, met a group of Chinese in search of a theory of social and political change. Russell arrived at a crucial time in China's intellectual and political evolution. The major split within the leadership of the new culture movement, between the Marxists and the 'liberals', occurred in 1921. While the Lecture Society encompassed a broad range of the 'liberal' Chinese political spectrum, the more radical, would-be Communists and socialists largely remained outside of it. But there were no rigid classifications at that time, only individuals who flowed from one group to another, for the differences were only of degree. On the definition of fundamental issues, there was near accord between the 'liberals' and the socialists-communists. That is, the major segments of Russell's 'political' audience (those interested in his ideas on social reconstruction) were each an assortment of 'progressives' in their attitudes toward change and development, even if later some 'socialists' were to be denounced as 'neo-conservatives'. They wanted to break with the past and 'progress' in a new direction. And both groups were preeminently nationalists, so that in spite of ideological differences, they agreed that China's major problems were economic backwardness, political disunity, and bad government. Still, the ideological perspective became important when each group inquired into the best methods for confronting these problems. Chinese intellectuals became more receptive to leftist views, including not only Marxism but also guild socialism, syndicalism, and anarchism. Since Russell was known to have spoken on all three ideas, was believed to have been an ardent guild socialist before his arrival in China, his trip generated enthusiasm not only among the 'liberals' who associated him with progressive individualist and libertarian values, but also among the various leftist groups. The Chinese also admired many of Russell's personal qualities : his near-heroic pacifism, his independence of thought and action, his advocacy of the ideal of world unity and his defiance of authority. The last trait was thoroughly compatible with the general Chinese new culture ideal of defiance. Russell came to China with a view to discovering what China's problems were ; but he also came with many preconceptions of what the best solutions would be. Throughout his life, Russell held two general convictions. The first was that political and economic problems could be solved by choosing and effecting the right economic system and the right political values. The second was that the right solutions would involve fundamental change which would be revolutionary unless action was taken to ensure an evolutionary path. A brief exposure to China's conditions convinced him that although his social ideas were correct in theory, they were inapplicable to China. Once in China, he talked, observed, argued and learned, so that his judgments changed as his information and understanding increased. Having visited Bolshevik Russia immediately prior to his trip to China, Russell was eager to expound on the evils of Bolshevism, but to separate this issue from socialism as a value construct. Russell and the Chinese began with different hopes and drew different conclusions from viewing the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution. The question of revolution's 'humanity' was not a luxury in which the Chinese felt they could indulge. For Russell it became the key issue. What the Chinese socialists saw in the Russian Revolution was the existential possibility of complete and rapid change. Russell saw no need to wonder that revolution could occur. So he approached it instead from the perspective of morality : the Bolshevik method of industrialization exploited the worker. This increased Russell's skepticism about socialism as a method of industrializing. While Russell endorsed socialism as 'necessary to the world', his concern for morality caused him to condemn Bolshevik methods of establishing it. Russell recommended a form of state socialism for China, a system about which he was alternately cynical, hopeful, dubious, critical, and enthusiastic. Instead of a Western-style democracy or a Soviet-style socialism, Russell suggested that China had first to experience a government 'analogous to', but not the same as, the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. This analogous form of dictatorship, carried out by '10,000 resolute men' would presumably educate the people to recognize the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy, would carry out 'non-capitalistic' industrialization, and would re-invest profits for the benefit of the people. Russell's vision of the best form of government for China presupposed political reform, but reform was the prerequisite for economic reform : the Chinese had to establish a unified, strong, and honest state capable of governing China before they nationalized, permitting the right people to control the socialist economy. Russell's views on the role of socialism in industrialization provoked much controversy among China's intelligentsia, which was already debating these questions in 1920-21. Russell asserted that education had to precede socialism in China : power without wisdom was dangerous, as Bolshevik Russia demonstrated. Industrialization would provide the resources for mass education, and education would reveal the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy. If the capitalists kept control, they could preempt discussion of individual freedom, so that the people's awareness of the incompatibility between democracy and capitalism would have no active implications. The only solution then, said Russell, would be revolution. He counseled against foreign control of Chinese education which in the past had made Chinese students 'slavish toward Western education'. China should not depend, for leadership, on 'returned students' who would adopt many foreign perspectives. Finally, Chinese education should preserve the 'courtesy, the candor and the pacific temper' which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a knowledge of Western science and its application to the practical problems of China. Russell's advice to continue the good aspects of Chinese education and culture, but to adopt Western science was difficult to implement, since Western science brought with it values not wholly compatible with traditional Chinese values. The events of the May fourth period indicated that, with China under militarist control, education remained nearly inseparable from politics. References to Russell's observations, long after his departure from China, are remarkable for two reasons. First, they indicate that while the major periodicals did not continue to publish articles on Russell's social and political ideas, people did continue to think about Russell and to read his books and articles. Second, it is what Russell said about the Chinese people that is remembered by the Chinese, not his solutions or proposals for action to reconstruct China. It was Russell as a traveler and an observer, someone who could, in the Chinese view, convey an accurate 8impression of China to the outside world, that left a lasting impression on the Chinese. 1987 Kuo Heng-yü : Bertrand Russell hält in China Vorlesungen über seine Philosophie, sowie Reden zu Theorie und Praxis des Bolschewismus und Chinas Weg zur Freiheit. Da er weltweit als Philosoph und Pazifist im Kampf gegen den Weltkrieg bekannt war, wurde er anfangs von fortschrittlichen Intellektuellen sehr begrüsst. Er gibt China den Rat, durch die 'Entwicklung des Erziehungswesens' das Bildungsniveau des Volkes zu heben und erst dann den Sozialismus zu praktizieren : "Hätte man diesen Stand nicht erreicht, und wollte dennoch den Sozialismus einführen, würde die Durchführung des Sozialismus und Kommunismus unvermeidlich scheitern". Zhang Dongsun nahm diese Worte zum Anlass und meinte, die dringendste Aufgabe Chinas läge darin, die Industrie aufzubauen und den Kapitalismus zu entwickeln, statt den Sozialismus zu propagieren und eine sozialistische Bewegung zu organisieren. Er schreibt : "Was den Bolschewismus betrifft, so fürchten wir nicht, dass er nicht verwirklicht wird, sondern dass er zu früh verwirklicht wird, so wie auch Russell es feststellte". 1994 Raoul Findeisen : The interest in Russell and his work had begun in China some time before the May fourth demonstrations and had risen to such an extent that Russell, upon his arrival in Shanghai Oct. 12 1920, was even celebrated as 'Confucius II'. There were many reasons for such an enthusiastic response, not least of course mutual sympathies. These sympathies had a solid basis : As many of the May fourth intellectuals, Russell had been much attracted by the foundation of the Soviet state in which he first saw, as the Chinese did, the 'utopia' of social equality and democracy realized. On the other hand, Russell's 'will of a system of philosophy' that would re-establish philosophy as a science of sciences fitted in perfectly well with the aim of Chinese students to acquire Western scientific methods. Highlight of this systematic effort are the Principia mathematica (1910-1913) and proposing formal logics as starting point for such a role of philosophy. The shock of World War I had also some similarities on boeth sides, with and Chinese and with Russell, and it was commonly known in China that Russell's pacifist activities had brought him to jail. Furthermore Russell's ethical commitment had certain common traits with the sill effective traditional Chinese image of the 'literatus' and civil servant. Finally Russell's rhetorical and didactic abilities perhaps made him more suitable than any other Western philosopher to quench the Chinese thirst for 'yang xue'. Especially the young generation of May fourth activists, who were interested in formal and logical problems of philosophy. They believed that a more systematic approach, to Western ideas as well as to their own tradition, would make their fight against traditional beliefs more effective and turn philosophy to practice. 2007 Ding Zijiang : Russell's contributions to philosophy were not accepted by Chinese inellectuals because his methods were too technical, too trivial, and totally different from traditional Chinese patterns of thinking. Russell's educational philosophy was not very influential in China. His 'school' is similar to the traditional Chinese private school. It even mimics the Confucian educational 'mode', which also includes a country estate for its setting, a modest tutorial staff, some servants, and a small group of students whose parents supported the project, where a demonstration of the application of Confucian theory could be carried on. There are three basic distinctions between Russell's school and a Confucian schools : (1) while the former emphasized freethinking, the latter did not ; (2) while the former had no discipline and penalty, the latter did ; and (3) while the former approved liberal sexual education, the latter did not. For Chinese new educators, the most important task was to save and reconstruct China through science, technology, industrialization, and democracy. They wanted to extend and develop a 'popular education' rather than an aristocratic education. For most of them, the urgent task was to enable their motherland to eliminate poverty, weakness, and backwardness. Therefore, for both Nationalists and Communists, nationalism and patriotism are more important than individualism and liberalism. For many Chinese intellectuals, Russell was a very enthusiastic and revolutionary social transformer. In his lecture at Beijing University, he treated himself as a Communist and stated that there would be real happiness and enjoyment after the realization of Communism. He said that he believed in many social claims made by Marxism. Later, different schools of Chinese intellectuals wanted to ask Russell to join their own 'fronts' or interpreted his theories to suit their own needs and images. The moderate reformers hoped that he would be a moderate reformer ; the anarchists hoped that he would be an anarchist ; the communists hoped that he would be a communist. |
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3 | 1922.01.15 |
Russell, Bertrand. The problem of China [ID D5122]. (15) Chapter XV The outlook for China In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, in what order, I should advocate in that case. To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power. The problem is not merely one of political independence; a certain cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with safety. First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary—not, of course, the bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, political independence will have little value. The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; (3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought to be taken in the above order. 1. The establishment of an orderly government.—At the moment of writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is imminent; the former is usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though The Times calls him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than "Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force. So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the Government. When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more scope. While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The society must make itself obviously the champion of the national interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political problems with which China is faced. Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's resources, it will be possible to obtain most of the needed concessions by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable opportunity. 2. Industrial development.—On this subject I have already written in Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans. Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both oppressed and misled. But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State Socialism must fail. For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import skilled workmen—say from Germany—and cause them to give instruction to Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be desired to develop. 3. Education.—If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a good in itself, but is also essential for developing political consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast population could be borne by the nation without a considerable industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of education. For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears. Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education as in the matter of industry. For the present, it is still necessary to have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates against national self-respect in those whom they teach. Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American university. But for the great majority of university students it is far better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university education, but at present the difficulty would be serious. To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but by no means a slavish admirer of our ways. The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl Marx. The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western philosophy of life. If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the West achieves by the application of science. If China were led astray by the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great military nations of the modern world will bring about their own destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better economic system—then China will have played the part in the world for which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover of mankind. FOOTNOTES: [110] An account of a portion of his work will be found in Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff. Appendix While the above pages were going through the Press, some important developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in Chinese politics. For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in our newspapers. According to The Times, he has pronounced in favour of the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. The Times Peking correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any obstructionists." On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in the same telegram as follows: Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall be elected by the people; District police shall be created under District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and gendarmerie, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the people on the land. This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of it will ever be carried out. Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in The Times of May 15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect: I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and opium-smoking are rife. Nevertheless, on May 30, The Times had to confess that this army had won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions. The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is to be hoped also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still problematical. June 21, 1922. Russell, Bertrand. The problem of China : Sekundärliteratur 1994 George C.H. Sun : Russell's book on China has a unique charm of its own which is presented in his characteristically lucid, brief and witty style and is highly suggestive, full of insight. Even when reread today, more than seventy years after its first appearance, it remains a rare classic, unsurpassed, in the field of China studies. 'The problem of China' is a book written with an unusual perspicuity, profound sympathy and a long range perspective into the cultural heritage of Chinese civilization, its future and that of the entire world. Much of what is said therein remains unchallenged, especially the non-topical parts. Many of the insightful prophecies made about the destiny of China have turned out to be true. His pessimistic view of the two alternatives China would be forced to take : militarism and/or communism, if the Western powers were not to relieve their pressure. 2007 Ding Zijiang : Russell advocated that China should (1) develop industry to halt the extreme poverty ; (2) to establish an efficient and constitutional parliamentary government, with the support of a patriotic and world-minded populace, stop military usurpation and foreign control, and avoid excessive bureaucratic dictatorship ; (3) build a new economic system which can be called 'State Socialism', or what Lenin called 'State Capitalism', because it is unsuitable to establish a pure or complete socialism in an undeveloped country such as China ; (4) apply the Russian type of communism to China's present stage of economic development since its urgent problem was to increase production with rapid speed (although it could not prevail in Western Europe and was not an ideal system for world peace) ; and (5) follow the pacific and non-violent approaches in its reform. The reconstruction of Chinese education should follow Russell's model : (1) education could help China avoid poverty and backwardness ; (2) Chinese education should teach more science and technical skills, but not morals or ethical maxims about government derived from Western culture ; (3) Chinese education should develop political consciousness among the people and avoid the foreign control that made Chinese students slavish toward Western civilization. The reconstruction of Chinese thought should follow Russell's philosophical approaches. Russell suggested : (1) new Chinese philosophy should be based on modern sciences, not on mysticism ; (2) Chinese intellectuals should apply the methods of philosophical analysis and mathematical logic, instead of romantic synthesis ; (3) China should give up the traditional Confucian and Daoist passive agricultural and family ethics and should instead develop public spirit, patriotism, or Western nationalism ; and (4) China should have an antireligious movement, including Marxism as a form of religion, in addition to Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam. Russell emphasized that Westerners should learn from the Chinese 'a just conception of ends of life'. He believed that the Chinese could not learn morals or ethical maxims about government from Western culture. For him, contact between East and West was likely to be fruitful to both parties. China could learn from the West the indispensable minimum of practical efficiency, and the West could learn from China the contemplative wisdom that has enabled it to persist. In China, unlike the Western militant and aggressive attitude. Russell found a tranquil, pacific, humane, and tolerant attitude among the average people, in particular among those in the countryside. Moreover, most Chinese ethics and political philosophy preached an ideal life along these lines. He felt that the Chinese Daoist philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi was most compelling. Russell's advocacy for industrialization without losing the passive and pacific characters of the Chinese and their ethics developed in an agricultural society raised the question whether it was too difficult to realize. Whether the Daoist philosophy to 'reject knowledge' and 'return to follow nature' was compatible with the modern scientific attempt to seek knowledge endlessly and conquer nature was also an open question. |
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4 | 1922 |
Hu, Shi. Hu Shi wen cun. (Shanghai : Ya dong tu shu guan, 1922). 胡適文存 Ding Zijiang : Hu Shi attempted to treat John Dewey's scientific method as a precondition for resolving China's social and cultural problems. The establishment of a scientific tradition in China was a result of interactions between Hu's psychological need to have a Chinese resource for facing the superior culture of America, and his intellectual need to construct a reformist means for the drastic purpose of Deweyanizing China. Before Hu adopted Dewey's experimentalism, his view of Confucianism and Chinese cultural traditions were by no means negative, since later he began formulating a 'way' to reform them. This 'way' was based on Dewey's scientific method. Hu's discovery of Dewey decisively transformed his previous simple, vague, tentative, but genuinely reformist attitude into a clear and straightforward advocacy of reformist means to westernize China according to the model of modernity and modernization provided by Dewey's early philosophical framework. Because Dewey argued for gradual social and cultural change, Hu wanted China's development to follow this path to avoid the Russian style of revolution. For Dewey, China needed gradual and peaceful reform, not radical and violent revolution, since 'reformation' is a very efficient type of experiment or instrument for socio-political transitions. Hu intended to adopt Dewey's experimentalism to make an 'overall transformation' to Chinese culture, not only for socio-political change, but also for almost all fields of culture, including language, literature, and thought patterns, such as 'the poetry revolution', 'the vernacular movement' and the 'Chinese logic method'. Hu Shi followed his pragmatic master in seeking an 'ever-enduring process of perfecting' rather than perfection. Accordingly, he said it was requisite for the progress of the present society to uphold natural science and pragmatic philosophy and to abolish superstition and fantasy. Although Hu Shi devoted himself to spreading Dewey's experimentalism, his efforts were not as successful as expected. |
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5 | 1948 |
Feng, Yu-lan [Feng, Youlan]. A short history of Chinese philosophy [ID D10068]. Feng Youlan pointed out that what John Dewey and Bertrand Russell mainly lectured about in China was their own philosophy : “This gave their hearers the impression that the traditional philosophical systems had all been superseded and discarded. With little knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, the great majority of audiences failed to see the significance of their theories. One cannot understand a philosophy unless at the same time he understands the earlier traditions that it either approves or refutes. So these two philosophers, though well received by many, were understood by few. Their visit to China, nevertheless, opened new intellectual horizons for most of the students at that time. In this respect, their stay had great cultural and educational value. |
# | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
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1 | 1930 | [Russell, Bertrand. Yu yan yu yi wei. In : Zhe xue ping lun ; vol. 3, no 4 (1930). Übersetzung von Russell, Bertrand. The analysis of mind. (London : Allen & Unwin, 1921). Chap. X. Words and meaning. | Publication / Russ212 |
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