China and the West

Farewell party for Bertrand Russell in Beijing.

John Dewey : Lecture 'The meaning of democracy' : delivered at the Fujian Shang-yu Club. = Min zhi di yi yi.In : Chen bao fu kan ; July 8 (1921).

Bertrand Russell and Dora Black Russell left Beijing.

John Dewey left China and returned to the United States.

Sun, Fuyuan. Duwei bo shi jin ri qu le [ID D28543]. [Dr. Dewey is gone today].
"The Dr. Dewey in your head may be the professor at the podium at Columbia University, or the person who occasionally talked to your or had lunch with you. The Dr. Dewey in someone else's head may not be the Dewey from the podium or the dinner table, because he may never meet Dewey in person. His Dr. Dewey may be the Dewey of the 'Five major lectures series' – the ideational Dewey, not the physical Dewey. Yet another person's Dr. Dewey may not reside in the real person or his works, but in the picture on the first page of that book. Since different people have different 'Deweys' in mind, and since 'Dr. Dewey' is exactly the synthesis of these different conceptions, then how does the physical Dewey that is gone today compare to this 'Dr. Dewey' in our heads ?"

Dewey, John.Divided China [ID D28488].
I
About six months ago the Peking government issued an edict proclaiming the unification of China. On May 5th Sun Yat Sen was formally inaugurated in Canton as president of all China. Thus China has within six months been twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once from the southern. Each act of 'unification' is in fact a symbol of the division of China, a division expressing differences of language, temperament, history, and political policy as well as of geography, persons and factions. This division has been one of the outstanding facts of Chinese history since the overthrow of the Manchus ten years ago and it has manifested itself in intermittent civil war. Yet there are two other statements which are equally true, although they flatly contradict each other and the one just made. One statement is that so far as the people of China are concerned there is no real division on geographical lines, but only the common division occurring everywhere between conservatives and progressives. The other is that instead of two divisions in China, there are at least five, two parties in both the north and south, and another in the central or Yangtse region, each one of the five splitting up again more or less on factional and provincial lines. And so far as the future is concerned, probably this last statement is the most significant of the three. That all three statements are true is what makes Chinese politics so difficult to understand even in their larger features.
By the good fortune of circumstances we were in Canton when the inauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a long way apart in more than distance. There is little exchange of actual news between the two places; what filters through into either city and gets published consists mostly of rumors tending to discredit the other city. In Canton, the monarchy is constantly being restored in Peking; and in Peking, Canton is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every other week open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, and General Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. There is nothing to give the impression—even in circles which accept the Peking government only as an evil necessity—that the pretensions of Sun Yat Sen represent anything more than the desires of a small and discredited group to get some slight power for themselves at the expense of national unity. Even in Fukien, the province next north of Kwantung, one found little but gossip whose effect was to minimize the importance of the southern government. In foreign circles in the north as well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling is general that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, it represents the cause of national unity, while the southern government represents a perpetuation of that division of China which makes her weak and which offers the standing invitation to foreign intrigue and aggression. Only occasionally during the last few months has some returned traveller timidly advanced the opinion that we had the 'wrong dope' on the south, and that they were really trying 'to do something down there'.
Consequently there was little preparation on my part for the spectacle afforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. This was the only demonstration I have seen in China during the last two years which gave any evidence of being a spontaneous popular movement. New Yorkers are accustomed to crowds, processions, street decorations and accompanying enthusiasm. I doubt if New York has ever seen a demonstration which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color or spontaneity—in spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked in in such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation even in the river boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds and localities which were not able to get a place in the regular procession organized minor ones on their own account on the day before and after the official demonstration. Making all possible allowance for the intensity of Cantonese local loyalty and the fact that they might be celebrating a Cantonese affair rather than a principle, the scene was sufficiently impressive to revise one’s preconceived ideas and to make one try to find out what it is that gives the southern movement its vitality.
A demonstration may be popular and still be superficial in significance. However, one found foreigners on the ground—at least Americans—saying that in the last few months the men in power in Canton were the only officials in China who were actually doing something for the people instead of filling their own pockets and magnifying their personal power. Even the northern newspapers had not entirely omitted reference to the suppression of licensed gambling. On the spot one learned that this suppression was not only genuine and thorough, but that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue of nearly ten million dollars on the part of a government whose chief difficulty is financial, and where—apart from motives of personal squeeze—it would have been easy to argue that at least temporarily the end justified the means in retaining this source of revenue. English papers throughout China have given much praise to the government of Hong Kong because it has cut down its opium revenue from eight to four millions annually with the plan for ultimate extinction. Yet Hong Kong is prosperous, it has not been touched by civil war, and it only needs revenue for ordinary civil purposes, not as a means of maintaining its existence in a crisis.
Under the circumstances, the action of the southern government was hardly less than heroic. This renunciation is the most sensational act of the Canton government, but one soon learns that it is the accompaniment of a considerable number of constructive administrative undertakings. Among the most notable are attempts to reform the local magistracies throughout the province, the establishment of municipal government in Canton— something new in China where local officials are all centrally appointed and controlled—based upon the American Commission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of political science in the United States; plans for introducing local self-government throughout the province; a scheme for introduction of universal primary education in Canton to be completed in three steps.
These reforms are provincial and local. They are part of a general movement against centralization and toward local autonomy which is gaining headway all over China, a protest against the appointment of officials from Peking and the management of local affairs in the interests of factions—and pocket-books— whose chief interest in local affairs is what can be extracted in the way of profit. For the only analogue of provincial government in China at the present time is the carpet-bag government of the south in the days following our civil war. These things explain the restiveness of the country, including central as well as southern provinces, under Peking domination. But they do not explain the setting up of a new national, or federal government, with the election of Mr. Sun Yat Sen as its president. To understand this event it is necessary to go back into history.
In June, 1917, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt a constitution. The parliament was controlled by leaders of the old revolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan and with the executive generally. The latter accused them of being obstructionists, wasting time in discussing and theorizing when the country needed action. Japan had changed her tactics regarding the participation of China in the war, and having got her position established through the Twenty-one Demands, saw a way of controlling Chinese arsenals and virtually amalgamating the Chinese armies with her own through supervising China's entrance into the war. The British and French were pressing desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow to act, and Tang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were averse, since they regarded the war as none of China's business and were upon the whole more anti-British than anti-German—a fact which partly accounts for the share of British journals in the present press propaganda against the Canton government. But what brought matters to a head was the fact that the constitution which was about to be adopted eliminated the military governors or tuchuns of the provinces, and restored the supremacy of civil authority which had been destroyed by Yuan Shih-kai, in addition to introducing a policy of decentralization. Coached by members of the so-called progressive party which claimed to be constitutionalist and which had a factionalist interest in overthrowing the revolutionaries who controlled the legislative branch if not the executive, the military governors demanded that the president suspend parliament and dismiss the legislators. This demand was more than passively supported by all the Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable exception of the American legation. The president weakly yielded and issued an edict dispelling parliament, virtually admitting in the document the illegality of his action. Less than a month afterwards he was a refugee in the Dutch legation on account of the farce of monarchical restoration staged by Chang Shun—who at the present time is again coming to the front in the north as adjutant to the plans of Chang Tso Lin, the present 'strong man' of China. Later, elections were held and a new parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as the legislature of China at Peking and elected the president, Shu Shi Chang, the head of the government recognized by the foreign Powers:—in short it is the Chinese government from an international standpoint, the Peking government from a domestic standpoint.
The revolutionary members of the old parliament never recognized the legality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to admit the legal status of the new parliament, called by them the bogus parliament, and of the president elected by it, especially as the new legislative body was not elected according to the rules laid down by the constitution. Under the lead of some of the old members, the old parliament, called by its opponents the defunct parliament, has led an intermittent existence ever since. Claiming to be the sole authentic constitutional body of China, it finally elected Dr. Sun president of China and thus prepared the act of the fifth of May, already reported.
Such is the technical and formal background of the present southern government. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking government is doubtless technically justified. But for various reasons its own positive status is open to equally grave doubts. The terms 'bogus' and 'defunct', so freely cast at each other, both seem to an outsider to be justified. It is less necessary to go into the reasons which appear to invalidate the position of the southern parliament because of the belated character of its final action. A protest which waits four years to assert itself in positive action is confronted not with legal technicalities but with accomplished facts. In my opinion, legality for legality, the southern government has a shade the better of the technical argument. But in the face of a government which has foreign recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashion for four years, a legal shadow is a precarious political basis. It is wiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary government, which in addition to the prestige of continuing the revolutionary movement of ten years ago has also a considerable sentimental asset as a protest of constitutionalism against the military usurpations of the Peking government.
It is an open secret that the southern movement has not received the undivided support of all the forces present in Canton which are opposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, for example, was notable for his absence at the time of the inauguration, having found it convenient to visit the graves of his ancestors at that time. The provincial governor, General Chen Kwang Ming, was in favor of confining efforts to the establishment of provincial autonomy and the encouragement of similar movements in other provinces, looking forward to an eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least all the provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals wanted to postpone action until Kwantung province had made a military alliance with the generals in the other southwestern provinces, so as to be able to resist the north should the latter undertake a military expedition. Others thought the technical legal argument for the new move was being overworked, and while having no objections to an out and out revolutionary movement against Peking, thought that the time for it had not yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin's attempting a monarchical restoration and think that the popular revulsion against that move would create the opportune time for such a movement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However in spite of reports of open strife freely circulated by British and Peking government newspapers, most of the opposition elements are now loyally suppressing their opposition and supporting the government of Sun Yat Sen. A compromise has been arranged by which the federal government will confine its attention to foreign affairs, leaving provincial matters wholly in the hands of Governor Chen and his adherents. There is still room for friction however, especially as to the control of revenues, since at present there are hardly enough funds for one administration, let alone two.
II
The members of the new southern government are strikingly different in type from those one meets elsewhere whether in Peking or the provincial capitals. The latter men are literally mediaeval when they are not late Roman Empire, though most of them have learned a little modern patter to hand out to foreigners. The former are educated men, not only in the school sense and in the sense that they have had some special training for their jobs, but in the sense that they think the ideas and speak the language current among progressive folk all over the world. They welcome inquiry and talk freely of their plans, hopes and fears. I had the opportunity of meeting all the men who are most influential in both the local and federal governments; these conversations did not take the form of interviews for publication, but I learned that there are at least three angles from which the total situation is viewed.
Governor Chen has had no foreign education and speaks no English. He is distinctively Chinese in his training and outlook. He is a man of force, capable of drastic methods, straightforward intellectually and physically, of unquestioned integrity and of almost Spartan life in a country where official position is largely prized for the luxuries it makes possible. For example, practically alone among Chinese provincial officials of the first rank he has no concubines. Not only this, but he proposed to the provincial assembly a measure to disenfranchise all persons who have concubines. (The measure failed because it is said its passage would have deprived the majority of the assemblymen of their votes.) He is by all odds the most impressive of all the officials whom I have met in China. If I were to select a man likely to become a national figure of the first order in the future, it would be, unhesitatingly, Governor Chen. He can give and also command loyalty— a fact which in itself makes him almost unique.
His views in gist are as follows: The problem of problems in China is that of real unification. Industry and education are held back because of lack of stability of government, and the better elements in society seclude themselves from all public effort. The question is how this unification is to be obtained. In the past it has been tried by force used by strong individuals. Yuan Shih-kai tried and failed; Feng Kuo Chang tried and failed; Tuan Chi Jui tried and failed. That method must be surrendered. China can be unified only by the people themselves, employing not force but the methods of normal political evolution. The only way to engage the people in the task is to decentralize the government. Futile efforts at centralization must be abandoned. Peking and Canton alike must allow the provinces the maximum of autonomy; the provincial capitals must give as much authority as possible to the districts, and the districts to the communities. Officials must be chosen by and from the local districts and everything must be done to encourage local initiative. Governor Chen's chief ambition is to introduce this system into Kwantung province. He believes that other provinces will follow as soon as the method has been demonstrated, and that national unity will then be a pyramid built out of the local blocks.
With extreme self-government in administrative matters, Governor Chen will endeavor to enforce a policy of centralized economic control. He says in effect that the west has developed economic anarchy along with political control, with the result of capitalistic domination and class struggle. He wishes to avert this consequence in China by having government control from the first of all basic raw materials and all basic industries, mines, transportation, factories for cement, steel, etc. In this way the provincial authorities hope to secure an equable industrial development of the province, while at the same time procuring ample revenues without resorting to heavy taxation. Since almost all the other governors in China are using their power, in combination with the exploiting capitalists native and foreign, to monopolize the natural resources of their provinces for private profit, it is not surprising that Governor Chen's views are felt to be a menace to privilege and that he is advertised all over China as a devout Bolshevist. His views have special point in view of British efforts to get an economic stranglehold upon the province—efforts which are dealt with in another article.
Another type of view lays chief stress upon the internal political condition of China. Its adherents say in effect: Why make such a fuss about having two governments for China, when, in point of fact, China is torn into dozens of governments? In the north, war is sure to break out sooner or later between Chang Tso Lin and his rivals. Each military governor is afraid of his division generals. The brigade generals intrigue against the division leaders, and even colonels are doing all they can to further their personal power. The Peking government is a stuffed sham, taking orders from the military governors of the provinces, living only on account of jealousies among these generals, and by the grace of foreign diplomatic support. It is actually bankrupt, and this actual state will soon be formally recognized. The thing for us to do is to go ahead, maintain in good faith the work of the revolution, give this province the best possible civil administration; then in the inevitable approaching debacle, the southern government will be ready to serve as the nucleus of a genuine reconstruction. Meantime we want, if not the formal recognition of foreign governments, at least their benevolent neutrality.
Dr. Sun still embodies in himself the spirit of the revolution of 1911. So far as that was not anti-Manchu it was in essence nationalistic, and only accidentally republican. The day after the inauguration of Dr. Sun, a memorial was dedicated to the seventy-two patriot heroes who fell in an abortive attempt in Canton to throw off the Manchu yoke, some six months before the successful revolt. The monument is the most instructive single lesson which I have seen in the political history of the revolution. It is composed of seventy-two granite blocks. Upon each is engraved: Given by the Chinese National League of Jersey City, or Melbourne, or Mexico, or Liverpool, or Singapore, etc. Chinese nationalism is a product of Chinese migration to foreign countries; Chinese nationalism on foreign shores financed the revolution, and largely furnished its leaders and provided its organization. Sun Yat Sen was the incarnation of this nationalism, which was more concerned with freeing China—and Asia—from all foreign domination than with particular political problems. And in spite of the movement of events since that day, he remains essentially at that stage, being closer in spirit to the nationalists of the European irredentist type than to the spirit of contemporary young China. A convinced republican, he nevertheless measures events and men in the concrete by what he thinks they will do to promote the independence of China from foreign control, rather than by what they will do to promote a truly democratic government. This is the sole explanation that can be given for his unfortunate coquetting a year ago with the leaders of the now fallen Anfu Club. He allowed himself to be deceived into thinking that they were ready to turn against the Japanese if he would give them his support; and his nationalist imagination was inflamed by the grandiose schemes of little Hsu for the Chinese subjugation of Mongolia.
More openly than others, Dr. Sun admits and justifies the new southern government as representing a division of China. If, he insists, it had not been for the secession of the south in 1917, Japan would now be in virtually complete control of all China. A unified China would have meant a China ready to be swallowed whole by Japan. The secession localized Japanese aggressions, made it evident that the south would fight rather than be devoured, and gave a breathing spell in which public opinion in the north rallied against the Twenty-one Demands and against the military pact with Japan. Thus it saved the independence of China. But, while it checked Japan, it did not checkmate her. She still expects with the assistance of Chang Tso Lin to make northern China her vassal. The support which foreign governments in general and the United States in particular are giving Peking is merely playing into the hands of the Japanese. The independent south affords the only obstacle which causes Japan to pause in her plan of making northern China in effect a Japanese province. A more than usually authentic rumor says that upon the occasion of the visit of the Japanese consul general to the new president (no other foreign official has made an official visit), the former offered from his government the official recognition of Dr. Sun as president of all China, if the latter would recognize the Twenty-one Demands as an accomplished fact. From the Japanese standpoint the offer was a safe one, as this acceptance of Japanese claims is the one thing impossible to the new government. But meantime the offer naturally confirms the nationalists of Dr. Sun's type in their belief that the southern split is the key to maintaining the political independence of China; or, as Dr. Sun puts it, that a divided China is for the time being the only means to an ultimately independent China.
These views are not given as stating the whole truth of the situation. They are ex parte. But they are given as setting forth in good faith the conceptions of the leaders of the southern movement and as requiring serious attention if the situation of China, domestic and international, is to be understood. Upon my own account, and not simply as expressing the views of others, I have reached a conclusion quite foreign to my thought before I visited the south. While it is not possible to attach too much importance to the unity of China as a part of the foreign policy of the United States, it is possible to attach altogether too much importance to the Peking government as a symbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one southern leader, while the United States can hardly be expected to do other than recognize the Peking as the de facto government, there is no need to coddle that government and give it face. Such a course maintains a nominal and formal unity while in fact encouraging the military and corrupt forces that keep China divided and which make for foreign aggression.
In my opinion as the outcome of two years' observation of the Chinese situation, the real interests of both China and the United States would be served if, in the first place, the United States should take the lead in securing from the diplomatic body in Peking the serving of express notice upon the Peking government that in no case would a restoration of the monarchy be recognized by the Powers. This may seem in America like an unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact. The present government endures only in virtue of the support of foreign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of intrigue, one kind of rumor and suspicion, which is holding industry and education back and which is keeping China in a state of unrest and instability. It would establish a period of comparative quiet in which whatever constructive forces exist may come to the front. The second measure would be more extreme. The diplomacy of the United States should take the lead in making it clear that unless the promises about the disbanding of the army, and the introduction of general retrenchment are honestly and immediately carried out, the Powers will pursue a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Peking government, insisting upon immediate payment of interest and loans as they fall due and holding up the government to the strictest meeting of all its obligations. The notification to be effective might well include a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition in case the government does not seriously try to put its profuse promises into execution. It should also include a definite discouragement of any expenditures designed for military conquest of the south.
Diplomatic recognition of the southern government is out of the question at present. It is not out of the question to put on the financial screws so that the southern government will be allowed space and time to demonstrate what it can do by peaceful means to give one or more provinces a decent, honest and progressive civil administration. It is unnecessary to enumerate the obstacles in the way of carrying out such a policy. But in my judgment it is the only policy by which the Great Powers will not become accomplices in perpetuating the weakness and division of China. It is the most straightforward way of meeting whatever plans of aggression Japan may entertain.

Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey children
[July 21, 1921?]
On Sayurday [23 July 1921] we are going up Paoshan. Laoshan is the second of the great mts of Shantung Perhpas yu know that Shantung means eastern mountains. The have a saying here Taishan is the greatest in height but Laoshan is the most magnificent of the Mountains of the province. I spose it sounds like a proverb in the native tongue. Well we are going with a picnic association of Chinese students. and shall probably spend the night on top Sat. On Snday we come back here and sail for Kobe on Tuesday the 2nd. I will tell you later what is a picnic association and about the trip.
We have met some misssionaries and they tell us the worst thing about the Jap management here now is the red tape, We had a specimen of the usefullnes of red tape this mroning. As soon as the Chinese gentlemen were well seated and had begun talking in our room there was a knock at the door, In walked a dapper ajp. The rooms here are so fixed that he was in an outer room and we were seated in the inner one. Well Lucy caught him quick and backed him out while talking. His errand was to bring a blank to be filled out to request the privilege of embarking from this Japanese port to another J port. The blank had the heading of the South Manchurian R. Way. It must be very good polcy to have many kinds of small business on hand which enables you to make an excuse to enter the guests room whenever any thing is going on which it is desirable to see, It was interesting to see that there was no conversation here on the part of the Chinese gentlemen which might not have hd witnesses safely, Tonight we shall go to a Chinese restaurant and we shall see what goes on there. One of them was recommended as knowing every thing worth knowing and seldom opening up, We hope we may smile on him and get him open. He was educated by a missionary whom we saw yesterday who lives in Weihsien. where very interesting things happened during the first occupation of this province. That story has much which the American people know nothing about and perhaps will not believe when they are told, I should like to have friend Wilson compelled to listen to those stories everyday the rest of his life.
We have been for the drive and have seen all the old German forts now deserted. It beats the bnd to see how they have abolished every ger word The streets look as if they had been born with the Emp when nothing else but Jap words existed, Before the i[n]vasion of Chinese civilization as they themselves have the nerve to say. The Imperial interpreter called on Pa a little wisp or wasp of a thing with a pinched face who said he knew Pa was here because he had read it in the papers, We said but not to him well you need not have added the because.
A man is waiting down stairs to escort us to the dinner party and this must start for Tsinan at nine tonight, so heres a goodby perhaps the last in China if this can be called China, Glad we have the dinner tonight to remind us of that part of the world. And here is the red letter telling you the winecups are clean and ready and waiti[n]g for you. Love and love till we get more time to write,
Mama.

Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
Tsinanfu, July 22. [1921]
I've got to do this by hand as Mamma is using the machine to write marginal notes in a book of rubbings. We got some more of those books from Chufu with the story of Confucious' life that Evelyn got last year, and Mamma is getting the story translated bit by bit. She's typing the translation in the margin so the thing will be most complete and natty. Some girls who are being sent to U.S. by the provincial government did the translating and they nearly had hysterics over it. Some of the tales are screamingly funny.
[begin TL] Its just occured to me that Dad is lecturing and I can use his machine. We had a wonderful trip to Chufu and Taishan this time, much better than last year as it was cool and we had more time. It rained most of the time we were in Chufu but we went and saw the things anyway. We were taken to call on the Confucian duchess but she refused to see us. The gentlemen who conducted us were furious as it had all been arranged ahead of time and the old lady was too lazy or something to bother with us. The major domo of the palace was toting the baby duke around the court and he was heard to remark that we all wore glasses and they didnt want to have anything to do with people of that kind. They took us out to the tomb of an emperor who died five thousand years ago and to the temple of the king who drove Confucius out of the kingdom of Lu. Confucius certainly has the better of him now. We stayed in a school house and lived on bad Chinese food. It can be trying when it is bad, too. Chiefly eggs and at the end of three days I had reached a state where the sight of an egg made me sick. The Chinese went right on eating them, tho. At Taian we had better luck as we were being taken care of by the magistrate. We slept that night in a school and had a delicious dinner. We started early the next morning and had breakfast at a nunnery about a quarter of the way up. It was a regular feast and the Chinese gentlemen all drank brandy for breakfast. This machine sticks like the devil, I dont see how Papa writes on it at all. The trip up the mountain was lovely. It was a partly cloudy day and the light on the plain below was beautiful. There has been a lot of rain here this spring and the brook bed was full of water, a real mountain stream and clear and nice. We got to the top about half past two. I had a chair this time and got out and walked past the place where Evelyn and I collapsed last year, just to show them I could do it. Its a shame Evelyn never got to the top as it is one of the most stunning views I ever saw. Taishan is the highest mountain around and the lower ranges and the valleys look just like the relief maps in school. You can see the Yellow River and beyond to the north and to the south a great plain. Theres been plenty of rain this year and the country is very rich and green, much more beautiful that I have ever seen it before. In fact there has been about all the rain the country can stand for awhile. There are floods already at places on the Yangtse and the people here are quite worried about the Yellow river. There have been two days without rain now and that ought to give time for some of the water to run off and they say of there is no more for a few days longer they will be all right. In 1917 there were very bad floods, last year famine, and this year floods again, it doesnt give the people much chance to recuperate between catastrophes.
They have resumed the airoplane service between here and Peking after stopping for nearly two weeks because of floods in the landing field. One of the aviators I know came in last night and offered to take me back to Peking today and bring me back again tomorrow. It sounded awfully tempting but quite impossible, of course. I guess I never told you that I was taken up to see Peking from an airoplane. We were up for ten minutes and going beautifully along towards the city when the engine died. We landed in the middle of a corn field and walked three miles back to the aerodrome. And that ended that episode. I was very much disappointed because I loved the sensation of flying and I have wantd to see Peking from an air ship ever since Ive been there Such is life.
We leave here for Tsingtau on Sunday, stay there till the following Tuesday, probably, and then go across to Japan. Its getting quite exciting being so near home, Im beginning to realize that we are leaving China.
Well, I must go and do the family ironing. Evelyn will be pleased to know that we are still carrying the electric iron around. Loads of love to you all and well see you soon.
Lucy

John Dewey : Lecture 'The work of educators'. = Jiao yu zhe di gong zuo. In : Chen bao fu kan ; July 11-23 (1921).

Russell, Bertrand. To the Editor of The Japan Chronicle, Tokyo, 24. July (1921). In : The Japan Chronicle ; 26. July (1921).
Sir, In your issue of July 24th there is a leaderette with whose general scope I am in agreement, but ending in a suggestion which seems to me misleading and not wholly just, to the effect that 'Professor Dewey… is not a good authority or an unprejudiced witness'. I do not know that any one of us could claim to be an unprejudiced witness where national bias enters in. I have myself struggled against the distorting influence of nationalism on my own thoughts for many years, yet I am still conscious of being by no means unprejudiced in an issue between Britain and a foreign country. Doubtless Professor Dewey also may be described – along with the rest of the human race – as a prejudiced witness in this sense, but in this sense only. He favours the Consortium. I do not. He sees in the extension of America's influence on China the best hope of China's regeneration. I do not. But these are very difficult questions in regard to which either opinion may be held rationally.
As to the statement that Professor Dewey 'is not a good authority', he has been in Canton and seen the leading men, and is, no doubt, repeating what they told him. Nor is he the only authority for the statement in question, which is repeated with more detail by Mr. Philip Haddon in the 'Review of the Far East' for July 16th. And certainly some explanation has to be sought for the extreme hostility of Hongkong to the Government of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The favour shown to that Government by the Americans also needs explanation, which, I hope, will be provided by some American as 'unpatriotic' as myself.

1921.07.24-27 / 1921.09.19-24 (publ.)
1) John Dewey : Lectures delivered at Jinan, Shandong. Wang Zuoran interpreter.
1) 'Social factors'. = She hui zuo yao su.
2) 'The social factor in education'. = Jiao yu zhi she hui di yao su.
3) 'The relationship between school subjects and society'. = Xue xiao ke mu yu she hui zhi guan xi.
4) 'The relationship between the organization and administration of the schools and society'. = Xue xiao di xing zheng he zu zhi yu she hui zhi guan xi.
In : Chen bao fu kan ; July 24-27 (1921).
5) 'Psychological factors in education'. = Jiao yu zhi xin li di yao su. In : Chen bao fu kan ; Sept. 19-21 (1921).
6) 'The relationship between school and society'. = Xue xiao yu she hui di guan xi. In : Chen bao fu kan ; Sept. 22-24 (1921).

Letter from John Dewey to Dewey family
July 25. [1921]
Dearest family,
We are at least on the train on the way to Tsingtau, and for the first tme I feel as if we were really leaving China, and I am feeling quite sentimental about it. We didnt get off yesterday becase friday th[e] students came and asked to give us a farewell tea party, that day, what little there was left of it, was already occupied, and there were a lunch party farewell and a dinner, and an afternoon tea party already arranged for saturday, so to stay sunday was the only thing possible. I think what the stirred up the boys was the fact that the girls normal school of had arranged an afternoon reception for friday and they they thot they would lose face. You can gather the sadvanced stage of "female education" in Shantung by the fact that this is the only girls school of high school grade in the entire province, thirty eight millions population, I mean govt school, there are more missionary schools. There were about thirty girls staying at the school during the vacation, and they have lots of l[i]fe and pep, also most of them quite pretty. It shows what habit does, but I see many more pretty women now than I did first, because I have got used now to thier soft features that blend together. Lucy is more the Chinese type though still too western. It was a very intresting afternoon; I didnt have to speak for one thing, and after mamma got thru, she asked the girls to expess their wishes and plans, and after a while three of them got up [a]nd made very inte[r]esting speeches on the backwardness[?] of girls [e]ducation, the difficulty they had in securing prepareaparaion for even the few higher schools they were, one of hem almost wept as she told how the men didnt want the women educated. Another said that she and several of her class-mates were going to tart a primary school after they graduated, as the govt schools didnt allow enough liberty and were too subject too interference from officials. The principal is a man but seemed more in sympathy with the wishes of the girls than most of them, at least his daughter was one who made quite a free speech. The province used to end sixty students to Japan every year, now thy are going to send forty to America and twenty to Japan. More of the speeches here dwelt upon the friendship of America than they have anywhere else, and it rather pathetic to see how they are depending upon us. They expect us somehow to work a miracle for them. Their enthusiasm for the Pacific conference is tempered by a certain amount of scepticism however on acct of the Versailles confrence. It is rather surprising how great the nowledge among educated people is of the war outcome and who how absolutely uniform the judgement is. A chinese who has recently gone to Geneva wrote back that there was no league of nations, but only an organization to enforce the Versailles treaty. A speaker at the dinner last night made much of the fact that England and France and France and Italy had already begun quarrelling among themselves as evidence that Europe was too selfish settle the Pacific question and that America and China must settle it, as America was the only question they trusted. He was a Japane[se] returned student and an old Chinese scholar too, the kind that begins by aplogizing that they have been able to give only very litle ad a very poor food and in general they regret the sufferings they have inflicted upon their guests, all te time they are doing more fr you than anybody else ever thought of doing. The provincial assembly took the lead in one farewell dinner, and the speaker after getting thru the introductory compliments in which he assured us tha all the progress Shantung had made in the last two years ^and half^ was due to our previous viit and that the interest in America in the Shantung question was ue holly to my writings got down to business and discusses the AJ alliance and the Pacific conference very intelligently. Well what I started out to stay was that among the students going to America this summer are three four girls, two are ging to Texas and two to Oberlin. It is a sign that some change is occurring that they were invited to most of the public functions, being the only "females" present aside from Du Wei Furin and Du Wei Ni su. After making five farewell speeches in two days in response to their speeches of welcome etc, you can imagine I how reduced I was. In spite of everything they made us some presents, two pieces if the best Shantung silk, two pieces of framd embroidery, etc.
We hd another deomstration that you cant beat the game. I boght my own tickets to Tsingtao in advance in conn[e]ction with steamer tickets to Kobe. Were they downhearted? Not they. We are accompanied on our trip by two guides, one the asst commissioner of education who speaks no English and the other a young man who understands ad seaks some english and who can also speak Japanese.
To change the subject. A young man who has succeeded in learning a little English said that he had not been in Chufu but he was sure that it was very mysterious. Also that he believed that Taishan was a natural not an artificial mountain. As it six thousand feet high more or less, I was reluctantly obliged to concede the correctness of his remark. A foreigner who speaks good Chinese got in conversation with a soldier ho seemed to be above the average and asked him how and why he got into that business. He said he used to be a merchant, and he found he had to do everybody, his friends included, so he looked around for a calling where that wouldnt happen and decided uon soldiering where you only had too do your enemies. Then he was asked if he sent his pay home now. An he said, He only had enough to entertain his friends so he allowed his relatives to support his family. Upon the whole I think this story contains more sides of Chinese life than any other one I have heard. The newspper men in Tsinan ae vry interprising. At every lecture they circuklated copies of the speechs made at he 1st time, and at last evenings banquet they gave us little pamphlets with the reports of my six andyr your mothers two speeches. Can you wonder I hate to leave a country where educational lectures are treated as news? Its another of the strange contradictions here, next to no schools and money for the m , and so much more interest in educational discussion than in any other country. We saw in thee paper that when Mr Russell was approached by the reporters when he reached Japan handed them out a slip in which he said that having died (in Japan) three months before, it was obviously impossible for him to say anything for publication. Also we saw by the poiper that Mr Ono had engaged the entire roof garden of Hot[e]l Peking last evening for a banquet to Japanese and Chinese bankers. He told us that he would robably be back in Japan before we got away, but according to the newspapers he has not yet had much success in his mission of renewing loans.
This part of Shantung is much more fertile and proserous than the parts which the road to Nanking goes thru. In fact it is the best farming country Ive seen north of the Yangste. There has been a tremendous amount of rain, and some of the famine districts where the drought had been the worst, are now flooded, many villages entirely under water. This country we are going thru is high and dry however tho everything is very green from the rain.
We stayed at a German hotel in Tsinan, and the proprietors with German thrift run a buthcer shop and a tannery and leather factory. We have blown ourselves to four big leather bags. They are not so handsome, but good leather and very strong, they with several portfolios cost about a hundred sxty mex, which as leather goods were in America is about half price And I dont know whether we could get such strong ones. We now have ten pieces of checked bagage, and only nine pieces of hand baggae in the car with us. We have a certain number of presents for people in Japan, and hope we can cut down by one piece. It will take one of my checks I guess to pay excess baggage in Japan and the U S…
Lots and lots of love Dad

Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey family
THE GRAND HOTELS, LIMITED. TSINGTAO.
[July 28, 1921]
Pa and Lucy have gone out to walk and I am staying at home to nurse my side. I have the door locked for it is not safe to assume that your room is your own in this hotel. Some D Jap just opens the door and walks in whenever he wants to. One stranger came this morning before I was out of bed, The otehrs had gone ou[t.] I thought it might be the boy wanting to come in to do the room so I went in my nightdress and opened the door, Bu stepped back and stranger boldly presented himself at the crack of the door which I made narrower as fast as I could, He said in suave tones, Is the doctor No he didny say that either, he just said Doctor Dewey? I said he is not in and as I shut the door I heard him murmer thank you. They are certainly the best illustration of the vulgarity of trying to follow customs they know nothing about that the world can show. This was nothing to what the manager of the hotel has ju[st] done, Lucy was undressed and said to me some one knocking. So I started but before I got underway this man opened the door wide and looked in at Lucy who requested him to withdraw, He closed the door and when I got there I asked him in no uncert[a]in tone to please never walk into this room without being invited again. It had happened enough times that strange men had com[e] in and we did not like it, He looked me squarely in the face without changing a muscle and said he wanted t[o] speak to the doctor and he thought he was in. I finihed by saying that he would please not think again but remember that this room was ours and not his and that we expected him not to come in unless he was invited. he wound off by saying he thought the doctor was in and that was why he did it, I couldnt take time to go into that question but left it to Pa. At one point he looked as if he were going to laugh at me but thot better of that but continued to stare and to wonder how I dared to talk to him like that. There is no doubt this has its reason for he was entirely brazen to the end of the talk and he will do it again of the door is not kept locked, I hate to go off for two days as we are planning to do on Saturday when we go.
Lucy and I conversed with Mr Ding last night at the bankers dinner, He has a son at Cornell studing engineering. Also a nephew. He has one little daughter six of who he seems very proud. He will send her to the states. He said he coud see the difference between his mother and his wife, His m never went to school his wife has. He believes it is very important to educate the mothers, Says the Chine women are good financiers, they make excell accountants in the banks and good shopkeepers. Unde[r] the old system a certain number have always succ in this way, they get their training in the family where all work together
Regarding the Pacific conference he said it that man Nono, (Ono) who is trying to get Chin appoint as the Chinese representative, I know that man, I have seen him oftenly, Why he does not know anything, he just does not know anything.
The loan which Mr Ono has come to arrange is not ye[t] settled. No I do not think it is settled yet. The Pekin Govt is bad, The Tuchuns are bad. I think Wang [Ching-wei] of Hupei will have to go, but we can not get rid of the system immediately. I think some one will follow Wang and he will be just as bad and after that we may throw it all away. The defeat of Kwangsi make it look as if the system were failing fast. No one would have thought it possible that Lu Yung Ting would fall down as he has done. They thought he was strongly entrenched, but now he is down and out, he wil have to go soon perhaps at once. It looks now as if the Canton Govt would have a chance.
Speakig of women in business he said the women of his family in Yangchow run a silk store, They do the ent business of buying and judging themselves as well as administering the shop. It is the best store in Yangchow The rich women like to buy there better than of the men they get better skill and better attention.
Yangchow is one of the old rich aristocratic towns above the Yngste on the Pukow R.R. It is famou[s] for good food and effete living. A rich town.6
[Alice Chipman Dewey]

Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
Tsingtau July 28. [1921]
Dear Family.
Here we are in this historic, not to mention famous, spot. I am trying to write with Dads machine and first it hesistates, then it shimmies and ends up with a long glide at the end. I cant keep up with its speed so dont blame any little inperfections on me. We have a lovely room here on the top of the building looking out over the bay towards the real Tsingtao, which is a little bit of an island with a light house on it. The water is covered with square sailed fishing junks and there are mountains in the background. Its really a lovely place and the Germans hve built a fine city here. The architecture is pure German with broad streets, lots of trees, both in the city and on the hills around. As Papa remarks, its no wonder the Germans are sore for this is in many respects the finest piece f work we have seen in China. Last night the Chamber of Commerce and business men gave us a dinner. And gosh how they hate the Japs. They seem to have really liked the Germans and got along well with them but not so the present possessors. The Germans confined themselves to wholesale business but the Js are gradually driving out the Chinese retailers and small shop keepers. There are thirty thousand Japs here, the figures for the Chinese varies fom fifty to seventy thousand. Its an absolutely Japanese city to appearances, they run most of the shops and sell goods of J manufacture. There are some Chinese stores but they are small and not very numerous. Every one agrees that business is not very good just now and the town seems very dead. I gather its just temporary as those business men said last night that business on the whole was as good as before the war. I am absolutely feeble minded today, the letdown from the constant rush in this damp climate has left me a rag so Ill leave this and write more later.
[Lucy Dewey]

Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
THE GRAND HOTELS, LIMITED. TSINGTAO, July 29. [1921]
I've given up the typewriter as a hopeless job. They took us out the other day to the old German fortification on the point. The Japs didn't do much damage there, only one of the guns had been injured at all. The Japs evidently do not consider the place tenable as they are not doing anything with it and these great guns are all rusting with their machinery. There are new forts up on a hill, higher & farther inland, which our cab drive said are not so large as the Germans. What a beastly thing war is, anyway, it made it all seem very real & vivid to see those fortifications with the shell holes and barbed wire.
Yesterday we didn't do much. Mamma has cracked her old broken rib and it bothers her a great deal. She stayed at home quietly all day yesterday to try and rest it and we stayed with her except for a short excursion down-town. She says her rib is some better this morning. Last night Dad & I went to the movies, it was quite an amusing show. This morning I am going out to swim with a girl I knew in Peking who is here for her vacation. It's very misty today—hasn't been really clear since we got here & we may give up the trip to the mountains tomorrow. Mamma is not very keen about it, especially as it involves spending the night and sleeping on board beds with all your ribs is not the most comfortable way to pass a night. If there is no chance for a view I think the whole thing will be given up, probably. I must run along to my swim. This will be continued in our next.
[Lucy Dewey]

Ting, V.K. [Ding Wenjiang]. Letter to Peking Leader ; 5. Aug, 1921.
Ting wrote that Bertrand Russell had made a 'profound' impression on those who heard his lectures on psychology, mathematics, and physics, 'for they realized for the first time that philosophy is nothing but the synthetic results of all the sciences and Mr. Russell's ideas of social reconstruction were the outcome of mature thinking. Ting implied that 'superficial' men, such as journalists, who were not prepared for, nor interested in, such technical lectures, erroneously concluded that others could not have found Russell of interest. He interpreted Russell's 'Farwell speech' as a clear mandate to the Chinese intellectual minority to be responsible for the reconstruction of China.

Zhao, Yuanren. Letter to Peking Leader ; 7. Aug. 1921.
"The Lecture Association would have found it worthwhile to invite Bertrand Russell if he had merely come to mingle with the present and future leaders of China to acquaint them with fair ways of thinking. His presence made dry as cotton books on abstract subjects sell like novels."
Zhang noted that Russell's lectures were to be published for profit by several commercial presses, and that discussion circles 'were formed with a zeal as has rarely been shown on any occasions'. Russell's close contact with the 'returned students' led them to 'constructive thinking and doing'. Zhao contended that even Russell's 'opponents' (reactionaries) were unable to ignore Russell and had to be content with alleging that others 'ignored' him. Zhao noted the young Chinese leaders' disappointment that Russell could not completely deliver 'his more directly practical lectures', but his opponents were 'joyful' over it.

Dewey, John. Shantung again [ID D28489].
Our last three weeks in China were spent in the province of Shantung. A year and a half had elapsed since our previous visit. Then it was the dead of winter; this time the heat of midsummer reigned. The social atmospheric changes were as great as the climatic. During the earlier period, Tsinan was under martial law, and militarism was literally at bayonets' points with the students' movement whose revolt was at its height. The Anfuites were in control at the national capital, and in the province. Even educational lectures were suspect. The provincial officials telegraphed the authorities at Peking to prevent our visit, as it would surely cause disturbance. The message never reached us, and we were in Tsinan before we even learned how dangerous was the visit. The prevailing excitement immediately revealed that something was up; newspapermen and assemblymen who were fighting the militaristic and pro-Japanese officials, provided an unusually warm welcome—and so did the officials. Soldiers lined the streets at intervals of twenty feet. The yard of the Provincial Assembly Hall was filled with companies of soldiers: machine guns were trained upon the building—all for fear that the students, then on strike as protest against the closing of their headquarters, might demonstrate in force. The chief of police occupied the position on the platform usually taken by an educational official.
This time everything was as quiet as in America when a teachers' institute is in progress. Only the ordinary number of armed policemen were in the streets. The provincial assemblymen were still engaged in fighting the provincial governor, but the struggle was a peaceful one; not a single soldier invaded the assembly hall. The present struggle is indicative of the political situation in China. The financial commissioner of the province was a Shantung man. As such he interested himself in protecting the people of the province by keeping expenditures confined to legitimate purposes. Since the office of provincial governor is prized because it is the shortest and quickest road to becoming a multi-millionaire, the governor removed the obnoxious treasurer-auditor. Hence the conflict with the provincial legislature. I call it characteristic of the present situation because while militarism is still rampant, the people of China are now learning the old lesson that political control goes with control of the public purse, and that soldiers in China are an effect as well as a cause of lack of legislative control of public funds. As this lesson is learned, the political development of China will begin to run parallel to the struggle for representative government in the western world. 'Republicanism' is slowly passing from an aspiration and a magic phrase to a matter of business.
Japanese relations as well as the domestic situation have assumed a much more tranquil aspect in the intervening year and a half. Direct acts of aggression have practically ceased, and the 'invasion' has now taken the form of a steady economic peaceful penetration. Provocative incidents still occur. For example, the governor was requested by the Japanese local authorities to forbid students' meetings and demonstrations on May 7th—the day of National Shame in commemoration of the signing of the Twenty- one Demands. The object was to provoke the students to some overt anti-Japanese move. But the order was passed on from the governor to the commissioner of education, from the commissioner to the principals, from them to the students—some time on the day after the anniversary. The meetings were held, and everything passed off peacefully. Again, on the spring holiday which is national tree-planting day, by some coincidence the garrison of Japanese soldiers in Tsinan appeared for manoeuvres on the same hill that had been selected by the students as the spot for planting trees. But the students are well organized; in this case the bull was educated to ignore the red rag however flaming, and the presumably desired provocation did not occur. But while such incidents still occur, the earlier outrages of arbitrary arrest and torture have ceased. In the main they are replaced by a conciliatory policy, so it is fair to presume that such incidents as occur are due to local bumptious Japanese who dislike the changed policy towards the Chinese. The change also affects foreigners in the province. There used to be more or less complaint about the brusque way in which passport regulations were enforced for travellers to Tsing Tao. Now a suave official, whose mouth might be a store-house for the provincial butter, asks if you are provided with one, and then informs you that since you are an American, it is not necessary to produce it. This trivial episode is characteristic of the way in which the traveller is now received, a way which is like the courtesy so uniformly found in Japan proper, instead of the rudeness which up to a short time ago reminded the visitor to Japanese possessions on the continent that he was an intruder, there only by the ungracious grace of the Japanese.
In the residential part of Tsing Tao as distinct from the industrial part, the impressions gained are of Germany rather than of Japan. And whatever one’s opinions of the origin and aims of German possession, one has to admit that she did a good job while in control. There is no part of the Far East so solidly and attractively built as this city which the Germans, in a few years, turned from a dirty fishing village of mud huts into the most cleanly city of China and into a port of enormous commercial potentialities. Here too the change of spirit on the part of the Japanese is evident. The whole outward aspect of things is clearly intended to minimize military occupation and emphasize civil administration. Pains are taken to attract foreign guests to a pleasant summer resort, and permanent foreign residents no longer complain of inquisitorial visits and vexatious interference, but only of the appalling amount of red tape that has to be unwound to get through any official business, such as a lease or paying taxes. It is, however, significant of the tenor of our Bryan period of Far Eastern diplomacy that old American residents have never received compensation for the systematic looting done by Japanese soldiers when they took possession, although British citizens have been attended to.
It cannot be truthfully said that the more conciliatory policy on the part of Japan has affected Chinese feeling or opinion. It would be enormously instructive to discover in full detail just why so little bitterness is felt toward prior German occupation and so much toward present Japanese control. The Japanese regard the contrast as part of the forward disposition of the Chinese people who characteristically decline to recognize their true friends. Idealization of a past that is done with, in contrast with a present that is acute, may have something to do with it. The friendly and tactful quality of German intercourse certainly had something to do with it also. So has the fact that German merchants mostly confined themselves to foreign trade while Japanese settlers are engaging in all kinds of retail trade, and, what is more serious, are getting hold of land. The fact counts also that the Shantung railway under German control was a private enterprise which freely used Chinese help and guards, while now it is a Japanese governmental enterprise with no use for Chinese except as coolie laborers. But I do not think that all these factors put together weigh in comparison with the fact that German possession seemed only one incident in a series of foreign aggressions which had to be dealt with as best they might, while Japanese control is a vast overshadowing threat of an engulfment which may become complete at any moment. Hence the depth and intensity of the feeling aroused.
As compared with a year and a half ago, immediate complaints now centre about the opium affair, and the furnishing of weapons to bandits and otherwise encouraging them. The establishment of a government opium monopoly in Tsing Tao is an officially acknowledged fact, not a piece of rumor. Official details are naturally not easy to get. It is known however that the business is handled by a Chinese, one Liu Tze Shan by name; that about two million and a half ounces a year are imported, and that the concessionaire pays two dollars an ounce to the imperial ad-ministration, so that the opium and morphine trade yields about five million a year toward the expenses of occupation. So far it may be said that Japan is only following British and French precedents in south China. But there is at least this difference. Hong Kong and Indo-China are actually under foreign sovereignty. The Chinese flag still flies over the Tsing Tao custom house, and regular duties are paid on all goods which go into the interior. Opium is of course contraband. It would not do to have it appear on the manifest of imports. So it is shipped in, labelled 'military stores', and is thus exempt from examination. It is also universally believed that aside from merchants who carry the stores as part of their luggage, the military railway guards act as distributing agents through the interior.
Definite facts about the distribution of arms to bandits are even harder to get at. One has to rely on what is generally stated by Chinese and foreigners alike. The objective fact is that the Japanese railway guards are sufficient to protect the zone, and that during German occupation even with Chinese guards the zone was entirely peaceful. Since then it has been much disturbed, sometimes to the extent of compelling the evacuation of whole villages. This state of things is of course impossible without the connivance of Japanese authorities. Making the waters troubled in order to fish in them is a policy which has good—or bad—precedents in plenty in Manchuria. Circumstantial stories tell of renting by the night of revolvers by Japanese soldiers, as well as of the direct sale of guns and ammunition—which are under strict official Japanese supervision. As near to statistics as one can come is that during a single month there were twenty cases of banditry within five miles of Tsing Tao, in territory leased to Japanese, and that the Japanese have never suffered.
The Japanese government has publicly pledged itself to the International Anti-opium Society to cancel the opium monopoly in Shantung, and the Chinese admit that there are already some signs of amelioration. When and if the Japanese military are with-drawn, banditry may reduce itself to the usual Chinese average, though the temptation to make trouble in order to have an excuse to interfere so as to protect Japanese subjects will remain. The remaining sore point is the economic question. Intelligent Shantungese who are convinced that Japan now intends to carry out her promise of withdrawal of troops at a fairly early date, say it will make no real difference in the situation, because in the meantime Japan has obtained such an economic stranglehold on the province. Even if this hold had been secured by superior economic efficiency, the Chinese would hardly welcome it more than do, say, Californians, especially when it affects land ownership which in China concentrates in itself all the emotions which in western countries are distributed also among religious and patriotic interests. But fraud and force are alleged as the means by which the economic position of Japan has been consolidated. The so-called auction of German properties in Tsing Tao was certainly a scandal as respects favoritism as to persons and prices. The means by which farmers have been compelled to part with their lands were reported in my former article. It is also stated that it is useless to appeal to the courts when disputes arise affecting leases or other economic interests, as it is an axiom that the Japanese litigant is always right. A number of combined Sino-Japanese companies have been started. According to Chinese opinion most of them are formed because of coercion, and the result is unequal treatment. But upon this point it is hard to find unbiased testimony.
In spite of the general Chinese belief that the economic control of Japan is too firm to be shaken by anything short of international pressure or a political upheaval, I do not believe that the industrial and commercial situation is satisfactory to Japan, especially in view of the glowing hopes which were at first entertained. I haven't, as I write, the figures for last year at hand, but the customs statistics for 1919 show no great increase in trade over the last year of German occupation, in spite of the large number of factories which the Japanese have built. This might be attributed to general depression, but from 1916 to 1919, the imports of Dairen, Japan’s northern port, almost trebled and exports more than doubled. Japanese plans when they took possession included the building of a number of railways to connect the interior with their railway at Tsinan. They indulged freely in predictions of the day when Tsing Tao would be the chief port of all central China, displacing Tientsin and rivalling Shanghai. Nor were the predictions based wholly on emotion, as is shown by the fact that the opposition of foreign commercial interests in China to Japanese occupation was openly based on the threat which their occupation conveyed of strangulation of the commerce of ports in which foreign firms were established. But in the intervening years Japan lavished her funds on unproductive political loans which won only the hatred of the people, and which made impossible the granting of the railway concessions. And now the projected railways come under the scope of the Consortium—a credit item in offset to the virtual omission of Manchuria from its scope. The gap between prospect and realization is so great that it inclines one to a belief that Japan would be willing to trade off some of her remaining privileges in Shantung for a Chinese and international solid acknowledgement of her 'special position' in Manchuria.
This brings us to the present diplomatic position of the Shantung question. It is quite true, as Japanese apologists state, that Japan has thrice approached China to open negotiations for the “return” of Shantung. These apologists when they are talking or writing for the benefit of those ignorant of conditions, say that Japan greatly deplores the absence of any government in China sufficiently stable to carry on negotiations, and say Japan longs for the time when such a government will come into existence. When they are more candid, they admit that no Chinese government dare enter into direct negotiations with Japan on the question. Even the Anfu government at its height dared not, knowing well that it would be the signal for an explosion and possible revolution. In part this unwillingness is grounded in the deepest psychology of the Chinese: 'When in doubt, don't. ' In this particular case, the policy of 'non-doing' had good reason in the uncertainty as to the intelligence, force and integrity of the officials who would have represented China in 'negotiations'. But there is also an objective ground for the refusal. The original Japanese request for negotiations was so worded as to commit the Chinese government, if it accepted it, to admitting the validity of the Versailles settlement as well as the treaties signed at the time of the Twenty-one Demands. Subsequent proposals repeat the original ground of offence. They refer to the 'formal agreement' by which 'the Chinese government pledged itself beforehand to acknowledge and consent to the transfer' of German rights to Japan. Of course the whole case of China lies in its refusal to admit the validity of these earlier treaties. The grounds of their refusal are threefold. First, they were made under duress; second, Germany's title forbade alienation to a third power; and, thirdly, when China entered the war as an ally her whole status was changed. The latter claim was admitted by implication in Japan’s efforts to prevent China's entering the war until after she had made her secret agreements with France and Great Britain to support her seizure of Shantung. Quite aside then from popular sentiment, for China to have entered into negotiations on the only basis proposed by Japan would be to stultify her recent diplomacy, and to surrender all hope of a rectification of the conditions growing out of the Twenty-one Demands. And the latter include much more than the Shantung question. For example, public opinion in the world seems as yet hardly awake to the fact that the original lease of Port Arthur and surrounding country to Russia expires in 1924, and that Japan's case for retention of its Manchurian possessions rests upon the validity of the treaties in which the Twenty-one Demands are embodied.
It is not surprising that the hopes and fears of China now centre about the Pacific Conference, and that it is the chief topic of conversation among intelligent Shantungese. It is hardly too much to say that its crucial issue is whether or not the treaties which embody the Twenty-one Demands are faits accomplis. If the conference regularizes Japan's position, one chapter in the fate of China is sealed. If it refuses to do so, the conference will doubtless be broken up unless Japan is willing to go further in compromise than now appears likely. The attempt was well worth making. But too great optimism about its outcome would be childish. It hardly requires Versailles to remind us that a peace conference may be as dangerous as war.

Dewey, John. The tenth anniversary of the Republic of China [ID D28490].
A Message
For those who believe in the Chinese people and who also believe in their genuinely democratic character, the Tenth Anniversary of the declaration of the Republic of China is an occasion for both congratulation and sorrow. Congratulation that the country has at least faced toward a goal where its strength, happiness and freedom may be found; regret that the Republic is still so largely only a name, and that under cover of this name autocratic and militaristic forces have won power in China's domestic affairs. If we look at the political condition of the country, either in the nation at large, in most of the provinces or the cities, we have to admit that while the Revolution of ten years ago succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, it is not as yet a complete revolution in any positive sense. The revolution as a transfer of power and authority to the people, as a liberation of the common people from a corrupt, despotic and ignorant oligarchy has still for the most part to be accomplished.
Nevertheless two years stay in China and visits to capitals of eleven of its provinces have convinced me that the signs of progress are unmistakable. I even believe that many of the things which, taken superficially, are discouraging, in reality mark the stirring of forces which in the next decade are going to accomplish great things for China. I shall not go into detail, but the most impressive single feature of my stay in China was witnessing the sure and rapid growth of an enlightened and progressive public opinion. The power of moral and intellectual force in China is so great that all lovers of China may take heart and courage and have faith that the people are going to win in their great struggle for a Republic which will be one in fact and not merely in name. As one of these lovers of China and as one who has faith in its destiny, I wish to add my humble voice to the many which upon the Tenth of October will acclaim the foundation of China as a Republic.

Letter from John Macrae to John Dewey
October 3. 1921.
Prof. John Dewey, | 2880 Broadway, | New York City. My dear Professor Dewey:
I am taking a liberty with a busy and a distinguished man. Your daughter, Miss Evelyn, informs me that you are back in New York; this I take to be official.
I read your article in the NEW REPUBLIC on China. You probably have stored in your brain and graven across your heart a good deal of valuable feeling on the subject of China. I should like to publish a book by you on China; and I should like to publish another book by you on your feeling regarding the whole Asiatic and Japanese question,—in fact, I urge you to write such a book and to let me publish it for you.
It is good to realize that you are back here, and that you will devote your marvellous gifts to the education of America.
With my very kind personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours, | [John Macrae]