China and the West

Dewey, John. The Conference and a happy ending [ID D28610].
If the American people are going to bring an enlightened public opinion to bear on the Conference, we need more sob sisters and fewer joy brothers to report the Conference. The nations and diplomats who are interested in maintaining the status quo in the Far East have everything to gain by spreading a Pollyanna atmosphere over the doings of the Conference. Foreign diplomats are well aware of American national psychology. They know our sentimental optimistic streak and our desire to feel that we are playing a great part in promoting the idealistic welfare of the world. They know that when all is said and done, it is going to be important to the Washington administration to have the American people believe that American policies have won out as regards the Far East, and that it is essential to the administration to secure results as to navies. These things are among the best cards held by foreign diplomats. A disposition of the American public to put the best face possible on everything done by the Conference is one of the surest ways to help some of the worst things happen or at least to fail to get done some of the possible good things.
Matters have reached, as this is written, the point where it is much more important to note what isn't done and said than what is said, because the former decides the meaning of the latter. The obvious exception is in the case of the reduction of armaments, where there are specific, statistical conditions to keep track of, not such generalities as are being fed to the public as regards the Far East. I suggest three matters, one for the United States, one for Great Britain and one for Japan, which will bear watching. What happens with reference to them will give a fair test for the reader of the daily news to apply to the outgivings from Washington, and will give him a means by which he can decide which way things are really going.
Everything that has so far occurred bears out the original in-formation as to the general instructions under which the Japanese delegates were to operate. The information was that Japan was to favor in a hearty and sincere manner the reduction of armaments, provided that it was confined to the navy and applied in fair ratio to the three great powers; but was to discourage, so far as possible, the discussion of Far Eastern policies and secure postponement if some action threatened. It was also understood that she would put emphasis upon the disorganized state of China—as of course she is entitled to do up to a certain point— and insist that if anything was done about China it would require a political concert of the powers with a supervisory control of China to make sure of execution.
The point of the latter policy is obvious. If it is accepted, Japan becomes, because of inevitable geographical facts, the trustee of the powers for China. If it fails, Japan can throw the blame upon others, especially upon the United States. She will say in effect that after talking as usual a great deal about her interest in China, the United States as usual failed to come to the point when it was a matter of doing something. It does not take much ingenuity to see that her policy may be to shape things so that there will be but two alternatives; one, doing nothing, leaving the status quo with all its advantages for Japan; the other, forcing to the front a plan for joint action which the United States will reject. Of course this policy does not preclude a number of incidental concessions which the Sino-Japanese relations call for anyway, and which a happy and hopeful American public will greet as victories for American policies.
Admiral Kato helped create the wave of indiscriminate optimism by his prompt assent to the Hughes proposals. It was heralded to the American people as a wonderful concession to the United States, and accepted as such by those who had been taught that Japan was always a militaristic nation and who do not know the pressure she is under from the burden of naval expense, nor how small a navy actually suffices Japan for defensive purposes or even for offensive aims under the generous conditions of American reduction proposed by Hughes. Probably Japan got more than she had hoped for. There is nothing to object to in this fact. It is in the interest of the world as well as of Japan that the plan should be adopted. The significant thing is that publicity began to pour forth that Japan needed an 8 or at least 7 ratio to 10-10, instead of a 3-5-5 ratio.
There is no unworthy suspicion of Japan attaching to the supposition that this is a mask for some real aim, and that what she is not talking about is more important than what she is loudly saying. It is no secret to Japan that American public opinion is much more active and informed on the subject of armaments than it is on the Far East. It is no secret to her that the administration has a great deal politically at stake in the success of the reduction of armament part of the Conference. It is no secret that while there is a good disposition toward China there is no absorbing interest nor exacting judgment as to what happens. It is possible that at the proper time Japan will reluctantly concede in the matter of naval armaments substantially what is asked of her, out of regard for her good friend, the United States, and her regard for the peace of the world—the proper time being gauged by the state of negotiations concerning China. Or she may stiffen up and imperil the success of limitation of armaments unless things go her way as to China.
The gush about Briand and the French necessities for land armament must have been highly pleasing to Japan. It practically disposed of any chance for consideration that the question of reduction of soldiery and abolition of conscription may ever have had. Those who were in Japan at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference know the one thing which made a great popular impression. It was erroneously reported at one time that the abolition of conscription had been decided upon. It was several days before the error was corrected. It is impossible to imagine the extent of official consternation and the amount of popular satisfaction during this short period. The Japanese are a very patriotic people. But if anyone believes they are in love with compulsory military service, the enormous sigh of relief that greeted the false report was the lesson of a lifetime. The optimistic American outburst of sentiment that met the eloquence of Briand would perhaps have been dampened if it had been realized that if there had been a definite understanding between the French and Japanese, the French position is just the one that Japan would have asked France to take, so that Japan might be relieved of the burden of defending her system of conscription and her huge army.
The optimists of the press also report Great Britain backing the American policy as to China. At the same time, it is reported that she insists upon keeping the Anglo-Japanese alliance. One set of newspaper headlines says 'Britain backing China and America but insists on entente with Japan'. This is much like saying that Britain wants white but insists upon black. The 'entente' means the alliance, although enlarged to take in the United States if possible. And the alliance is just the thing, so far as the Far East is concerned, which stands between Great Britain on the one hand and China and the United States on the other. But from all sources, even from far New Zealand, come in just the nick of time reports as to the necessity of continuing the alliance, with the United States if possible, without us if necessary.
It doesn't show undue suspicion of Great Britain to ask what is the concealed aim, what is Great Britain really after. She knows well enough that the United States will not come into a tripartite agreement, that the Senate would not ratify it, even if the American diplomats agreed—which they know the Senate and American opinion too well to do. It is also familiar to them that in all human probability Canada stands ready to repudiate the dual alliance if it is renewed, and that opinion in England itself is so rapidly crystallizing against it that the power of the Foreign Office to renew it is uncertain. Why didn't Great Britain renew when the stage was all set, and when there was much less opposition at home than there is now, if her heart is so unalterably fixed? This talk is obviously trading talk, or aimed at some as yet unavowed point. Is it to back up Japan’s policy at a critical moment on the ground that the United States declines to enter into the only arrangement which is practicable? Quite likely not, but what then? There is a desire to create some situation which will bring pressure on the United States in some direction.
As for the United States’s policy so far as revealed, the test question is whether Mr. Root’s four points are meant to sanction the status quo in China. If events as they continue to develop show that such is their main intent, then we may be sure that the administration in order to secure itself politically with the American people, is willing to bargain with Japan and Great Britain at the expense of China. There has been a cryptic intimation that the recognition of China’s sovereignty by these Root principles is equivalent to enforcing against her all the treaties and commitments which she has signed—for otherwise China would not be sovereign in her treaty-making power! This ingenious device is worthy of that type of American legal mind which has found that it is interference with the liberty of the American workingman to do anything to place him in a secure position of freedom. But it is almost inconceivable—unfortunately not quite—that the problems of the Far East should be approached in this spirit.
Of course it is something to improve China’s condition for the future. But the forces which are operating because of the things that have been done in the past will not stop operating because a Conference of powers in Washington decides that such and such things shall be done in the future. The only successful way to regulate the future is by dealing with conditions that now exist. Diplomats are wont to square the circle and perform other impossibilities. To consecrate the status quo in China and then to resolve that things shall be done differently in the future is another of these miracles of diplomacy.
Is the American press going to feed that portion of the American public which requires a happy ending to every novel and drama? Or is it going to take the risk of offending American sentiment and pride by ceasing to proclaim every move as a great advance, and every remark of a foreign diplomat as a tribute to American success, and a reason for swelling American pride? The danger is the greater because our vanity got such a terrible prick at Versailles—a wound that had much to do with our withdrawal into our shell. Now that we have put our heads out again, we are looking for solace and compensation. There are foreign diplomats skilled enough to salve our wounds while they achieve in fact their own ends. If we are not too much inclined to spend our energy in gladsome cheering, we are more likely to attain that
Dewey, John. The Conference and a happy ending [ID D28610].
If the American people are going to bring an enlightened public opinion to bear on the Conference, we need more sob sisters and fewer joy brothers to report the Conference. The nations and diplomats who are interested in maintaining the status quo in the Far East have everything to gain by spreading a Pollyanna atmosphere over the doings of the Conference. Foreign diplomats are well aware of American national psychology. They know our sentimental optimistic streak and our desire to feel that we are playing a great part in promoting the idealistic welfare of the world. They know that when all is said and done, it is going to be important to the Washington administration to have the American people believe that American policies have won out as regards the Far East, and that it is essential to the administration to secure results as to navies. These things are among the best cards held by foreign diplomats. A disposition of the American public to put the best face possible on everything done by the Conference is one of the surest ways to help some of the worst things happen or at least to fail to get done some of the possible good things.
Matters have reached, as this is written, the point where it is much more important to note what isn't done and said than what is said, because the former decides the meaning of the latter. The obvious exception is in the case of the reduction of armaments, where there are specific, statistical conditions to keep track of, not such generalities as are being fed to the public as regards the Far East. I suggest three matters, one for the United States, one for Great Britain and one for Japan, which will bear watching. What happens with reference to them will give a fair test for the reader of the daily news to apply to the outgivings from Washington, and will give him a means by which he can decide which way things are really going.
Everything that has so far occurred bears out the original in-formation as to the general instructions under which the Japanese delegates were to operate. The information was that Japan was to favor in a hearty and sincere manner the reduction of armaments, provided that it was confined to the navy and applied in fair ratio to the three great powers; but was to discourage, so far as possible, the discussion of Far Eastern policies and secure postponement if some action threatened. It was also understood that she would put emphasis upon the disorganized state of China—as of course she is entitled to do up to a certain point— and insist that if anything was done about China it would require a political concert of the powers with a supervisory control of China to make sure of execution.
The point of the latter policy is obvious. If it is accepted, Japan becomes, because of inevitable geographical facts, the trustee of the powers for China. If it fails, Japan can throw the blame upon others, especially upon the United States. She will say in effect that after talking as usual a great deal about her interest in China, the United States as usual failed to come to the point when it was a matter of doing something. It does not take much ingenuity to see that her policy may be to shape things so that there will be but two alternatives; one, doing nothing, leaving the status quo with all its advantages for Japan; the other, forcing to the front a plan for joint action which the United States will reject. Of course this policy does not preclude a number of incidental concessions which the Sino-Japanese relations call for anyway, and which a happy and hopeful American public will greet as victories for American policies.
Admiral Kato helped create the wave of indiscriminate optimism by his prompt assent to the Hughes proposals. It was heralded to the American people as a wonderful concession to the United States, and accepted as such by those who had been taught that Japan was always a militaristic nation and who do not know the pressure she is under from the burden of naval expense, nor how small a navy actually suffices Japan for defensive purposes or even for offensive aims under the generous conditions of American reduction proposed by Hughes. Probably Japan got more than she had hoped for. There is nothing to object to in this fact. It is in the interest of the world as well as of Japan that the plan should be adopted. The significant thing is that publicity began to pour forth that Japan needed an 8 or at least 7 ratio to 10-10, instead of a 3-5-5 ratio.
There is no unworthy suspicion of Japan attaching to the supposition that this is a mask for some real aim, and that what she is not talking about is more important than what she is loudly saying. It is no secret to Japan that American public opinion is much more active and informed on the subject of armaments than it is on the Far East. It is no secret to her that the administration has a great deal politically at stake in the success of the reduction of armament part of the Conference. It is no secret that while there is a good disposition toward China there is no absorbing interest nor exacting judgment as to what happens. It is possible that at the proper time Japan will reluctantly concede in the matter of naval armaments substantially what is asked of her, out of regard for her good friend, the United States, and her regard for the peace of the world—the proper time being gauged by the state of negotiations concerning China. Or she may stiffen up and imperil the success of limitation of armaments unless things go her way as to China.
The gush about Briand and the French necessities for land armament must have been highly pleasing to Japan. It practically disposed of any chance for consideration that the question of reduction of soldiery and abolition of conscription may ever have had. Those who were in Japan at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference know the one thing which made a great popular impression. It was erroneously reported at one time that the abolition of conscription had been decided upon. It was several days before the error was corrected. It is impossible to imagine the extent of official consternation and the amount of popular satisfaction during this short period. The Japanese are a very patriotic people. But if anyone believes they are in love with compulsory military service, the enormous sigh of relief that greeted the false report was the lesson of a lifetime. The optimistic American outburst of sentiment that met the eloquence of Briand would perhaps have been dampened if it had been realized that if there had been a definite understanding between the French and Japanese, the French position is just the one that Japan would have asked France to take, so that Japan might be relieved of the burden of defending her system of conscription and her huge army.
The optimists of the press also report Great Britain backing the American policy as to China. At the same time, it is reported that she insists upon keeping the Anglo-Japanese alliance. One set of newspaper headlines says 'Britain backing China and America but insists on entente with Japan'. This is much like saying that Britain wants white but insists upon black. The 'entente' means the alliance, although enlarged to take in the United States if possible. And the alliance is just the thing, so far as the Far East is concerned, which stands between Great Britain on the one hand and China and the United States on the other. But from all sources, even from far New Zealand, come in just the nick of time reports as to the necessity of continuing the alliance, with the United States if possible, without us if necessary.
It doesn't show undue suspicion of Great Britain to ask what is the concealed aim, what is Great Britain really after. She knows well enough that the United States will not come into a tripartite agreement, that the Senate would not ratify it, even if the American diplomats agreed—which they know the Senate and American opinion too well to do. It is also familiar to them that in all human probability Canada stands ready to repudiate the dual alliance if it is renewed, and that opinion in England itself is so rapidly crystallizing against it that the power of the Foreign Office to renew it is uncertain. Why didn't Great Britain renew when the stage was all set, and when there was much less opposition at home than there is now, if her heart is so unalterably fixed? This talk is obviously trading talk, or aimed at some as yet unavowed point. Is it to back up Japan’s policy at a critical moment on the ground that the United States declines to enter into the only arrangement which is practicable? Quite likely not, but what then? There is a desire to create some situation which will bring pressure on the United States in some direction.
As for the United States’s policy so far as revealed, the test question is whether Mr. Root’s four points are meant to sanction the status quo in China. If events as they continue to develop show that such is their main intent, then we may be sure that the administration in order to secure itself politically with the American people, is willing to bargain with Japan and Great Britain at the expense of China. There has been a cryptic intimation that the recognition of China’s sovereignty by these Root principles is equivalent to enforcing against her all the treaties and commitments which she has signed—for otherwise China would not be sovereign in her treaty-making power! This ingenious device is worthy of that type of American legal mind which has found that it is interference with the liberty of the American workingman to do anything to place him in a secure position of freedom. But it is almost inconceivable—unfortunately not quite—that the problems of the Far East should be approached in this spirit.
Of course it is something to improve China’s condition for the future. But the forces which are operating because of the things that have been done in the past will not stop operating because a Conference of powers in Washington decides that such and such things shall be done in the future. The only successful way to regulate the future is by dealing with conditions that now exist. Diplomats are wont to square the circle and perform other impossibilities. To consecrate the status quo in China and then to resolve that things shall be done differently in the future is another of these miracles of diplomacy.
Is the American press going to feed that portion of the American public which requires a happy ending to every novel and drama? Or is it going to take the risk of offending American sentiment and pride by ceasing to proclaim every move as a great advance, and every remark of a foreign diplomat as a tribute to American success, and a reason for swelling American pride? The danger is the greater because our vanity got such a terrible prick at Versailles—a wound that had much to do with our withdrawal into our shell. Now that we have put our heads out again, we are looking for solace and compensation. There are foreign diplomats skilled enough to salve our wounds while they achieve in fact their own ends. If we are not too much inclined to spend our energy in gladsome cheering, we are more likely to attain that 'happy ending' to the Washington drama which is so much needed by our mental habit and by our still sore pride.

Dewey, John. Chinese resignations [ID D28498].

Dewey, John. Chinese resignations [ID D28498].
The numerous resignations of influential men connected with the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference raise the question as to the reasons for such action. The average American, I think, will regard them as unwise and illtimed. The action will appear somewhat unsportsmanlike, like quitting because you are afraid you are going to be beaten before you actually have been beaten. Chinese custom in such matters is different. The usual act of an official who differs from his superiors is to resign, more often as a protest or as a means of calling public attention to some action that he disapproves than as a final deed. Resignation as a means of publicity occupies in China something of the position once occupied in Russia by assassination.
If Chinese representatives thought that the American public was not aware that affairs were going badly for China, if they thought that American public opinion could be stirred to greater activity by a dramatic gesture, it would be quite in their habit to resign. There are also other possible motives. One, at least, of the advisers who has protested by resignation belongs to a faction of Chinese politics which has been engaged for many months in an active struggle to get its men into the Cabinet. Nothing would be more likely to overthrow the present ministry than an act which would convince the Chinese people that the Cabinet is not duly protecting the interests of China, especially in Shantung.
An American can hardly conceive the closeness with which the deliberations of the Conference are watched by the educated class in China. What for us is an interesting game, or at most an important event, is to them almost a matter of life and death. Sentiment is easily stirred under such circumstances, and it is a fairly safe guess that public feeling is already gathering against what it regards as supine action on the part of the Cabinet. No matter what the difficulties in Washington, the present Government will almost surely have to bear the brunt of failure and there will be a temptation to many to get out from under while there is still time.
One speculation may be dismissed as probably unfounded. There has been a widespread report that the Peking Government is under the control of Chang Tso Lin, the military governor of Manchuria, while he is managed by the Japanese. Those who accept this rumor believe that the resignations may be directed against a pro-Japanese element in the government which instructs the delegation.
But so far as international relations are concerned, a pro-Japanese policy in Washington is a myth. In the first place, foreign diplomats are never much under the control of Peking, and, in the second place, no Chinese politician would dare to be pro- Japanese in foreign politics, even if he wanted to be. It would be social and political suicide, if not physical.
At the time of the Versailles Conference a pro-Japanese Cabinet was in power in Peking. There were reliable reports of an attempt on the part of Japan to influence the chief delegate from China as he passed through Tokio. But the delegates unanimously declined to sign the treaty and China made a separate peace with Germany. What could not be done then cannot possibly be done now. There were internal dissensions at Paris among the peace delegates and they may exist now at Washington. If so, however, they are more personal and factional than due to any difference as respects Japan.
The resignations, whatever their cause, raise the question of how China is faring at Washington and what her reasonable expectations are. Roughly speaking, I fancy there are four parties in Chinese sentiment, leaving out of account any attempt to use the Conference for internal political purposes. One pins itself to the United States to such an extent that its hopes are unbounded. It says, in effect, that Wilson took Shantung away from China at Versailles and Harding is going to get it back at Washington.
Another party wants, of course, good results, but is hopeful of nothing. A letter from one of the most distinguished leaders of intellectual China says that he had just made a public speech in which he warned his audience that China was due for a great shock, a great disappointment. This group is out of politics and is opposed to all existing political factions. They insist upon the need of internal reforms and are firmly convinced that when they are attained Japan cannot stand against China, and that other nations will be obliged to give up their wrongful possessions and practices.
A third group, largely educated abroad, many as students of political science, are ardent nationalists. They have learned to talk about sovereignty. They are actively interested in such topics as extra-territoriality and foreign municipal concessions in China. The freeing of China from foreign legal interferences is their chief aim.
The fourth and largest party, in my opinion, consists of those who will measure the failure or success of the Conference by what happens with reference to the 21 demands and Shantung. They don't care so much for postoffices, customs, consular courts, etc., which they regard as minor matters in comparison with the main issues.
I have just seen a copy of a telegram addressed to the American public by the combined chambers of commerce and combined educational associations of China, the bodies most representative of the enlightened non-political opinion of China. The cablegram begins by thanking the American people for past aid. It ends by requesting American public opinion to back up China energetically in her two essential requirements—restoration of Shantung and abrogation of the 21 demands. Doubtless the State Department as well as the Chinese delegation is in a difficult and delicate position at Washington. But the Chinese delegates will naturally be held to a stricter accounting by the Chinese people than will American representatives by our citizens for whatever results are attained or not attained on these points. So far the Chinese have refrained to a surprising extent from direct propaganda in the United States. Resignations may be the forerunners of an active propaganda, mainly anti-Japanese.

Dewey, John. Three results of treaty [ID D28611].
Senator Lodge's speech is the high-water mark of genuine eloquence in the Conference. While under its spell one is likely to read its glow and felicity into the agreement and find more in it than is actually there. The islands are not, of course, the danger point in the Pacific, but Asia.
Nevertheless, the four-power treaty accomplishes three results. It sets a precedent of consultation among great powers. This goes further than two-powers' agreement to arbitrate. It puts an end to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This is a great gain to better relations between the United States and Great Britain. Indirectly it renders war less likely between Japan and the United States. Indirectly it affords promise to China. She may be disappointed in other respects, but she has obtained from the Conference one great result.
The chief object of the present pact in the mind of those who drew it was probably to afford a graceful means of ending the alliance. In the third place it ought to stop the American talk of a naval base at Guam. The Philippines would not, I think, ever have become a source of trouble between Japan and the United States. But a fortified naval base is a provocation to Japan. We Americans may not intend it as such, but if we were in the place of the Japanese we should feel about it as they do.
Since the Philippines are now protected by the treaty, it is to be hoped that the Guam project will be abandoned. If it is, Japan's assent to the 5-5-3 naval ratio will probably soon follow. Negatively at least, the terms of the treaty are ground for congratulation. Our State Department has probably been subject to pressure to make an agreement which would include China in an agree¬ment of the powers. The islands are a safe place to attempt a diplomatic guarantee of the status quo. To have joined in guaranteeing it in China would have been a fatal blunder. That we are saved from.

Russell, Bertrand. How Washington could help China. In : The Daily Herald ; 16 Dez. (1921).
In international dealings it is useless to expect any nation to pursue any end which it does not believe to be in its own interest. No good to China could be expected to come out of the Washington Conference but for the fact that the interests of both England and Amer¬ica are, for the present, identical with those of China, except in a few points, such as our possession of Hong Kong. The immediate and pressing aims of any Chinese patriot must be two: to end the internal anarchy and to recover the independence and integrity of China. The aims of English and American statesmanship in China, from a purely selfish point of view, may be taken to be the extension of trade and the opportunity to exploit Chinese natural resources. Territorial ambitions have no place in America's programme, and ought to have none in ours; I believe that, in fact, our ambitions in that respect are limited (in China) to the retention of what we already possess, or rather part of it, for our Government seems to have realized that our true national interest would be furthered by the restitu¬tion of Wei-Hai-Wei. What both English and American interests most urgently require in China is stable government and the open door: that is to say, the ending of anarchy and of Japanese territorial aggression. Our interests are, therefore, for the present, almost completely identical with those of China.
The interests of Japan, at any rate as conceived by the militarists who control policy, are different from ours, and not compatible with the wel¬fare of China. Japan wishes to be a Great Power, in territory, population, and industrial resources. Japan has not much of the raw materials of in¬dustry, whereas China has them in abundance. If Japan is to be able to conduct a long war successfully, control of mines in some portion of China is essential. Moreover, Japanese statesmen have not merely eco¬nomic aims, but also the desire for dynastic grandeur and a vast empire. Psychologically, one of the fundamental causes of the whole situation is the Japanese inferiority-complex. At every moment they are afraid that they are being insulted or cold-shouldered on account of not being white, and this makes them aggressive and ill-mannered. This is by far the strongest part of the Japanese case. Europeans do not beat Japanese ricksha-drivers to make them hurry, nor do their chauffeurs dismount to cuff pedestrians who are slow in getting out of the way, as I have seen the chauffeur of an American do in Peking. The Japanese are not liked by either Europeans or Americans, but they are treated with a respect which few white men show to the Chinese. The reason is simply that Japan has a strong army and navy. White men, as a rule, only respect those who have power to kill them or deprive them of their means of livelihood ; and as wealth depends upon success in war, skill in homicide is, in the last analy¬sis, the only thing that secures tolerable courtesy from a white man. If the Japanese are defeated in war by the Americans or by an Anglo-American alliance there will be a setback for the coloured races all over the world, and an intensification of the intolerable insolence displayed towards them by white men. There will be an immediate catastrophic destruction of the Japanese civilization, which still has many merits that our civilization lacks. And following upon this there will be a slow destruction of the civilization of China, not by war, but by Americanization. The big towns will become like Chicago, and the small towns like 'Main Street'. Ameri¬cans would feel that they were conferring a boon in effecting this trans¬formation, but no person with any receptivity or aesthetic sense would share their view.
We may, therefore, diagnose the situation as follows: Japan is in a bad mood, and is more immediately dangerous to China than any other nation; but England and America—especially the latter—are, by the very nature of their civilization and outlook, destructive of all that is best in the Far East, and doomed, nolens volens, to be oppressors if they have the power. Under these circumstances the worst thing that could happen would be a Japanese-American war, leading to the destruction of everything distinc¬tive in the civilization of the yellow races, the increase of white tyranny, and the launching of America upon a career of militarist Imperialism. On the other hand, the best thing that could happen would be a diplomatic humiliation of the Japanese military party, causing Japan itself to become less aggressive and less anxious to subjugate the adjoining mainland. The difficulty is that Japan will not yield except to the threat of war. If England and America, at Washington, join in insisting upon acceptance of the naval ratio and evacuation of Shantung, one may presume that Japan will give way sooner than face a war against both combined. If America alone threatens, Japan will probably choose war, and be destroyed.
What is, of course, to be expected is that America will give way, in sub¬stance though not in form, about Shantung, in return for Japanese acceptance of the naval ratio; that after a few years American spies will report (truly or falsely) that Japan is building secretly; that in the meantime America will have fortified naval bases in the neighbourhood of Japan; and that then America will proceed to destroy Japan with a good con¬science. I do not see any issue from this cycle of disaster except a change of heart in Japan. Of course, a change of heart in America would be just as good, but nothing will convince Americans that they need a change of heart.
China, unfortunately, cannot escape being industrialized. It would be far better for China to develop her industries slowly with native capital; but they will, in fact, be developed quickly with foreign capital. So much, I fear, is independent of the issue at Washington. For the immediate inter¬ests of China it would be well if America and England combined to force Japan by diplomatic pressure, not by war, both to accept the naval ratio and to evacuate Shantung. This would also be good for Japan, since it would be a blow to the military party, and perhaps introduce a much more liberal régime. (Evacuation of Vladivostok and friendly relations with the Far Eastern Republic should also be insisted upon.) But in the long run it is not in the interests of Asia that the one genuinely independent Asiatic Power should be crushed. England and America can, if they choose, exer¬cise despotic sway over the world. There is much good that they might do in that case. They might curb the ambitions of France and Japan, make all nations except themselves disarm, undertake the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Russia for the sake of their own trade, and liberate China from the fear of Japan. But if they were able to accomplish all this they would also acquire the habit of bullying, and become confirmed in the ruthless certainty of their own moral superiority. They would soon come to display an economic and cultural despotism such as the world has never known—always, of course, in a missionary spirit. From such a tyranny the world could only escape by a universal rebellion, possibly with Great Britain at the head of the rebels.
From the alternative of tyranny or war there is, so far as I can see, no escape while the industrial nations continue their system of capitalist exploitation. Nothing offers any real escape except Socialism—i.e., in this connection, production for use instead of production for commercial profit. America is still in the phase of Liberalism which more experienced nations have outgrown since the war. President Wilson attempted to save the world by Liberal ideas, and failed ; President Harding is making a second attempt, and will fail even if he seems to have succeeded. He will fail, I mean, as a humanitarian, not as the champion of American capital. The existing capitalist system is in its very nature predatory, and cannot be made the basis of just dealing between nations. So long as America draws nearly all the dividends derived from Capitalism, she will continue to think the present system heaven-sent, and will employ Liberal futilities which will delude fools into supporting knaves.
But in all this I am speaking of the future, not of the immediate situ¬ation. For the moment, Anglo-American cooperation at Washington can secure two important things: (1) the naval ratio, (2) a breathing space for China by a curbing of Japanese ambitions. If these ends are achieved the Washington Conference will have been useful. If it leaves Japan's activities in China unchecked, it will have been futile ; but if it leads to war with Japan it will have been immeasurably harmful.

Dewey, John. A few second thoughts on four-power pact [ID D28612].
Second thoughts often change first impressions. In a previous letter to the Sun I expressed the belief that the chief point of the four-power treaty was to allow Great Britain and Japan to make a graceful exit from their alliance. A little more rumination convinced me that even if that were so the fourth clause, to the effect that the alliance would cease when the four-power treaty was ratified, should not have been introduced.
The policy for this country was to keep pointing out to the British and Japanese the ugly influence exerted by the alliance upon our friendly relations with them, while stating that abrogation was their own affair, to be decided in view of their estimate of the importance of our good relations. Then there would have been neither a bargain nor an appearance of a bargain, nor of bringing pressure to bear upon the Senate for ratification.
The inclusion of the clause suggests that our delegation, like President Wilson at Versailles, had something to sell, and in order to sell it was willing to make an offer. The thing to be sold is the 5-5-3 ratio in particular and naval reduction in general. The latter is close to a political necessity for the Administration; the former is important for the prestige of our delegates, a seeming diplomatic victory. But was a bargain necessary?
The cold facts of the case are that Japan was likely to go bankrupt if she continued her naval program. If our delegation had been bold instead of cautious, if it had declared that the United States would reduce anyway, business and popular pressure would have compelled a similar reduction in Japan. And it would appear as if the financial relations of the United States and Great Britain were sufficient to secure a like policy on the part of England, provided Great Britain had assurance that we were going to reduce naval armaments.
Moreover, it is highly probable that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would have had to go anyway or be seriously modified suggestion of surrender to bargaining on our part to secure something we could have got without bargaining is confirmed by a story which comes from highly dependable sources. Admiral Kato was at first willing to accept the 5-5-3 ratio. But the naval experts objected. Then they were told by the British experts that if they held out the United States would yield a larger quota to them. Japanese naval experts, according to reliable information, told others that their proposals had the approval of British experts and used this fact to justify their claim.
At the same time, a propaganda was started by their means at home, so that the delegates became frightened about their reception at home if they consented to Hughes' original proposal. Kato weakened. This state of affairs imperiled the whole limitation issue. Thus the British indirectly created a situation which brought pressure to bear upon the United States to enter the four-power pact as a condition of securing the 5-5-3 ratio. Meantime Japan's propaganda at home got rather out of hand, especially because of reports that we were coercing Japan to accept our proposition, and a feeling of hostility was created which goes far to offset the moral effect of the naval reductions.
Another second thought was caused by an inquiry made of me by a lawyer the day after the pact was announced. He asked if the treaty did not apply to Japan proper. He called attention to the wording by which a 'controversy arising out of any Pacific question' comes within the scope of the treaty. The query put a new face on the matter for me. Leaving China out of account, Japan is due for trouble sooner or later with the Far Eastern Republic, if not with all Russia.
Are we committed to discussion and adjustment of this matter in a conference where Japan is represented and the Russians excluded? If so, this fact alone is sufficient, in my opinion, to justify the Senate in either rejecting the treaty or insisting upon a reservation that, if the controversy involves a nation which is not a party to the treaty, that power shall be entitled to representation in the conference on an equality with other powers.
If the controversy concerned China, this would also protect her and our own good relations with her. No nation could refuse without exposing its own purposes. I still feel that the treaty has the benefit of allaying American suspicion about Japan and the Philippines, Australian fears of Japan and Japan's fears of us about Guam. So far it makes for real peace. But to put over a treaty nominally applying to insular possessions when it actually applies to Japan proper as well, and leaves out the two nations with which Japan may have a serious controversy, namely, Russia and China, is not to give up the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is to make us a party to it, minus, of course, any explicit provision for armed assistance.
More than one paper this morning asserts positively that the treaty includes Japan; one, close to the State Department in the past, denies it. The matter is too fundamental to be left in the ambiguity of which diplomacy is so fond. If any ambiguity is left, it is likely that some emergency will arise where the United States will not be willing to take part in adjusting matters against China and Russia. Then we shall be exposed to bitter charges of bad faith. In the end more bitterness will be stirred up than is now temporarily calmed down.
It is noteworthy that President Harding is not sending the treaty at once to the Senate. This omission is probably connected with the fact that the nine-power pact which has been talked about, relating to China, is not settled upon.
This means that one cannot be understood without the other. It also indicates that our delegates made a mistake in committing themselves upon one while the other was still uncertain. Final judgment must, therefore, be reserved upon the four-power agreement. If it is too early to condemn unreservedly, it is also too soon for approval. The two treaties must be judged together. If the additional agreement does not remove the uncertainties in the present treaty, and if it adds additional ambiguities on its own account, the American people ought to be getting ready to express a public opinion which will affect our own Senate and also the representatives of other powers.
The intimation which has been put forth that the vague four Principles of Root are to form the core of further treaty is discoursing. China cannot get all she ought to have or all she hopes for. But the United States ought not to become a party to sacrificing her even to the extent of assent to ambiguous generalities. Such generalities, while they remove immediate friction between diplomats, are always in the end a threat to the peace of the world. Each power interprets them in its own wav and accuses others of bad faith.
It is also to be hoped that the new treaty, instead of calling for a conference after some controversy has actually arisen, will substitute a series of annual or biennial conferences. Provision ought to be made also for popular or parliamentary representation at these conferences. The world is surely ready for that much concession to open diplomacy.
Provision for a regular series of conferences will give China some security for the future in return for failure to obtain what she now requires. It will put the nations on their good behavior between times. It will avert the necessity of having to try to adjust matters which are always more or less accomplished facts, a necessity which is the bane of diplomatic meetings that occur only after controversy has become acute. It will do away with the objection to the four-power treaty, so ably urged by Senator Borah, that under present conditions the normal commitment to back up an adjustment means practically a promise to use force to carry it out. It will tend to avert future trouble instead of striking bargains and making compromises about troubles that have already got well under way. It represents an intelligent way to cooperate with other nations without getting into entangling alliances.

Ludwig Bachhofer ist am Museum für Völkerkunde München tätig, forscht und reist zur Vorbereitung der Habilitation.

August Conrady ist Professor für ostasiatische Sprachen an der Universität Leipzig.

Gustav Ecke promoviert in Philosophie an der Universität Erlangen

Wilhelm Gundert ist Lektor der Hochschule von Mito.

Franz Hübotter ist Ausserordentlicher Professor für Medizingeschichte an der Universität Berlin.

Gottfried Rösel erhält das Diplom für Chinesisch am Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Berlin.

Alfred Salmony habilitiert sich in Kunstgeschichte an der Universität Bonn.

Hans Wirtz hat einen Lehrauftrag für Chinesisch an der Universität Köln. Er gibt Einführungen in die chinesische Umgangs- und Literatursprache.

Tod von Frederick William Baller.

Tod von Wilhelm Leuschner.

Tod von Wu Tingfang.

Tod von Zheng Guanying.

Rückgabe von Qingdao an China durch Japan.

Siegfried Knak kommt in Hong Kong an.