China and the West

FINCA VIGIA SAN FRANCISCO DE PAULA CUBA
July 30, 1941
Mr. Henry Morgenthau,
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Morgenthau:
I was dreadfully sorry not to get to Washington again in June. One of my best friends became ill while we were on a trip down here and died on the day I had planned to go to New York, so I had to call the Washington trip off.
When I left for China Mr. White asked me to look into the Kuomingtang-Communist [sic] difficulties and try to find out any information which could possibly be of interest to you. When I was in Washington last this problem was comparatively dormant, so I left it more or less alone when we talked. It will recur as a serious problem quite frequently, so I thought perhaps it would be useful for me to write you a short summary of what I find at this date to be true, after studying the problem for some three months in China.
First, I believe there will be no permanent setdement of the Communist problem in China until an agreement between the Generalissimo's Government and the Soviet Union setdes definite limits to the territories the Communist forces are to occupy. Until then the Communists, as good Chinese, will fight against the Japanese but as good Communists they will attempt to extend their sphere of influence in China no matter what territorial limits they may accept on paper. It is to their territorial interests to try to make a geographically defensible frontier for whatever territory they are occupying and they have consistently tried to keep a corridor open between the spheres of influence they have behind Nanking and the territory they legally occupy in the northwest.
The bitterness between the Communists and most of the Kuomingtang [sic] leaders I talked to, including the Generalissimo, can not hardly be exaggerated. It is necessary to remember, always, that the Generalissimo fought the Communists for ten years and that his kidnapping and conversion to the fight against Japan was under Communist influence.
The extent of the Communists' part in the kidnapping has always been played down by Mme. Chiang in her writing and in all official accounts of the kidnapping. The Communists have also played it down as they sought to appear merely as mediators who were brought in and finally showed the Generalissimo the light but, as one Kuomintang official put it to me, they still regard Communism as the "HEART DISEASE" from which China suffers while the Japanese invasion is only a "SKIN DISEASE."
There are a certain amount of Communists kept in Chungking as window-dressing to prove the existence of Kuomingtang-Communist [sic] co-operation in the fight against Japan but aside from these showpieces some of whom seemed to me to be agents provocateurs, others to be sort of tourist traps, i.e., they were well watched and perhaps acting innocently in order that any visitors making contact with them would be signaled by their watchers to be local secret police, there is very little true Communist representation in Chungking with the exception of General Chou En-Lai. He is a man of enormous charm and great intelligence who keeps in close touch with all the Embassies and does a fine job of selling the Communist standpoint on anything that comes up to almost anyone in Chungking who comes into contact with him. I do not know whether you ever knew Christian Rakovsky who was a very able and also very charming Soviet diplomat before he was sent to Siberia. Chou En-Lai's ability, brilliance and charm reminded me very much of the early Rakovski, of the period of the Genoa conference and the negotiations of the first German-Soviet Pact. He is one of the few people of opposing views who can get to and talk with the Generalissimo. He was once, as you undoubtedly know, the Generalissimo's aide when Chaing [sic] Kai-Shek headed the Huang Pu (Whangpoo) [sic] academy. It was he who did the talking to Chiang Kai-Shek at the time of his kidnapping and they will see each other quite often. Chou En-Lai and his wife and Mme. Chaing [sic] Kai-Shek and the Generalissimo had dinner together in Chungking while I was there; but while Chou En-Lai and the window-dressing Communists move about freely in Chungking, under-cover Communists are hunted in Kuomingtang [sic] territory almost as relentlessly as they would be in Japan, and Liberals, when they are professors in the University, are extremely suspect and under close surveillance. Students suspected of liberal views, and by this I do not mean Communist but merely those who are at all to the left of political views of the gentry or land-holding class, are liable to arrest and imprisonment in concentration camps. I have seldom seen such an atmosphere of fear of betrayal by informers as at the great university at Chengtu. These were men that I knew were not Communists nor fellow-travelers nor Communist sympathizers, but at a tea party in the campus anyone who wished to tell you anything even remotely critical of the Kuomingtang [sic] would be careful to walk away into a clear open space before speaking.
You have probably noticed that each time reports of Kuomingtang-Communist [sic] friction come simultaneously with any aggressive move in the East by Japan. Undoubtedly, incidents are created between Kuomingtang [sic] and Communist troops by the Chinese in favour of the Wang Ching-Wei puppet government to create friction, always with the ultimate hope of civil war between the Communist and the Kuomingtang [sic] believe a part of these incidents are artificially forced by the propeace generals and politicians who surround the Generalissimo. Others are the natural product of the conflicting aims of the two parties, but the timing of the incidents over the past six months has too often been to Japan's advantage for them to be merely coincidences. I think it is very possible that Japan has agents working on both sides. But with the natural desire for peace of all those who are unable to enjoy their former privileges in wartime and whose one desire is to have the war with Japan over and the Communists destroyed, it is natural to suppose that they would try to produce any sort of incident which would lead to war with the Communists.
To keep the whole thing as simple as possible, I think we can be sure that war between the Kuomingtang [sic] and the Communists is inevitable unless the Soviet Union and the Chungking Government come to some mutual agreement which will make part of China really Soviet China with a defensible frontier which will be respected by both the Chungking Government and the Communists. I believe we can delay indefinitely any all-out civil war between the Chungking Government and the Communists if our representatives make it perfectly clear at all times that we will not finance civil war in any way. I am perfectly sure that many people in China will try to make it clear to any American representatives there, as they attempted to do to me, that China now has an army capable of crushing the Communists in a short time and that it would be advisable to complete the surgical interven¬tion to cure the "Heart Disease." Personally, I have known no disease of the heart which has ever been cured by such a violent means and I think that a major military campaign against the Communists in the northwest would be the most disastrous thing that could happen for China.
It is very easy to criticize the lack of true democracy in the area governed by the Kuomintang [sic] but we have to remember that they have been at war against Japan for five years now and it is a great credit to China that after five years of war, which almost invariably produces a form of dictatorship during its prosecution, any vestiges of democracy should remain at all. Life in Chungking is unbelievably difficult and unpleasant. Many of the wealthiest Chinese have fled to Shanghai or Hong Kong. Those who remain are heartily sick of the war although their public statements naturally say nothing of this. It is the wealthy people, the land-owners, and the banks who are most anxious for the war to end. They are naturally anxious to enjoy the fruits of their wealth and position. There is no enjoyment of any kind in Chungking but these people who want the war with Japan to end are equally anxious for the destruction of the Communists and their ideal of a solution would be for us to back China while she destroyed the Communists and made peace with Japan. They bring every form of pressure on the Generalissimo and his advisors to work toward this solution and naturally, as nothing is done clearly or openly in China, their aims seldom seem to be what they actually are.
I could outline the various peace groups to you, but you undoubtedly have had so much information on that from others better qualified than I am to analize [sic] them that I shall not bother you with that.
While we recognize the importance that there should be no civil war between the Communists and the Kuomingtang [sic], we should not accept completely the value that the Communists put on their own war effort. They have had much excellent publicity and have welcomed writers of the caliber of Edgar Snow to their territory that America has an exaggerated idea of the part they played in the war against Japan. Their part has been very considerable but that of the central government has been a hundred times greater. The Generalissimo, in conversations, is very bitter about this. He said to me in conversation,
"The Communists are skillful propagandists but without much fighting ability. As the Communists do not possess military strength, the government does not need to resort to force against them. If the Communists try to create trouble injurious to the prosecution of the war, the government will take minor measures to deal with them as disciplinary questions arise. I guarantee you that the government will undertake no major operations against the Communists.
"The Fourth Route Army Incident was very insignificant. It equaled one-tenth of one percent of the noise created about it in America.
"There has been intensive propaganda, so that Americans believe that Communists are necessary to the war of resistance. Actually, without the Communist Party, the armed resistance of China would be facilitated, not hindered. The Communists are
hampering the Chinese Army. There are Eight war zones without any Communist troops in them at all."
At this point Mme. Chiang-Kai-Shek said that she had received letters from Americans stating the Government Army fired at the backs of the Fourth Route Army while it was withdrawing according to orders. The Generalissimo interrupted her impatiendy to continue.
"The Communists give no assistance to the Government Army. They disarm Government troops whenever possible to get more material and more territory. It is not true about firing on withdrawing Communist armies. The Communists have refused to retire to the areas which have been assigned to them, and disciplinary measures were taken against them accordingly. Those are the type of disciplinary measures which will be taken in the future but there will be no major operations against the Communists and no measures against them if they obey the orders of the Central Government."
The Generalissimo went on, "The Communists made no contribution in the war against Japan but hampered the war effort. If there were no Communists in China the Government could have made greater achievements. The Government is not afraid of Communists, but they only delay the final victory. If the United States worries about the Communists they are simply falling into the Communist trap."
During this time the Generalissimo spoke with great passion and vehemence, and Mme. Chiang Kai-Shek interpreted for him. He sometimes interrupted her in his eagerness to proceed with the theme. He went on, "Large numbers of Government troops are diverted to guard against the Communists. Sixty divisions are held in the rear, in readiness against a possible Japanese southward push. They also serve to watch the Communists. I tell you this in confidence. Unless the Communists use force, the Government armies will not. I hope that the Communists will come into the framework of the Central Government. They will be treated as any other army unit if they do. If they do not, they must accept the disciplinary mea¬sures which they will incur."
Mme. Chiang Kai-Shek interrupted to say, "We are not trying to crush them. We want to treat them as good citizens of China." 
As these statements would have only served to inflame feeling between the Kuomingtang [sic] and the Communists and tend toward creating an atmosphere of civil war, I did not publish it. Dr. Laughlin Curie [sic, Currie] told me in Hong Kong, as he came out, that our policy was to discourage civil war between the Communists and the Central Government and I wrote nothing which would encourage a possible war between the two parties. Also the various statements of the Generalissimo were at variance with his own former statements and with the known facts of the Communist war effort. I write them to show you the passions and the disregard of the facts which enter when the Communist question is raised. Communists, however, in my experience in Spain, always try to give the impression that they are the only ones who really fight. This is part of their tactics and their enemies slander them with equal injustice.
You have probably had enough of this subject for one letter. There are a couple of other very interesting angles which I would like to write you about if it would be of any interest. Checking over all my material, certain things stand out as of more or less permanent importance, no matter what necessary changes in the manner in which the situation must be regarded due to develop¬ments in the past six weeks. If you would care to have me write a couple of more letters on these subjects, perhaps your secretary would let me know.
I have a report on various incidents in the difficulties between the Eighth Route Army and the Fourth Route Army (The two Communist units; the latter now disbanded) and the troops of the Central Government, written by Generals Ho Ying-Chin and Pai Chung-Hsi, Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese army, and the two answers to their thesis on the whole situation which General Chou En-Lai wrote for me. The attack on the Fourth Route Army was as long ago as last February but the basic attitudes of the two parties toward all of these incidents are set forth very clearly in these documents. They can, therefore, serve as a basis of study for sifting out the truth on future incidents which are bound to occur. In reading them each side makes an extremely strong case. Their respective case is that handled in the first para¬graph of this letter. I believe these dissimilar reports are valuable as background for judging the importance of future incidents which will arise. Could your secretary let me know if you want these and other documents? 
Another thing you might wish to have is a study of the wage scale of the Chinese army. A Lieutenant-Colonel in the Central Government Army with ten years of military service as a Commissioned officer having fought against the warlords, the Communists and the Japanese, at present makes 126 Chinese dollars per month. In 1937, before all officers took a voluntary pay cut as their sacrifice toward fighting the Japanese, the same officer received 180 dollars. In 1937 one dollar bought 14 pounds of rice. This Spring one dollar buys two pounds of rice. Officers have no food allowance. I believe that in the present wage scale of officers in the Kuomingtang [sic] Army there is a greater threat to Chinese continuance of the war—not this year, but for next year—than in any other single destructive possibility.
I have the notes for a report on this which I can write and send to you if you will be interested.
Please forgive me for bothering you with such a long letter. There was so much to say when I saw you last June, and I have tried to let time eliminate those things which did not seem essential.
With very best wishes to you in this most difficult time, I am
Very truly yours,
Ernest Hemingway.