China and the West

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhou Enlai. Plas Penrhyn, 14. Juni 1963.
Dear Premier Chou En-lai,
I am grateful to you for your instructive and generous letter to me, and I value the opportunity to send my personal associates to China. I have been deeply impressed by the initiatives that your Government has taken with a view to bringing about a settlement of the dispute between China and India, and by the fact that you have done more than has been asked of your Government by the Colombo Powers with respect, to the withdrawal of your troops in the Central and Eastern Sectors, although you were not obliged to do so by the recommendations of the Colombo Powers. I further understand that China has, in addition to releasing all military personnel, returned all captured military equipment to the Government of India. These steps, and the repeated guarantee on the part of China that negotiations between the two countries may be conducted without any assumptions as to where boundary lines and troop positions are to be placed, have impressed me with the entire sincerity of your Government in its desire to settle this dispute.
I agree with you when you say that the Indian Government has failed to provide one initiative or conciliatory gesture such as might allow a friendly atmosphere and the onset of serious negotiations. I recognize, also that there is every reason to suspect the sincerity of India's professed willingness to negotiate. I suggest, however, that, assuming all this to be the case, it would be in China's interests to accept the Indian interpretation of the proposals. There would be two advantages in this course : first, that is would probe the sincerity of India's professed willingness to negotiate ; and second, that, if India proved insincere and refused to negotiate, even the habitual practice of misrepresentation by the West would not be able to conceal from world opinion that China is eager for peace, and India is not. I suggest that these considerations should outweigh your justifiable objection to Indian civilian officials in Aksai Chin. It seems to me that it would not be 'appeasement' or 'weakness' should China say that, unreasonable as it is for India to presume to suggest that there could be pre-conditions for negotiations, , China is prepared to allow these civilian posts so that India will have no further stated grounds to use as pretexts for failing to begin negotiations.
I have persistently urged India to begin negotiations, first on the basis of your proposals of October 24th, then on the basis of your interpretation of the Colombo proposals. I have written to Prime Ministers Nehru and Bandaranaike and to U Thant in this sense. I have appealed to all those Indians with whom I have had association during many years. You will understand, therefore, that I have not sought to persuade only China to make concessions or have at any point envisaged impairing the position of your Government or your people. Should China state that the considers India's demands to be unreasonable in the extreme but, nonetheless, as a test of India's sincerity, will permit a certain number of Indian civilian posts in the area north of the line from which Chinese troops have withdrawn 20 kilometres in the Western Sector, there would be nothing India could do except agree to negotiate or accept exposure before the world.
I am well aware of the difficulties which were imposed upon the conflict between China and India through the intrusion of the United States and Britain. It is clear to me that they are encouraging India to arm to the teeth and to harbor long-term hostilities toward China. It is largely because of this that I urge you to remove the last obstacle to negotiations. This, to my mind, is the course of strength and is not appeasement or unlimited concession. It seems to me that, should China remove every vestige of nominal Indian objections to beginning negotiations, China would both force India to come to the Conference table and release many forces within India which could then agitate for peace and understanding and agreement.
Although the Colombo proposals as interpreted are weighted to India's advantage, they are, as all the participating members have pointed out, recommendations, and have only the force of suggested arrangements such as to facilitate negotiations. You yourself have pointed this out to me. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be possible for China to accede to such interpretations as India unreasonably insists upon, so that the danger of provocations or of foreign intervention or of a deteriorating situation may be avoided.
I am grateful for your frankness in putting to me your view in China and Tibet, and I am taking care to study them and also your Government's position on the overall question of peace and war.
With good wishes and high regard, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell