China and the West

Mou, Zongsan. Zhi de zhi jue yu Zongguo zhe xue [ID D17146].
Mou schreibt : [Heidegger] strongly emphasizes man's finitude. He makes an ontological analysis of human finitude by borrowing his approach to existentialism and his method to phenomenology and finally establishes his fundamental ontology. Ontology discloses the Being of Dasein (ren, zai nali). It is thanks to authenticity (zhenshixing, as opposed to facticity: jia) that Heidegger understands Being. Being may be understood as a "character of Being" (shiyouxing). In Heidegger's text, the word "Being" appears in almost every sentence but the thing to which it relates is never specified...Expressions such as "being without dwelling" (unheimlich, wujiaxing), the nothingness of being (cunzai de xuwu), his pain, dread (Angst, buli as opposed to fear: Furcht, jupa) are all used to describe, from an existentialist perspective, the process that man has to go through in order to acquire his authenticity and unveil his Being. Man is the guardian of Being (shiyou de shouhuzhe) which means that Being discloses his character through man's existence. This is precisely where the question of fundamental ontology lies. Heidegger's descriptions could let us think of a disclosure of a "true mind" (zhen xin) for instance when he speaks about "call of consciousness" (Ruf, liangxin de huhuan), feeling of guilt (jiuze zhi gan), dread (Sorge, jiaolü), determined being (Entschlossenheit, jueduan) or nothingness (Nichtigkeit, xuwu). Nevertheless, all these descriptions are still "floating" and he has not been able to pave the way for a "true mind."Heidegger's thought does not recognize any transcendent reality (chaoyue de shiti)—infinite constitutive mind (wuxianxing de xinti), constitutive nature (xingti), constitutive authenticity (chengti)—thanks to which man would achieve his authenticity and anchor his way of being into transcendent grounding. Consequently, we can posit that his theory is rootless. In reality, according to Kant, "true metaphysics" is "transcendent." If we want to speak about a fundamental ontology (jiben cunyoulun), the only necessary approach is to base ourselves on "transcendent metaphysics." Heidegger did not grasp this point.The Transcendental Object, is nothing else, for us, and I base myself on Heidegger's own terms, than a nothing (wu). This stems from the fact that it is neither a being (essent) (cunzaiwu) nor an object that would stand against us. It is not a being (cunzaiwu) but a nothing (wu), a being with the character of a nothing (wuwu). As such, it is nevertheless still a "something" (mouwu), not an absolute nothing. It is the transcendental basis thanks to which an object becomes an object (acquires its character of object); it is the principle (daoli) of objects. The reason why we cannot get an intuition of it comes precisely from the fact that it is a principle, the most universal character of what the unity of categories (fanchou de tongyi) represents. It is not a concrete phenomenon (being/essent) and therefore it can only be thought of but not perceived through senses. But here we cannot say either that it can be given by a pure intellectual intuition as it is not a real being (a real essent), but a construction of the unity of apperception...
If we speak about "an object independent from sensibility," we can of course describe it as a "transcendental object." Nevertheless, there is no obligation to use such a term: wouldn't it be appropriate to speak about a "transcendent object?" Supposing that we accept the word "object" (duixiang), the Chinese translation of this idea should be chaojue de duixiang and not chaoyue de duixiang. The realm of a thing described as chaojue is beyond experience, completely cut off from experience (jingyan) (hence an independence from sensibility).
When Heidegger speaks about ontological knowledge or truth and understands them as "bifurcating into the unveiledness of Being and the openness of beings"; when he assimilates truth with "un-concealment of . . ." (moumou zhi bu yinbi), his words are only based on his own thought. In reality, Kant posits that a priori synthetic judgments (xianyan zonghe panduan) stem from understanding (zhixing) and apperception (tongjue). From this it is possible to say that they constitute an ontological knowledge, refer to a phenomenal ontology (xianxiang de cunyoulun) and enable an "unveiledness of being." But the issue is just that of the unveiledness of the universal characteristics of a phenomenal being and does not relate to the "Being" that Heidegger has actually in mind. Heidegger adds his personal touch to Kant's words. According to the latter, true ontology is a "transcendent metaphysics" (chaojue xingshangxue) that focuses on free will (ziyou yizhi) and the thing in itself, and not an "immanent metaphysics" (neizai xingshangxue). But this is at the level of an immanent metaphysics that Heidegger wants to position his fundamental ontology. Therefore, he interprets Kant's work as ontological knowledge and as the foundation of an ontology.My understanding of the problem has nothing to do with that of Heidegger... As transcendental imagination builds the schemes thanks to time, time is the ground of transcendental imagination. [Apprehending something] under the mode of time (shijianhua) boils down to objectifying (duixianghua) something. If the authentic moral Self and the moral principles [he submits himself to] in an autonomous way can be apprehended under the mode of time they consequently become phenomena. As such they can [through respect] reveal themselves in an objective and thematic way: The consequence is then to negate them as authentic Self (zhen wo) and moral principles. Heidegger's speech does not make sense: It shows that he does not understand the meaning of the true moral Self. Moreover, his understanding of the meaning of transcendental imaginations is affected as well.
It is correct to posit that the law (moral principles) and the acting Self cannot be experienced as objects. In that way, one could think that Heidegger, highlighting that point, reaches a certain understanding of the moral Self. Nevertheless, linking the possibility of the law and the acting Self with transcendental imagination is a strange thing. It makes no sense to establish a link between practical reason and transcendental imagination.