“The Conference an a happy ending” (Publication, 1921.12.07)
Year
1921.12.07
Text
Dewey, John. The Conference an a happy ending. In : New Republic ; vol. 29 (Dec. 7, 1921). (DewJ149)
Type
Publication
Contributors (1)
Dewey, John
(Burlington 1859-1952 New York, N.Y.) : Philosoph, Pädagoge, Psychologe
Subjects
History : China - United States of America
/
Philosophy : United States of America
Chronology Entries (1)
| # | Year | Text | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1921.12.07 |
Dewey, John. The Conference and a happy ending [ID D28610]. If the American people are going to bring an enlightened public opinion to bear on the Conference, we need more sob sisters and fewer joy brothers to report the Conference. The nations and diplomats who are interested in maintaining the status quo in the Far East have everything to gain by spreading a Pollyanna atmosphere over the doings of the Conference. Foreign diplomats are well aware of American national psychology. They know our sentimental optimistic streak and our desire to feel that we are playing a great part in promoting the idealistic welfare of the world. They know that when all is said and done, it is going to be important to the Washington administration to have the American people believe that American policies have won out as regards the Far East, and that it is essential to the administration to secure results as to navies. These things are among the best cards held by foreign diplomats. A disposition of the American public to put the best face possible on everything done by the Conference is one of the surest ways to help some of the worst things happen or at least to fail to get done some of the possible good things. Matters have reached, as this is written, the point where it is much more important to note what isn't done and said than what is said, because the former decides the meaning of the latter. The obvious exception is in the case of the reduction of armaments, where there are specific, statistical conditions to keep track of, not such generalities as are being fed to the public as regards the Far East. I suggest three matters, one for the United States, one for Great Britain and one for Japan, which will bear watching. What happens with reference to them will give a fair test for the reader of the daily news to apply to the outgivings from Washington, and will give him a means by which he can decide which way things are really going. Everything that has so far occurred bears out the original in-formation as to the general instructions under which the Japanese delegates were to operate. The information was that Japan was to favor in a hearty and sincere manner the reduction of armaments, provided that it was confined to the navy and applied in fair ratio to the three great powers; but was to discourage, so far as possible, the discussion of Far Eastern policies and secure postponement if some action threatened. It was also understood that she would put emphasis upon the disorganized state of China—as of course she is entitled to do up to a certain point— and insist that if anything was done about China it would require a political concert of the powers with a supervisory control of China to make sure of execution. The point of the latter policy is obvious. If it is accepted, Japan becomes, because of inevitable geographical facts, the trustee of the powers for China. If it fails, Japan can throw the blame upon others, especially upon the United States. She will say in effect that after talking as usual a great deal about her interest in China, the United States as usual failed to come to the point when it was a matter of doing something. It does not take much ingenuity to see that her policy may be to shape things so that there will be but two alternatives; one, doing nothing, leaving the status quo with all its advantages for Japan; the other, forcing to the front a plan for joint action which the United States will reject. Of course this policy does not preclude a number of incidental concessions which the Sino-Japanese relations call for anyway, and which a happy and hopeful American public will greet as victories for American policies. Admiral Kato helped create the wave of indiscriminate optimism by his prompt assent to the Hughes proposals. It was heralded to the American people as a wonderful concession to the United States, and accepted as such by those who had been taught that Japan was always a militaristic nation and who do not know the pressure she is under from the burden of naval expense, nor how small a navy actually suffices Japan for defensive purposes or even for offensive aims under the generous conditions of American reduction proposed by Hughes. Probably Japan got more than she had hoped for. There is nothing to object to in this fact. It is in the interest of the world as well as of Japan that the plan should be adopted. The significant thing is that publicity began to pour forth that Japan needed an 8 or at least 7 ratio to 10-10, instead of a 3-5-5 ratio. There is no unworthy suspicion of Japan attaching to the supposition that this is a mask for some real aim, and that what she is not talking about is more important than what she is loudly saying. It is no secret to Japan that American public opinion is much more active and informed on the subject of armaments than it is on the Far East. It is no secret to her that the administration has a great deal politically at stake in the success of the reduction of armament part of the Conference. It is no secret that while there is a good disposition toward China there is no absorbing interest nor exacting judgment as to what happens. It is possible that at the proper time Japan will reluctantly concede in the matter of naval armaments substantially what is asked of her, out of regard for her good friend, the United States, and her regard for the peace of the world—the proper time being gauged by the state of negotiations concerning China. Or she may stiffen up and imperil the success of limitation of armaments unless things go her way as to China. The gush about Briand and the French necessities for land armament must have been highly pleasing to Japan. It practically disposed of any chance for consideration that the question of reduction of soldiery and abolition of conscription may ever have had. Those who were in Japan at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference know the one thing which made a great popular impression. It was erroneously reported at one time that the abolition of conscription had been decided upon. It was several days before the error was corrected. It is impossible to imagine the extent of official consternation and the amount of popular satisfaction during this short period. The Japanese are a very patriotic people. But if anyone believes they are in love with compulsory military service, the enormous sigh of relief that greeted the false report was the lesson of a lifetime. The optimistic American outburst of sentiment that met the eloquence of Briand would perhaps have been dampened if it had been realized that if there had been a definite understanding between the French and Japanese, the French position is just the one that Japan would have asked France to take, so that Japan might be relieved of the burden of defending her system of conscription and her huge army. The optimists of the press also report Great Britain backing the American policy as to China. At the same time, it is reported that she insists upon keeping the Anglo-Japanese alliance. One set of newspaper headlines says 'Britain backing China and America but insists on entente with Japan'. This is much like saying that Britain wants white but insists upon black. The 'entente' means the alliance, although enlarged to take in the United States if possible. And the alliance is just the thing, so far as the Far East is concerned, which stands between Great Britain on the one hand and China and the United States on the other. But from all sources, even from far New Zealand, come in just the nick of time reports as to the necessity of continuing the alliance, with the United States if possible, without us if necessary. It doesn't show undue suspicion of Great Britain to ask what is the concealed aim, what is Great Britain really after. She knows well enough that the United States will not come into a tripartite agreement, that the Senate would not ratify it, even if the American diplomats agreed—which they know the Senate and American opinion too well to do. It is also familiar to them that in all human probability Canada stands ready to repudiate the dual alliance if it is renewed, and that opinion in England itself is so rapidly crystallizing against it that the power of the Foreign Office to renew it is uncertain. Why didn't Great Britain renew when the stage was all set, and when there was much less opposition at home than there is now, if her heart is so unalterably fixed? This talk is obviously trading talk, or aimed at some as yet unavowed point. Is it to back up Japan’s policy at a critical moment on the ground that the United States declines to enter into the only arrangement which is practicable? Quite likely not, but what then? There is a desire to create some situation which will bring pressure on the United States in some direction. As for the United States’s policy so far as revealed, the test question is whether Mr. Root’s four points are meant to sanction the status quo in China. If events as they continue to develop show that such is their main intent, then we may be sure that the administration in order to secure itself politically with the American people, is willing to bargain with Japan and Great Britain at the expense of China. There has been a cryptic intimation that the recognition of China’s sovereignty by these Root principles is equivalent to enforcing against her all the treaties and commitments which she has signed—for otherwise China would not be sovereign in her treaty-making power! This ingenious device is worthy of that type of American legal mind which has found that it is interference with the liberty of the American workingman to do anything to place him in a secure position of freedom. But it is almost inconceivable—unfortunately not quite—that the problems of the Far East should be approached in this spirit. Of course it is something to improve China’s condition for the future. But the forces which are operating because of the things that have been done in the past will not stop operating because a Conference of powers in Washington decides that such and such things shall be done in the future. The only successful way to regulate the future is by dealing with conditions that now exist. Diplomats are wont to square the circle and perform other impossibilities. To consecrate the status quo in China and then to resolve that things shall be done differently in the future is another of these miracles of diplomacy. Is the American press going to feed that portion of the American public which requires a happy ending to every novel and drama? Or is it going to take the risk of offending American sentiment and pride by ceasing to proclaim every move as a great advance, and every remark of a foreign diplomat as a tribute to American success, and a reason for swelling American pride? The danger is the greater because our vanity got such a terrible prick at Versailles—a wound that had much to do with our withdrawal into our shell. Now that we have put our heads out again, we are looking for solace and compensation. There are foreign diplomats skilled enough to salve our wounds while they achieve in fact their own ends. If we are not too much inclined to spend our energy in gladsome cheering, we are more likely to attain that Dewey, John. The Conference and a happy ending [ID D28610]. If the American people are going to bring an enlightened public opinion to bear on the Conference, we need more sob sisters and fewer joy brothers to report the Conference. The nations and diplomats who are interested in maintaining the status quo in the Far East have everything to gain by spreading a Pollyanna atmosphere over the doings of the Conference. Foreign diplomats are well aware of American national psychology. They know our sentimental optimistic streak and our desire to feel that we are playing a great part in promoting the idealistic welfare of the world. They know that when all is said and done, it is going to be important to the Washington administration to have the American people believe that American policies have won out as regards the Far East, and that it is essential to the administration to secure results as to navies. These things are among the best cards held by foreign diplomats. A disposition of the American public to put the best face possible on everything done by the Conference is one of the surest ways to help some of the worst things happen or at least to fail to get done some of the possible good things. Matters have reached, as this is written, the point where it is much more important to note what isn't done and said than what is said, because the former decides the meaning of the latter. The obvious exception is in the case of the reduction of armaments, where there are specific, statistical conditions to keep track of, not such generalities as are being fed to the public as regards the Far East. I suggest three matters, one for the United States, one for Great Britain and one for Japan, which will bear watching. What happens with reference to them will give a fair test for the reader of the daily news to apply to the outgivings from Washington, and will give him a means by which he can decide which way things are really going. Everything that has so far occurred bears out the original in-formation as to the general instructions under which the Japanese delegates were to operate. The information was that Japan was to favor in a hearty and sincere manner the reduction of armaments, provided that it was confined to the navy and applied in fair ratio to the three great powers; but was to discourage, so far as possible, the discussion of Far Eastern policies and secure postponement if some action threatened. It was also understood that she would put emphasis upon the disorganized state of China—as of course she is entitled to do up to a certain point— and insist that if anything was done about China it would require a political concert of the powers with a supervisory control of China to make sure of execution. The point of the latter policy is obvious. If it is accepted, Japan becomes, because of inevitable geographical facts, the trustee of the powers for China. If it fails, Japan can throw the blame upon others, especially upon the United States. She will say in effect that after talking as usual a great deal about her interest in China, the United States as usual failed to come to the point when it was a matter of doing something. It does not take much ingenuity to see that her policy may be to shape things so that there will be but two alternatives; one, doing nothing, leaving the status quo with all its advantages for Japan; the other, forcing to the front a plan for joint action which the United States will reject. Of course this policy does not preclude a number of incidental concessions which the Sino-Japanese relations call for anyway, and which a happy and hopeful American public will greet as victories for American policies. Admiral Kato helped create the wave of indiscriminate optimism by his prompt assent to the Hughes proposals. It was heralded to the American people as a wonderful concession to the United States, and accepted as such by those who had been taught that Japan was always a militaristic nation and who do not know the pressure she is under from the burden of naval expense, nor how small a navy actually suffices Japan for defensive purposes or even for offensive aims under the generous conditions of American reduction proposed by Hughes. Probably Japan got more than she had hoped for. There is nothing to object to in this fact. It is in the interest of the world as well as of Japan that the plan should be adopted. The significant thing is that publicity began to pour forth that Japan needed an 8 or at least 7 ratio to 10-10, instead of a 3-5-5 ratio. There is no unworthy suspicion of Japan attaching to the supposition that this is a mask for some real aim, and that what she is not talking about is more important than what she is loudly saying. It is no secret to Japan that American public opinion is much more active and informed on the subject of armaments than it is on the Far East. It is no secret to her that the administration has a great deal politically at stake in the success of the reduction of armament part of the Conference. It is no secret that while there is a good disposition toward China there is no absorbing interest nor exacting judgment as to what happens. It is possible that at the proper time Japan will reluctantly concede in the matter of naval armaments substantially what is asked of her, out of regard for her good friend, the United States, and her regard for the peace of the world—the proper time being gauged by the state of negotiations concerning China. Or she may stiffen up and imperil the success of limitation of armaments unless things go her way as to China. The gush about Briand and the French necessities for land armament must have been highly pleasing to Japan. It practically disposed of any chance for consideration that the question of reduction of soldiery and abolition of conscription may ever have had. Those who were in Japan at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference know the one thing which made a great popular impression. It was erroneously reported at one time that the abolition of conscription had been decided upon. It was several days before the error was corrected. It is impossible to imagine the extent of official consternation and the amount of popular satisfaction during this short period. The Japanese are a very patriotic people. But if anyone believes they are in love with compulsory military service, the enormous sigh of relief that greeted the false report was the lesson of a lifetime. The optimistic American outburst of sentiment that met the eloquence of Briand would perhaps have been dampened if it had been realized that if there had been a definite understanding between the French and Japanese, the French position is just the one that Japan would have asked France to take, so that Japan might be relieved of the burden of defending her system of conscription and her huge army. The optimists of the press also report Great Britain backing the American policy as to China. At the same time, it is reported that she insists upon keeping the Anglo-Japanese alliance. One set of newspaper headlines says 'Britain backing China and America but insists on entente with Japan'. This is much like saying that Britain wants white but insists upon black. The 'entente' means the alliance, although enlarged to take in the United States if possible. And the alliance is just the thing, so far as the Far East is concerned, which stands between Great Britain on the one hand and China and the United States on the other. But from all sources, even from far New Zealand, come in just the nick of time reports as to the necessity of continuing the alliance, with the United States if possible, without us if necessary. It doesn't show undue suspicion of Great Britain to ask what is the concealed aim, what is Great Britain really after. She knows well enough that the United States will not come into a tripartite agreement, that the Senate would not ratify it, even if the American diplomats agreed—which they know the Senate and American opinion too well to do. It is also familiar to them that in all human probability Canada stands ready to repudiate the dual alliance if it is renewed, and that opinion in England itself is so rapidly crystallizing against it that the power of the Foreign Office to renew it is uncertain. Why didn't Great Britain renew when the stage was all set, and when there was much less opposition at home than there is now, if her heart is so unalterably fixed? This talk is obviously trading talk, or aimed at some as yet unavowed point. Is it to back up Japan’s policy at a critical moment on the ground that the United States declines to enter into the only arrangement which is practicable? Quite likely not, but what then? There is a desire to create some situation which will bring pressure on the United States in some direction. As for the United States’s policy so far as revealed, the test question is whether Mr. Root’s four points are meant to sanction the status quo in China. If events as they continue to develop show that such is their main intent, then we may be sure that the administration in order to secure itself politically with the American people, is willing to bargain with Japan and Great Britain at the expense of China. There has been a cryptic intimation that the recognition of China’s sovereignty by these Root principles is equivalent to enforcing against her all the treaties and commitments which she has signed—for otherwise China would not be sovereign in her treaty-making power! This ingenious device is worthy of that type of American legal mind which has found that it is interference with the liberty of the American workingman to do anything to place him in a secure position of freedom. But it is almost inconceivable—unfortunately not quite—that the problems of the Far East should be approached in this spirit. Of course it is something to improve China’s condition for the future. But the forces which are operating because of the things that have been done in the past will not stop operating because a Conference of powers in Washington decides that such and such things shall be done in the future. The only successful way to regulate the future is by dealing with conditions that now exist. Diplomats are wont to square the circle and perform other impossibilities. To consecrate the status quo in China and then to resolve that things shall be done differently in the future is another of these miracles of diplomacy. Is the American press going to feed that portion of the American public which requires a happy ending to every novel and drama? Or is it going to take the risk of offending American sentiment and pride by ceasing to proclaim every move as a great advance, and every remark of a foreign diplomat as a tribute to American success, and a reason for swelling American pride? The danger is the greater because our vanity got such a terrible prick at Versailles—a wound that had much to do with our withdrawal into our shell. Now that we have put our heads out again, we are looking for solace and compensation. There are foreign diplomats skilled enough to salve our wounds while they achieve in fact their own ends. If we are not too much inclined to spend our energy in gladsome cheering, we are more likely to attain that 'happy ending' to the Washington drama which is so much needed by our mental habit and by our still sore pride. |
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Cited by (1)
| # | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2012 | Ethik-Zentrum Universität Zürich | Organisation / EZ |
|