“Underground burrows” (Publication, 1921.11.29)
Year
1921.11.29
Text
Dewey, John. Underground burrows. In : Baltimore sun ; 29.11.1921. In : Dewey, John. The middle works. Vol. 13 : 1921-1922. Ed. by Jo Ann Boydston. (Carbondale, Ill. : Southern Illinois University Press, 1976-1983). [Conference Washington]. (DewJ148)
Type
Publication
Contributors (1)
Dewey, John
(Burlington 1859-1952 New York, N.Y.) : Philosoph, Pädagoge, Psychologe
Subjects
History : China - United States of America
/
Philosophy : United States of America
Chronology Entries (1)
| # | Year | Text | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1921.11.29 |
Dewey, John. Underground burrows [ID D28609]. Ever since the Conference was called I have believed that in the end publicity would be more important than the particular decisions reached. We are at a point where the chief guarantees for the peace and security of the world are found in the trust of the nations in one another’s good faith and good will. Publicity is the way to develop mutual trust. Nations who have no sinister plans have everything to gain from making their attitude known; nations with predatory policies are best restrained by the knowledge that their operations are subject to exposure and general discussion. Publicity means, of course, the utmost possible in the way of open diplomacy. But it also means an education of the public so that it will be immune against dishonest propaganda and reasonably intelligent in passing judgment on events as they happen. Coming to Washington for a few days with this prepossession in mind, my first concern was naturally to try to get an idea of the atmosphere. I wanted to know how much ventilation and circulation there was, whether things were stifling and close or open and relaxed. Thanksgiving was a critical time. At the beginning of the Conference the American eagle had made a great flight in the open. No one had expected so much frankness; having had a good taste of it, we all hoped for as much candid publicity in the discussion of Far Eastern issues. But it didn’t come. The American eagle seemed to be idly perched on a tree half asleep, while moles and woodchucks were burrowing underground and rabbits scurrying for cover. Two of the European nations at the Conference were accusing France of insincere statements and a desire to promote her own advantage, even if it wrecked the Conference. It was reported that the Chinese so resented the interpretation put by British delegates objected to even the measure of publicity involved in keeping records of meetings; that the Chinese delegation was losing the support of Chinese unofficial representatives because they were dickering privately with the Japanese over Shantung; that the British were saying nothing and lying low; that the Japanese after saying at first that a 50 per cent, navy was adequate for defensive purposes were holding out for 70 per cent.; that the Root principles were meant to refer only to the future and out of deference to Japanese and British susceptibilities would consolidate the status quo—and so on and so on. In short, there was an unmistakable atmosphere of nervousness; there was an air of distrust. The nervousness and distrust were associated with shutting down on the publicity that accompanied the naval proposals. The latter days of the week brought official denials of a number of the rumors mentioned above. There followed an unmistakable letting down of the tension of the previous days. Some of the reports, however, were not denied; they were confirmed. Out of the combination of denials and confirmations there formed in my mind a picture of the situation which I give for what it may be worth. As compared with the earlier days, there is an absence of disclosures on important topics. The public has no such clear and authorized idea of the position of the various nations on Far Eastern issues as it has on their attitude toward naval reductions. This, however, is not so much because important events going on behind the scenes are kept from the public as because the leading nations are hesitating from bringing up any issue which is so important that to talk about it would result in committing the nation and giving away its position. If there weren't so much public publicity there might be, so to speak, more private, more diplomatic, publicity. As it is, the nations seem to feel that they are approaching a mined field. No one wishes to step on it first for fear of the resulting explosion. Each delegation is rather waiting in hopes that some other delegation is going to make a false move which will redound to its own advantage. This means in effect that there are a series of committee meetings, occupied in part in reducing to stated form decisions already reached and in part with discussion of minor points, minor comparatively speaking. Extra-territoriality, postoffices and customs are not exactly minor points for China, the last in particular. But they are much less explosive than the 21 demands and Manchuria, or than Shantung. For it seems likely that the Chinese could get large concessions about the latter if they were willing to join other nations in admitting Japan's special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. The present disposition seems to be to assist China in getting what she can on minor points, lest raising the bigger points would result in a breakup and China would depart having gained nothing. This phase of diplomacy was probably inevitable. It denotes some marking time and some deploying to sound other nations out, and to discover a policy by which each nation can later justify itself, in case nothing significant is done about the Far East. The Conference is entitled to breathing spells, especially when during them routine business is accomplished. But they cannot last indefinitely. The dangerous questions exist and they must be faced. The most important of all the issues of the Conference is still in suspense. When the 21 demands, Manchuria, Shantung and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are dealt with is it to be in the light of open and avowed statements of the respective positions of Japan, Great Britain and the United States? Or are the main issues to be lost in a fog of irrelevant issues, pious generalities, evasions, dickerings, private understandings? The United States appears committed by a high authority to the former alternative. The next best thing to getting results is for the public of all countries to know just why they were not got and who has stood in the way and why. It is not too much to say that the failure or success of United States policies now depends upon their being backed up by an adequate demand for publicity on the part of all nations. Underground burrows have got to be dug open. Meantime Great Britain, to my mind, is the sphinx. I have found no one who professes to know exactly where she stands on any specific issue. Speaking for myself alone, I shall judge the probable outcome of the Conference by watching to see whether in the next week or two she breaks her sphinxlike silence. We know in general what the United States and China want. We know what Japan would like, although we do not know just what she would be willing to accept. It seems to be Great Britain's turn to come forward and tell what she wants. Opportunism is well enough under some circumstances. An excess of opportunism on the part of the British may spoil the Conference. |
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Cited by (1)
| # | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2012 | Ethik-Zentrum Universität Zürich | Organisation / EZ |
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