1921.12.09
Publication
# | Year | Text | Linked Data |
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1 | 1921 | Dewey, John. Chinese resignations [ID D28498]. |
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2 | 1921.12.09 |
Dewey, John. Chinese resignations [ID D28498]. The numerous resignations of influential men connected with the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference raise the question as to the reasons for such action. The average American, I think, will regard them as unwise and illtimed. The action will appear somewhat unsportsmanlike, like quitting because you are afraid you are going to be beaten before you actually have been beaten. Chinese custom in such matters is different. The usual act of an official who differs from his superiors is to resign, more often as a protest or as a means of calling public attention to some action that he disapproves than as a final deed. Resignation as a means of publicity occupies in China something of the position once occupied in Russia by assassination. If Chinese representatives thought that the American public was not aware that affairs were going badly for China, if they thought that American public opinion could be stirred to greater activity by a dramatic gesture, it would be quite in their habit to resign. There are also other possible motives. One, at least, of the advisers who has protested by resignation belongs to a faction of Chinese politics which has been engaged for many months in an active struggle to get its men into the Cabinet. Nothing would be more likely to overthrow the present ministry than an act which would convince the Chinese people that the Cabinet is not duly protecting the interests of China, especially in Shantung. An American can hardly conceive the closeness with which the deliberations of the Conference are watched by the educated class in China. What for us is an interesting game, or at most an important event, is to them almost a matter of life and death. Sentiment is easily stirred under such circumstances, and it is a fairly safe guess that public feeling is already gathering against what it regards as supine action on the part of the Cabinet. No matter what the difficulties in Washington, the present Government will almost surely have to bear the brunt of failure and there will be a temptation to many to get out from under while there is still time. One speculation may be dismissed as probably unfounded. There has been a widespread report that the Peking Government is under the control of Chang Tso Lin, the military governor of Manchuria, while he is managed by the Japanese. Those who accept this rumor believe that the resignations may be directed against a pro-Japanese element in the government which instructs the delegation. But so far as international relations are concerned, a pro-Japanese policy in Washington is a myth. In the first place, foreign diplomats are never much under the control of Peking, and, in the second place, no Chinese politician would dare to be pro- Japanese in foreign politics, even if he wanted to be. It would be social and political suicide, if not physical. At the time of the Versailles Conference a pro-Japanese Cabinet was in power in Peking. There were reliable reports of an attempt on the part of Japan to influence the chief delegate from China as he passed through Tokio. But the delegates unanimously declined to sign the treaty and China made a separate peace with Germany. What could not be done then cannot possibly be done now. There were internal dissensions at Paris among the peace delegates and they may exist now at Washington. If so, however, they are more personal and factional than due to any difference as respects Japan. The resignations, whatever their cause, raise the question of how China is faring at Washington and what her reasonable expectations are. Roughly speaking, I fancy there are four parties in Chinese sentiment, leaving out of account any attempt to use the Conference for internal political purposes. One pins itself to the United States to such an extent that its hopes are unbounded. It says, in effect, that Wilson took Shantung away from China at Versailles and Harding is going to get it back at Washington. Another party wants, of course, good results, but is hopeful of nothing. A letter from one of the most distinguished leaders of intellectual China says that he had just made a public speech in which he warned his audience that China was due for a great shock, a great disappointment. This group is out of politics and is opposed to all existing political factions. They insist upon the need of internal reforms and are firmly convinced that when they are attained Japan cannot stand against China, and that other nations will be obliged to give up their wrongful possessions and practices. A third group, largely educated abroad, many as students of political science, are ardent nationalists. They have learned to talk about sovereignty. They are actively interested in such topics as extra-territoriality and foreign municipal concessions in China. The freeing of China from foreign legal interferences is their chief aim. The fourth and largest party, in my opinion, consists of those who will measure the failure or success of the Conference by what happens with reference to the 21 demands and Shantung. They don't care so much for postoffices, customs, consular courts, etc., which they regard as minor matters in comparison with the main issues. I have just seen a copy of a telegram addressed to the American public by the combined chambers of commerce and combined educational associations of China, the bodies most representative of the enlightened non-political opinion of China. The cablegram begins by thanking the American people for past aid. It ends by requesting American public opinion to back up China energetically in her two essential requirements—restoration of Shantung and abrogation of the 21 demands. Doubtless the State Department as well as the Chinese delegation is in a difficult and delicate position at Washington. But the Chinese delegates will naturally be held to a stricter accounting by the Chinese people than will American representatives by our citizens for whatever results are attained or not attained on these points. So far the Chinese have refrained to a surprising extent from direct propaganda in the United States. Resignations may be the forerunners of an active propaganda, mainly anti-Japanese. |
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# | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
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1 | 2012 | Ethik-Zentrum Universität Zürich | Organisation / EZ |
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