China and the West

Hemingway, Ernest. China's Air needs. In : PM ; June 17 (1941).
Rangoon.—There is much difference of opinion about the Chi¬nese air force. I have seen them fly, visited their training schools and talked with the Americans and Russians who have taught them. Some say they are fine. Some say they are terrible. No people on earth, except the Spaniards, are more conceited than the Chinese and conceit is a hard thing for a pilot. It keeps him from progressing.
Lately kids from the people are being trained as pilots instead of the gentry having a monopoly. The course of training is not adequate and there are no planes for them when they are graduated so nothing is really proved. But they are not as conceited as the type of airman who wishes to establish the fact that he is a superior being by flying and, once he can fly, wishes to go no further.
Recently the Japanese came up to one of the Chinese air fields in northern Szechwan Province with two seater long range fighters. Sixteen Chinese pursuit pilots flying the Russian E 15-3, a Russian conversion of our old Boeing Pi2 with a new gull wing and retractable landing gear, took off to meet them. A few days before these same Chinese pilots had impressed President Roosevelt's representative, Dr. Lauchlin Currie, with their formation flying. But when the heat was on it was a different story and the Japanese shot down 16 of 16 that went up. They broke formation and scattered and the Japanese, keeping their formation, just went around methodically accounting for the singles after the covey had been flushed.
Any real American aid to the Chinese in the air would have to include pilots. Sending them planes keeps them happy and keeps them fighting. It will not put them in condition to take the dffensive successfully.
China can resist indefinitely with the equipment it has if it is financed and the Generalissimo sees an ultimate chance of victory through Japan being involved in war with Great Britain and the U.S.A. China cannot face the Japanese in any offensive action.
There are about 4000 supposedly competent Chinese artillery officers. Most of them are holding staff commands because of the lack of guns. Many of them are German-trained and very good. Others are of doubtful ability. There are at least two Chinese offensive projects which could be undertaken successfully if they were supplied with artillery.
There is an excellent chance that Japan will not try to move south this year at all, but will try to defeat China by two great final drives. Having lost its chance to make peace with China it may realize it can never move south successfully with the bulk of its forces held in China, which cannot be crushed economically as long as it is receiving periodic financial injections from the U.S.A.
Japan's problem is to cut the main roads into China by which aid comes in from the U.S.A. and Russia. If it does not attempt a move to the south it will undoubtedly try to drive north toward Siam to cut the communications between Russia and China.
Japan's other drive must be from Laokai on the French Indo-China frontier, or somewhat east of there, north again to Kunming to cut the Burma Road. Cutting these two roads would sever the main lifelines into China from the two countries that are helping it most. They are the two moves to be expected this summer in case Japan does not move to the south. Both of them are exceedingly difficult and the Chinese have an adequate mobile reserve to oppose them.
At this moment it looks as though Japan would not move south unless there was a German move to invade England. It does not look as though a German attack on Suez would provide sufficient confusion for her to move. It looks as though Japan will not risk war with England and America until she sees a possibility of England and the U.S.A. being so occupied that they cannot oppose her adequately.