“The white peril in China : business as usual” (Publication, 1926)
Year
1926
Text
Russell, Bertrand. The white peril in China : business as usual. In : The new leader ; vol. 13, no 49 (Sept. 17 1926). (Russ298)
Type
Publication
Contributors (1)
Russell, Bertrand
(Trelleck, Monmouthsire 1872-1970 Plas Penrhyn bei Penrhyndeudraeth, Wales) : Philosoph, Logistiker, Mathematiker, Literaturnobelpreisträger ; Dozent Cambridge, Oxford, London, Harvard University, Chicago, Los Angeles, Beijing
Subjects
Philosophy : Europe : Great Britain
Chronology Entries (1)
| # | Year | Text | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1926.09.17 |
Russell, Bertrand. The white peril in China : business as usual [ID D28423]. Never since 1900 has the position of foreigners in China been so critical as at the present moment. But in recalling the Boxer movement I am not suggesting a parallel ; quite the contrary. What is important for Europeans to realize is the profound gulf which separates the Chinese nationalists of the present day from the misguided reactionaries of twenty-six years ago. The Boxers represented the least civilized and least enlightened elements in their country ; they stood solely for the preservation of ancient tradition. On the other hand, the Kuo Min Tang, the modern nationalist party, consists of the most modern and Westernised people in China – people who have assimilated, not the slave morality which Europeans have tried to inculcate in the East, but the doctrines of freedom and self-respect which they have tried to keep for home consumption. No unprejudiced person can doubt that the Kuo Min Tang represents all that is best in China, both morally and intellectually ; that is why our Foreign Office is itching to destroy it. One word about the situation. In Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin is seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was built by Chinese labour and Tsarist capital, and is therefore claimed by the Soviet Government. Not very far to the north of Peking is the intact army of Feng, the northern champion of Chinese nationalism, who was driven from Peking by the combined forces of Chang Tso-lin, the protégé of Japan, and Wu Pei-fu, the champion of British interests in the Yangtze. On the Yangtze, at is most crucial point, the Cantonese nationalist army, marching from the south, has occupied the twin cities of Hankow and Hanyang – including Wu's great arsenal in the latter, but not the foreign concession in the former. Farther up the Yangtze, one of Wu's lieutenants has turned against us, seized some British ships and come into collision with British gunboats. In the neighbourhood of Hankow, the nationalists are said to be firing upon all foreign ships indiscriminately, including those of America ; whether this is fact or propaganda it is not yet possible to know. Wu Pei-fu, for the moment at least, is impotent ; Chang Tso-lin is held in check, both by Russia to the north and by Feng in the south. In these circumstances, it is doubtful whether Chinese armies can be found to fight our battles for us. There is at this moment a serious possibility that China may be united under the joint leadership of Feng and the Cantonese. Public opinion enthusiastically supports them – not only that of the students, as our newspapers pretend, but also that of the 'solid middle class'. It is true that the 'students' . i.e., the men and women who have had a modern education, both old and young – are the most active and energetic of the champions of Chinese freedom, but they have won over almost all who are politically conscious among the Chinese. They even influence the soldiers in the mercenary armies, and make it difficult for Generals who are tools of the foreigner to rely upon their troops. That is in part the explanation of the successes of the Cantonese armies. Hankow and Hanyang are practically one city, about the size of Glasgow, on the northern bank of the Yangtze. Together with Wuchang, opposite them on the southern bank, they constitute the centre of China, where the river, running from west to east, crosses the north-and-south route from Peking to Canton. This is the key position, industrially, commercially, and strategically. Hence our dismay at the success of the Cantonese. The Cantonese are called 'Reds' in our propaganda Press. They are less 'Red' than Mr. MacDonald ; perhaps about as 'Red' as Mr. Lloyd George. But they are willing to accept help from Red Russia in the 'sort of war' that we have been waging against them from Hongkong, just as Chang Tso-lin, whom we regard as a pattern of virtue, has always accepted help from White Russia. The Cantonese wish to establish an orderly democratic government in China, and to restore Chinese independence, which we destroyed by the Opium War and its successors. The extent to which China has been deprived of independence is not always realized. Let us illustrate it by an analogy. Suppose the Germans had won the war, and had compelled us to sign a treaty giving them the City of London, control of the railway from London to Harwich, the right to garrisons at Reading and Oxford as 'Treaty Ports', the exclusive admiration of the business quarters in Glasgow, Liverpool, Southampton, with a score of other ports, and the right to determine import duties, collect the customs, and hand over the proceeds only to such Governments as they approved of, and to decide all disputes between Germans and British by German Courts. This would represent fairly accurately the state of affairs which Europe and Japan have created in China. I think that even the present Cabinet and Foreign Office would be found among the patriots if that were the condition of England. But sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander. The Chinese are 'wicked' when they demand the abrogation of the unequal treaties. For a long time, in fact, ever since the present British Government came into power, our Foreign Office has wished to intervene in China, but has been restrained by fear of America. It is hoped, however, that America will be brought to consent to intervention by means of the propaganda which represents Chinese nationalists as Bolsheviks. In many respects Americans are liberal, but where the Reds are concerned they see red. It is therefore possible that they may be induced at least to tolerate our intervention. This will, of course, further embitter our relations with Russia, leading, not improbably, to open war with the Soviet Government. Whatever may be the immediate outcome, it may be taken as certain that we shall be defeated in the end, with the loss of the whole of our political and commercial advantages in China. From the standpoint of British interests, opposition to Chinese nationalism is madness. It has already ruined Hongkong and seriously damaged our China trade elsewhere. And the more we persist, the more we shall lose. If we were fighting for a great cause, the prospect of loss might be faced with heroism. But the exact opposite is the case : we are fighting against everything progressive, upright, and intelligent in China, in favour of everything ignorant, reactionary and corrupt. We are fighting to keep civilization under in a great nation, in order that it may be the easier to exploit. We are fighting for the right to shoot down young unarmed students when they protest against the killing of Chinese workers by Japanese capitalists in labour disputes. We are fighting to prolong anarchy and civil war among self-seeking militarists dependent upon foreign support. We are fighting to preserve everything that is bad and to prevent the growth of everything that is good. This, alas, is our position throughout Asia. This is the sacred cause which we pursue with a pig-headed obstinacy that must, before long, bring ruin and national disaster upon us. Both as a patriot and as an internationalist, I view the situation with feelings little short of despair. What can be done about it ? The Labour Party might make an emphatic gesture to dissociate itself from reckless imperialism. It is painful to have to acknowledge that during the Labour Government the Colonial Office and the India Office were little better than at other times, though the Foreign Office was distinctly better until the permanent officials broke loose. The Labour Pary ought to declare emphatically that, in the present disturbed state of affairs, no British naval vessels should navigate the Yangtze or take part in hostile acts against Canton. It should declare that the time has come to revise the unequal treaties. It should emphatically express sympathy with the Kuo Min Tang, which is fighting the battle of Labour in China. And, last but not least, it should make it clear that it will not be a party to any hostilities against the U.S.S.R. which may grow out of the Chinese tangle. Looking further ahead, the Labour Party should resolve that, when next Labour is in office, it shall not depend upon officials and capitalists for its information about such countries as Mexico and China. So long as it remains in this dependence all its information will be biased, and it will be led to pursue a policy diametrically opposed to its professed objects. The attitude of the Labour Government towards Mexico (where Labour is in power) was such as to serve the oil interests, but was quite against the interests of humanity. So it will be again if we continue to depend upon reactionaries for our information. The continuity of foreign policy, which, I regret to say, has received some support from nominal adherents of the Labour Party, is a Satanic principle, which no humane person can tolerate for a moment. Our foreign policy, from the days of Henry VIII to the present moment, has been abominable : it has had one uniform principle, that of causing dissensions among others, in order that they might weaken each other for our benefit. This is called the Balance of Power. The Labour Party has, on paper, the most admirable principles in international affairs, but it allows itself to be deceived by not realizing the cunning and wickedness of the forces opposed to it, more particularly of those whose opposition is concealed and surreptitious. If our international ideals are to be effective, we shall have to be less gentle and trustful towards those whose ideals are different. I do not mean that we should persecute them ; I mean only that we should not leave them in key positions of influence and power. If I were Prime Minister, I should give a long holiday on full pay to many of our diplomatic service and of the higher permanent officials in the Foreign Office and the India Office. Until we do this, everything that we attempt will be sabotaged. Meanwhile we have to face the cry of 'British lives in danger'. Will our mandarins never understand the cry of 'Chinese lives in danger' which went up after the Shanghai massacre, committed at a time when no British lives were in danger ? If the British in China are in danger, let us announce that we are prepared to withdraw them, and the danger will cease. So long as the British arrogate to themselves the right to shoot Chinese at sight they cannot expect that the Chinese will respect their right to life. 'This animal is wicked ; it defends itself when attacked'. |
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Cited by (1)
| # | Year | Bibliographical Data | Type / Abbreviation | Linked Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2000- | Asien-Orient-Institut Universität Zürich | Organisation / AOI |
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