China and the West

Russell, Bertrand. China asserts herself : Imperialism in a quandary [ID D28424].
The Canton Government's embargo upon British and Japanese shipping has come as a surprise, and neither the friends nor the enemies of China in this country seem to know what line to take. The friends of China are disposed to think that the Cantonese have made a mistake, but this view is hardly borne out by the perplexities of China's enemies, as illustrated by the comments of the Conservative Press and the inaction of the British Government. It is evident that the Canton Government thinks the moment propitious for bringing to an end a long series of affronts inflicted by Hong-Kong. But in order to understand the situation, it is necessary to bear in mind a few historical facts, which are not widely known in this country.
Hong-Kong was acquired by the British in 1841 as a result of the Opium War of 1840. It was at the time a barren island, but we made of it a great city, with dockyards, naval arsenal, and the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank. For some reason which I have never understood, we think the Chinese ought to be grateful to us on this account. The population of Hong-Kong is over 600,000, and its trade, before the recent troubles, was about £200 millions per annum. There is a Government opium monopoly. Child-slavers in the colony was abolished in 1922, as a result of an agitation ; a British naval officer was recalled because his wife took part in the protest.
Corruption Frustrated.
Some distance up the river from Hong-Kong stands Canton ; their geographical relations are like those of London and the Isle of Sheppey. The population of Canton (which is the capital of the province of Kwangtung) is about 1,300,000. There is a small foreign concession, called Shameen ; the remainder of the city is purely Chinese. There is a railway from Canton to Kowloon (on the mainland close to Hong-Kong), but there is no railway from Canton into the interior, although one has long been projected.
The prosperity of Hong-Kong has always depended upon failure to develop Canton. If Canton had docks suitable for large ocean-going vessels, commerce would have no need to use Hong-Kong. This would be still more the case if railway communications were developed. It has, therefore, naturally been our policy to embarrass Canton, and to hamper its development unless under British auspices. For a moment, complete success seemed within our grasp. Immediately after the war, we negotiated with the corrupt militarists who then controlled Canton, a concession known as the Cassel Agreement, which would have given us a virtual monopoly of the railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. But in 1920, before this Agreement could be ratified, Sun Yat-Sen acquired control of Canton, and very properly refused to ratify. This was the initial cause of our hostility to him.
Sun Yat-Sen's Government, and the present Government, which is its legitimate successor, have never been recognized by the Powers. On this ground, the present action of Canton is regarded as piracy, not war, so that anybody supporting it can be hanged as a common criminal. Non-recognition is very serious for any Chinese Government, because the foreigners collect the customs and the salt tax, which form the bulk of the normal revenue, and the proceeds are not handed over to a Government which the Powers dislike. Ever since Sun Yat-Sen's acquisition of power in Canton, the proceeds of these taxes in the South have been kept on deposit in the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank, to be handed over as soon as there is a government bad enough to win our approval.
Official apologists, of course, pretend that they are guided solely by legal considerations in giving or witholding recognition from various Chinese Governments, but this is quite untrue. Mr. Henry K. Norton, formerly a Professor at Tsing-hua College, as the result of a prolonged and careful study, came to the conclusion that the Canton Government was the only one in China that could validly claim to be legal.
Rival Governments
The Revolution of 1911, led by Sun Yat-Sen, led to the overthrow of the monarchy and the election of a Parliament. The majority in the Parliament belonged to the progressive Kuo-min-tang Party, and opposed Yuan Shi-kai's attempts to make himself autocrat. He, therefore, illegally dissolved the Parliament. He was greatly admired by the British, and his autocracy was unquestioningly recognized as the legal government of China. It is from his usurpation that subsequent Peking governments have derived their claim to legality. But Parliament refused to regard itself as dissolved, and the partisans of the Kuo-min-tang refuge at Canton. After various vicissitudes they established themselves under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen in 1920. Their claim to legality is therefore at least as good as that of Peking.
The Canton government has been liberal and mildly socialistic ; force of circumstances has driven it to seek the alliance of the Bolsheviks. Among these circumstances, not the least effectual has been the hostility of Hong-Kong. A Fascist militia was organized at Canton among the conservative plutocracy, with the help of a Chinese employed by the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank ; its purpose was to overthrow Sun Yat-Sen. A European ship full of arms arrived at Canton, with its cargo consigned to these Fascisti ; we were furious when the Canton Government prevented the arms from being delivered.
Checkmate
We might have succ4eeded in establishing a Government of corrupt reactionary militarists at Canton, but for two circumstances. The first of these was the attitude of America. Decent Americans who know China hate us for our brutality. Other Americans hate us as trade rivals. Both combine in wishing to develop Canton at the expense of Hong-Kong. While I was in China, Messrs. Morgan, the bankers, sent a representative to China on behalf of the Consortium, and he spent a considerable part of his time in Canton. What he did there I do not know, but perhaps readers can guess. The other circumstance which stood in our way was the sudden defection of Feng, the Christian General, who turned Bolshevik and carried the Pekin Government with him, thus removing the ground of quarrel between North and South.
At this juncture, when everything was going against British imperialist designs, the British in control of the Municipal Council in Shanghai shot down a number of unarmed students without warning. The Municipal Council claimed to be an independent Power, and refused to submit to the report of the inquiry instituted by the Diplomatic Body ; their independence, however did not go so far as to abstain from demanding to be protected by all the navies of the world. From Shameen, the European quarter of Canton, a large number of Chinese were shot down, in self-defence, so we say ; but the American missionaries on the spot reported otherwise. The strike in Hong-Kong connected with these incidents has been so complete as to paralyse trade entirely ; it is estimated that our traders in Hong-Kong are losing £400,000 a day.
Our Government and our reactionaries are completely nonplussed. If we fight China, we must also fight Russia ; our Tories would like nothing better, but they know that Labour would not tolerate such a thing, and that therefore they must be defeated, as they were when they supported Denikin and Wrangel. Moreover, they are not, as then, supported by the other Powers. The French have no interest in the quarrel ; the Americans are definitely hostile to us, both for idealistic reasons and for reasons of self-interest. The Japanese, at first sight, seem to be involved on our side, but there are reasons why they should act independently. Since we terminated the Alliance and started to make a great naval base at Singapore, they have no reason to love us. They naturally dislike our position in Hong-Kong, and they are rivals for the China trade. Moreover, since the Washington Conference, they have been driven by fear of isolation into a more friendly policy towards Russia and China. We cannot therefore count upon them to help us in our dirty work. No wonder our Government is puzzled ; no wonder our reactionary Press screams in impotent fury.
A Simple Remedy
There is one line of action which has not occurred to any of them, although it would put an end to the whole trouble in a week. The line of action I mean is the adoption of friendliness, common justice, and common honesty. Let us accept the report of the diplomatic inquiry into the Shanghai shooting, and act upon it ; let us cease to foment civil war at Canton, and loyally accept the existing Canton Government as at least the de facto authority, to which its quota of the Customs revenue should be given ; les us concert with America proposals for the gradual abolition of extra-territoriality, say by subjecting Europeans, for a time, to European judges appointed by and responsible to the Chinese Government. Let us not leave our policy to be decided by Admirals on the spot, as we are doing at present. At least so it appears from the sinister statement. ('Times', Aug. 20) that Vice-Admiral Sir Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair 'would take such steps as he thought fit for the protection of British shipping without first consulting the Government'.
We must instruct correspondents of important newspapers not to write, as the 'Times' Peking correspondent did in the issue of August 20, 'extremists are endeavouring by misrepresentation to establish the view in Europe and America that the Treaties operate only to the advantage of foreigners and are oppressive to China. So it might be said of all the nursery rules imposed upon children by their elders'. The Chinese are not children, and it is not the practice in nurseries to shoot children in the back with rifle bullets. Our rich men must learn to treat the Chinese justly and as equals, or must put up with losing their money. I fear they will find the second alternative the less painful of the two.

Dewey, John. Is China a nation or a market ? [ID D28618].
If it were not a fact and a fact of a kind more or less familiar, the Conference now in solemn conclave in Peking would be incredible. The orthodox axiom of all 'sound political science' is national sovereignty; in practice no phase of political independence is more jealously guarded than the right to control taxation and to levy tariffs, whether for revenue or for the rearing of infant industries. In session in Peking are representatives of the three great democracies of the world, Great Britain, the United States and France, each professing unqualified faith in the right of independent nations to self-government. In addition there is a wide-spread hostility to everything which smacks of 'internationalism'; for are not the 'Reds' internationalists, and are not the Reds a menace? From these premises, one would hardly conclude that the Conference in Peking sits an international assembly held to take part in governing China; that it arrogates to itself one of the most 'sacred' functions of sovereignty, that of fixing the tariff on foreign goods, and that it has no notion of yielding any more to the expressed desire and purpose of China concerning its own affairs than it shall find necessary in order to avoid serious trouble.
It is doubtless highly theoretical to call attention to such flagrant discrepancies between political theory and practice. Nevertheless it may be one way to induce the American public to visualize the Chinese scene, and to realize that the State department of the United States has soon to decide whether it will continue to engage in the regulation of the internal affairs of China, contrary to the practically united will of the Chinese people, or whether it will have the courage and initiative to act in not merely a democratic but a decent way in permitting financial self-government to the Chinese government. There is no reason to doubt the kind sentiments of the State department; in all probability it means well by China, and its expressions of goodwill are not hypocritical camouflage. But the department is influenced by precedent, by routine, by the etiquette of diplomacy which might more easily fear a breach of manners toward other nations than a breach of justice towards China. And it is also exposed to direct and more or less powerful influence from business interests that want in behalf of their own pockets to keep the tariff of China on foreign goods at the lowest possible point. Is it too much to hope that the general public shall have an active concern in the decisions which are to be made, and shall bring greater pressure to bear upon the State department to act in a fair, humane and democratic way, than self-interest and hidden groups bring to bear in the opposite direction? It is futile to lecture the general public on its responsibilities in this matter; it is fed up with foreign responsibilities and wants to be left alone. But it may do no harm to assert with all possible emphasis that in China at present the American people is on trial, and that the attitude taken toward tariff autonomy by the United States will determine for long years the attitude taken by the Chinese towards us. Are our professions of goodwill to China sincere? Are our assertions of greater disinterestedness than animates other nations genuine? Or are they a combination of Pharisaism, sentimentality and highfaluting talk? That is the issue in the minds of most Chinese, and the way the American people meets the tariff question may determine for a generation the moral and political alignment of the Chinese people to western civilization in general and to American ideas and institutions in particular.
Needless to say the illogical position of interference of democratic nations, themselves highly nationalistic, and mostly addicted to protective tariffs, with the internal affairs of China grew up gradually for historic reasons, and so was tolerated until it became familiar and a vested interest. At the outset, the Chinese people were indifferent, and it is almost correct to say that the Chinese government invited the interference. In the past, it has not worked altogether badly; considerable good came of it. If international conferences to help regulate the affairs of individual nations were the rule and not an exception confined to countries so weak that they can be safely meddled with, there might even be something to say for continuing the practice in China. But the past is not the present, and present China is bent upon a radical break with the past in all that concerns its own management of its own affairs. The danger is that diplomats will not face the reality and extent of this change, and will palter, compromise, truckle over details, do as little as they possibly can, and trust to future events to be able to get away with their evasion of the issue. It is not too much to say that unless the International Conference takes action which looks in a definite and stated way towards the resumption of Chinese tariff autonomy, not at some vague future time when all shall be well with the government of China but at a specified date under specified conditions, public opinion in China will force any Chinese government that may exist to resume tariff autonomy in defiance of the powers, and that at no distant date. To put the matter at its lowest level, it might be as well to make a virtue of necessity, and by anticipating events get the credit for a just and sensible act.
It is understood that the powers are willing to permit China to level duties up to ten or fifteen percent. Japan is reported to have sprung a surprise by volunteering at the first meeting to agree to a raise up to twelve and a half percent. One feels helpless to comment adequately upon the situation. If the imagination will only work and think of a similar conference called to pass upon the affairs of France or Italy, or the United States, or even of a third- rate European power, there will be no need for any comment; a sense of the indignation and resentment of an awakened China and of the danger of giving cause for its continued growth, will take care of the affair. But it is more than the amount of tariff which China is to be permitted to levy that is under consideration. It is also proposed to decide for China what China shall do with the moneys when they are raised. There is a story that the assent of Japan to the American proposal of a Conference was secured by a tacit agreement that the United States would join in urging that the added funds be employed to pay off the Nishihara loans by Japan. The story may well be false—but it may also have a grain of fact in it. Doubtless China should meet her foreign obligations. But in view of the fact that these loans were made at a time when the Anfu pro-Japanese party was in power at Peking and are universally regarded as part of the betrayal of China to foreign interests, it is obvious that the popularity and prestige of the Conference will not be increased by any such proposals. And this situation illustrates the danger which now attends upon every pretension of foreign powers to decide China’s domestic affairs for her. Some decisions as to the use to be made by China of additional funds would be less unpopular than some others, but any attempt to decide and to enforce decision, anything more than advice which in the present entangled condition of Chinese finance is legitimate, will surely make trouble instead of alleviating an already troubled situation.
It is trite to say that in the present condition of the world nations can no longer do the sort of thing which once they did as a matter of course and with impunity. But that trite fact is the essence of the Chinese situation. The only question is whether it is to be recognized only by small bits, grudgingly, and by yielding to trouble after it has broken out, or whether it will be recognized at once in its full force and whole-heartedly. If the United States shows a disposition to compromise, to postpone, to take half steps and quarter steps, to evade, to depend upon time-honored formulae that have nothing to do with the present situation, the case, difficult enough at best as between the powers, is lost in advance. If it leads with a definite and thoroughgoing policy of which financial autonomy for China is a central feature, something definite will be accomplished.
The American public should bear in mind that there is no question of even what is called national honor and prestige at stake. There is only a vested interest. Reduced to its lowest terms, the question for American citizens to form a judgment upon is whether they wish the power of the United States government to be used to promote, at the expense of China and of the good relations of China and the United States, the pecuniary interests of a small group of manufacturers, merchants, commission agents and exporters. They are doubtless all enthusiastic high-tariff men at home, but they want to retain a cheap and easy hold on Chinese markets by keeping down the rate of duty. At bottom, this is what the solemn and dignified International Conference at Peking is about, in spite of the fact that it is possible to overlay this ground-work with many important but irrelevant matters. The issue is simple enough so that even a people sick of foreign questions and policies should be able to pass upon it, and do so with promptness and efficacy. Do we wish China to be treated as a free and self-respecting people should be treated or as a market upon which to dump goods for the pecuniary profit of a small number?

Lily Abegg promoviert an der Universität Hamburg.

Lily Abegg ist Assistentin am Institut für Zeitungswissenschaften der Universität Heidelberg.

Ludwig Bachhofer habilitiert sich in Kunstgeschichte und Asiatischer Archäologie an der Universität München. Er wird Privatdozent an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und richtet die japanische Abteilung des Museums für Völkerkunde in München ein.

Walter Fuchs ist Lektor für Deutsch und Latein an der Medizinischen Hochschule der Südmandschurischen Eisenbahngesellschaft in Shenyang (Liaoning). Er beginnt Japanisch zu lernen und macht sich mit der japanischen Sinologie vertraut.

Walter Fuchs reist in die Mandschurei, zum Yiwulü shan (Liaoning), zum Baitoushan (Jilin), nach Beijing, Chengde (Hebei), Shanxi, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Taiwan, Japan, den Ryûkyû-Inseln, Russland und Vladivostok.

Gustav Haloun habilitiert sich in Sinologie an der Universität Prag.

Gründung der Gesellschaft für Ostasiatische Kunst durch Otto Kümmel in Berlin.

Die Übersetzungen von Franz Kuhn erhalten Anerkennung.

Wolfgang Mohr ist Hörer am Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen der Universität Berlin.

Alfred Salmony organisiert eine Ausstellung ostasiatischer Kunst am Museum für Ostasiatische Kunst Köln.

Alfred Salmony unternimmt Forschungsreisen in Amerika.

Walter Simon ist unbezahlter Lektor für ostasiatische Linguistik an der Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Berlin.

Diether von den Steinen wird Assistent am China-Institut Frankfurt a.M.

Bernhard Karlgren und Johan Gunnar Andersson gründen das Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities in Stockholm.

Tod von Wilhelm Schrameier.

Tod von Song Xiaolian.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin kehrt mit Emile Licent nach Tianjin zurück.

Jonathan Goforth und Rosalind Goforth kehren nach China zurück.