China and the West

Dewey, John. Is China a nation or a market ? [ID D28618].
If it were not a fact and a fact of a kind more or less familiar, the Conference now in solemn conclave in Peking would be incredible. The orthodox axiom of all 'sound political science' is national sovereignty; in practice no phase of political independence is more jealously guarded than the right to control taxation and to levy tariffs, whether for revenue or for the rearing of infant industries. In session in Peking are representatives of the three great democracies of the world, Great Britain, the United States and France, each professing unqualified faith in the right of independent nations to self-government. In addition there is a wide-spread hostility to everything which smacks of 'internationalism'; for are not the 'Reds' internationalists, and are not the Reds a menace? From these premises, one would hardly conclude that the Conference in Peking sits an international assembly held to take part in governing China; that it arrogates to itself one of the most 'sacred' functions of sovereignty, that of fixing the tariff on foreign goods, and that it has no notion of yielding any more to the expressed desire and purpose of China concerning its own affairs than it shall find necessary in order to avoid serious trouble.
It is doubtless highly theoretical to call attention to such flagrant discrepancies between political theory and practice. Nevertheless it may be one way to induce the American public to visualize the Chinese scene, and to realize that the State department of the United States has soon to decide whether it will continue to engage in the regulation of the internal affairs of China, contrary to the practically united will of the Chinese people, or whether it will have the courage and initiative to act in not merely a democratic but a decent way in permitting financial self-government to the Chinese government. There is no reason to doubt the kind sentiments of the State department; in all probability it means well by China, and its expressions of goodwill are not hypocritical camouflage. But the department is influenced by precedent, by routine, by the etiquette of diplomacy which might more easily fear a breach of manners toward other nations than a breach of justice towards China. And it is also exposed to direct and more or less powerful influence from business interests that want in behalf of their own pockets to keep the tariff of China on foreign goods at the lowest possible point. Is it too much to hope that the general public shall have an active concern in the decisions which are to be made, and shall bring greater pressure to bear upon the State department to act in a fair, humane and democratic way, than self-interest and hidden groups bring to bear in the opposite direction? It is futile to lecture the general public on its responsibilities in this matter; it is fed up with foreign responsibilities and wants to be left alone. But it may do no harm to assert with all possible emphasis that in China at present the American people is on trial, and that the attitude taken toward tariff autonomy by the United States will determine for long years the attitude taken by the Chinese towards us. Are our professions of goodwill to China sincere? Are our assertions of greater disinterestedness than animates other nations genuine? Or are they a combination of Pharisaism, sentimentality and highfaluting talk? That is the issue in the minds of most Chinese, and the way the American people meets the tariff question may determine for a generation the moral and political alignment of the Chinese people to western civilization in general and to American ideas and institutions in particular.
Needless to say the illogical position of interference of democratic nations, themselves highly nationalistic, and mostly addicted to protective tariffs, with the internal affairs of China grew up gradually for historic reasons, and so was tolerated until it became familiar and a vested interest. At the outset, the Chinese people were indifferent, and it is almost correct to say that the Chinese government invited the interference. In the past, it has not worked altogether badly; considerable good came of it. If international conferences to help regulate the affairs of individual nations were the rule and not an exception confined to countries so weak that they can be safely meddled with, there might even be something to say for continuing the practice in China. But the past is not the present, and present China is bent upon a radical break with the past in all that concerns its own management of its own affairs. The danger is that diplomats will not face the reality and extent of this change, and will palter, compromise, truckle over details, do as little as they possibly can, and trust to future events to be able to get away with their evasion of the issue. It is not too much to say that unless the International Conference takes action which looks in a definite and stated way towards the resumption of Chinese tariff autonomy, not at some vague future time when all shall be well with the government of China but at a specified date under specified conditions, public opinion in China will force any Chinese government that may exist to resume tariff autonomy in defiance of the powers, and that at no distant date. To put the matter at its lowest level, it might be as well to make a virtue of necessity, and by anticipating events get the credit for a just and sensible act.
It is understood that the powers are willing to permit China to level duties up to ten or fifteen percent. Japan is reported to have sprung a surprise by volunteering at the first meeting to agree to a raise up to twelve and a half percent. One feels helpless to comment adequately upon the situation. If the imagination will only work and think of a similar conference called to pass upon the affairs of France or Italy, or the United States, or even of a third- rate European power, there will be no need for any comment; a sense of the indignation and resentment of an awakened China and of the danger of giving cause for its continued growth, will take care of the affair. But it is more than the amount of tariff which China is to be permitted to levy that is under consideration. It is also proposed to decide for China what China shall do with the moneys when they are raised. There is a story that the assent of Japan to the American proposal of a Conference was secured by a tacit agreement that the United States would join in urging that the added funds be employed to pay off the Nishihara loans by Japan. The story may well be false—but it may also have a grain of fact in it. Doubtless China should meet her foreign obligations. But in view of the fact that these loans were made at a time when the Anfu pro-Japanese party was in power at Peking and are universally regarded as part of the betrayal of China to foreign interests, it is obvious that the popularity and prestige of the Conference will not be increased by any such proposals. And this situation illustrates the danger which now attends upon every pretension of foreign powers to decide China’s domestic affairs for her. Some decisions as to the use to be made by China of additional funds would be less unpopular than some others, but any attempt to decide and to enforce decision, anything more than advice which in the present entangled condition of Chinese finance is legitimate, will surely make trouble instead of alleviating an already troubled situation.
It is trite to say that in the present condition of the world nations can no longer do the sort of thing which once they did as a matter of course and with impunity. But that trite fact is the essence of the Chinese situation. The only question is whether it is to be recognized only by small bits, grudgingly, and by yielding to trouble after it has broken out, or whether it will be recognized at once in its full force and whole-heartedly. If the United States shows a disposition to compromise, to postpone, to take half steps and quarter steps, to evade, to depend upon time-honored formulae that have nothing to do with the present situation, the case, difficult enough at best as between the powers, is lost in advance. If it leads with a definite and thoroughgoing policy of which financial autonomy for China is a central feature, something definite will be accomplished.
The American public should bear in mind that there is no question of even what is called national honor and prestige at stake. There is only a vested interest. Reduced to its lowest terms, the question for American citizens to form a judgment upon is whether they wish the power of the United States government to be used to promote, at the expense of China and of the good relations of China and the United States, the pecuniary interests of a small group of manufacturers, merchants, commission agents and exporters. They are doubtless all enthusiastic high-tariff men at home, but they want to retain a cheap and easy hold on Chinese markets by keeping down the rate of duty. At bottom, this is what the solemn and dignified International Conference at Peking is about, in spite of the fact that it is possible to overlay this ground-work with many important but irrelevant matters. The issue is simple enough so that even a people sick of foreign questions and policies should be able to pass upon it, and do so with promptness and efficacy. Do we wish China to be treated as a free and self-respecting people should be treated or as a market upon which to dump goods for the pecuniary profit of a small number?