China and the West

Li Enqiu ist chargé d’affaires der chinesischen Botschaft der Niederlande in Den Haag.

Chen Xiongfei ist Botschafter der chinesischen Botschaft in Brüssel, Belgien und Luxemburg.

Lloyd Ross besucht Taiwan.

Eine Delegation der Australian Labor Party besucht Taipei. Frederick Daly ist Mitglied.

Michael Halliday ist Direktor des Communication Research Center des University College, London.

Wilbur Norman Christiansen besucht China und hält einen Vortrag an der Chinese Academy of Sciences.

Jocelyn Chey erhält den M.A. der University of Hong Kong.

Oldrich Svarny macht eine zweite Dissertation über das Problem von Morphemen und Wörtern im Chinesischen.

Alois Bürke ist Rektor des Hualian-Seminars, Taiwan.

Jorrit De Boer ist Pfarrer in Malan, Taiwan.

Josef Guntern ist Pfarrer in Daxi, Taiwan.

Jakob Hilber macht ein Taiwanesisch-Studium in der Xinzhu-Sprachschule, Taiwan.

Dominik Steiner ist Pfarrer in Yiwan, Taiwan.

Franz Giet ist Dozent der Fu Jen Universität in Taipei, Taiwan.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhou Enlai. Plas Penrhyn, 19. März 1963.
Dear Mr. Chou En-Lai, I have read with interest your statements concerning the Colombo proposals and I am heartened that your Government accepts them in principle. I am anxious, however, about the difference in interpretation placed upon the proposals by Mr. Nehru and yourself.
I believe that the unilateral cease-fire of your Government and the withdrawal of your forces indicates clearly the sincerity of your desire for an understanding with the Indian Government on the border question. The fact that your forces are now substantially behind the positions of September 8th, 1962, which Mr. Nehru has said earlier were the circumstances necessary for his willingness to enter talks, speaks again of Chinese sincerity.
You will appreciate, therefore, that in writing to you now I do so with awareness of your efforts to solve this dispute and with sympathy for them. I believe that the issue separating your Government and that of Mr. Nehru from beginning bilateral negotiations consists of the disposition of Indian troops in the Eastern sector and of Indian civil check-points in the Western sector. I understand that China feels that the withdrawal of her troops to twenty kilometres behind the McMahon Line should not herald the advance of Indian forces into the vacated area. I also understand that China objects to Indian civil check-points in the Western sector from which Chinese troops have withdrawn.
Would it not be possible to have the consistent principle apply wherein the civil authorities of both China and India could set up check-points in the vacated areas of all sectors without regard to the final determination of any part of the boundary ? Final determination would wait upon bilateral negotiations between India and China.
Would it not further be possible for Madame Bandaranaike to appeal for talks to begin immediately on the ground that the differences now separating China and India, as regards the conditions for talks, are so slight as hardly to justify continued dispute ? You will understand how anxious I am that talks begin as soon as possible and in the best possible spirit and it may be that a suggestion from Madame Bandaranaike would facilitate the immediate commencement of them. I assure you I have sympathy for your efforts to settle this dispute amicably and that I shall continue to seek to facilitate this to whatever extent I am able.
There is a particular point about which I should wish to seek your advice. I should be happy and anxious to have a first hand account of the Chinese feelings and Chinese advances. If it would be possible for you to invite two of my representatives to come to China, so that I might have this opportunity. I should be in your great debt. I should dearly with to come myself, but age prevents this. I hope you will not mind my asking this of you.
With my warm good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Plas Penrhyn, 22. Mai 1963.
Dear Madame Bandaranaike,
I am very grateful for your kind letter with which I am in complete agreement. I appreciate very much your unrelenting efforts to bring about a settlement between India and China and feel honoured that I should be able to assist.
I was interested to learn that Mr. Chou En-Lai has indicated that he is ready to start talks either in Peking or in New Delhi at any time. I realized that China had been calling for negotiations, but not the extent to which the position they maintained conformed to the entirety of the Colombo proposals.
I am most anxious to pursue your suggestion of a further appeal to Mr. Nehru. May I ask if it would be possible for you to receive two personal representatives from me for the purpose of discussing with them how most effectively to conduct this appeal and to further the work for a settlement in the Sino-Indian dispute. It is my hope that after their discussion with you they could proceed on my behalf to New Delhi to meet with Mr. Nehru and to convey to him the appeal from me that you mention. I feel that it is in Mr. Nehru's hands to permit peace between India and China or to create, at best, a Cold War as between those two countries, the onset of a disastrous arms race, the involvement of South East Asia in the military consequences of such a contest, the intrusion of the Cold War Powers, and an end to Asian neutralism…
With my warm good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely Bertrand Russell.

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 30.5.1963. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai expresses China's view on the border dispute with India. China wants an amicable settlement of its boundary questions through peaceful negotiations on the basis of equality.

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 5.6.1963. [Zusammenfassung].
Zhou Enlai makes reference to the fact that China has successively taken a series of important measures on its own initiative in order to promote Sino-Indian negotiations.
Zhou Enlai would warmly welcome Russell's personal visit to China, if health condition permits it. He comments that he would welcome the visit by Russell's representatives, and gives an outline of the steps China has taken towards securing a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. He also pints out to Russell that facts about Tibet contained in unarmed victory are inconsistent with the historical facts.
He said he had been reading a summary of 'Unarmed Victory' in Chinese. (This was presumably prepared specially for him : no Chinese translation was ever published). He seemed quite pleased with the book, which at the time was one of the few Western documents which attempted to put China's case sympathetically, though Russell made no bones about his detestation of Chinese communism or his immense respect for Nehru and the Indian policy of non-alignment. Zhou thought, that Russell had made mistakes about Tibet, the McMahon Line, and China's foreign policy. (He sent the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires to Wales to put him right). He also dismissed the differences between India and China over the Colombo proposals as unimportant matters could be resolved in negotiations.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhou Enlai. Plas Penrhyn, 14. Juni 1963.
Dear Premier Chou En-lai,
I am grateful to you for your instructive and generous letter to me, and I value the opportunity to send my personal associates to China. I have been deeply impressed by the initiatives that your Government has taken with a view to bringing about a settlement of the dispute between China and India, and by the fact that you have done more than has been asked of your Government by the Colombo Powers with respect, to the withdrawal of your troops in the Central and Eastern Sectors, although you were not obliged to do so by the recommendations of the Colombo Powers. I further understand that China has, in addition to releasing all military personnel, returned all captured military equipment to the Government of India. These steps, and the repeated guarantee on the part of China that negotiations between the two countries may be conducted without any assumptions as to where boundary lines and troop positions are to be placed, have impressed me with the entire sincerity of your Government in its desire to settle this dispute.
I agree with you when you say that the Indian Government has failed to provide one initiative or conciliatory gesture such as might allow a friendly atmosphere and the onset of serious negotiations. I recognize, also that there is every reason to suspect the sincerity of India's professed willingness to negotiate. I suggest, however, that, assuming all this to be the case, it would be in China's interests to accept the Indian interpretation of the proposals. There would be two advantages in this course : first, that is would probe the sincerity of India's professed willingness to negotiate ; and second, that, if India proved insincere and refused to negotiate, even the habitual practice of misrepresentation by the West would not be able to conceal from world opinion that China is eager for peace, and India is not. I suggest that these considerations should outweigh your justifiable objection to Indian civilian officials in Aksai Chin. It seems to me that it would not be 'appeasement' or 'weakness' should China say that, unreasonable as it is for India to presume to suggest that there could be pre-conditions for negotiations, , China is prepared to allow these civilian posts so that India will have no further stated grounds to use as pretexts for failing to begin negotiations.
I have persistently urged India to begin negotiations, first on the basis of your proposals of October 24th, then on the basis of your interpretation of the Colombo proposals. I have written to Prime Ministers Nehru and Bandaranaike and to U Thant in this sense. I have appealed to all those Indians with whom I have had association during many years. You will understand, therefore, that I have not sought to persuade only China to make concessions or have at any point envisaged impairing the position of your Government or your people. Should China state that the considers India's demands to be unreasonable in the extreme but, nonetheless, as a test of India's sincerity, will permit a certain number of Indian civilian posts in the area north of the line from which Chinese troops have withdrawn 20 kilometres in the Western Sector, there would be nothing India could do except agree to negotiate or accept exposure before the world.
I am well aware of the difficulties which were imposed upon the conflict between China and India through the intrusion of the United States and Britain. It is clear to me that they are encouraging India to arm to the teeth and to harbor long-term hostilities toward China. It is largely because of this that I urge you to remove the last obstacle to negotiations. This, to my mind, is the course of strength and is not appeasement or unlimited concession. It seems to me that, should China remove every vestige of nominal Indian objections to beginning negotiations, China would both force India to come to the Conference table and release many forces within India which could then agitate for peace and understanding and agreement.
Although the Colombo proposals as interpreted are weighted to India's advantage, they are, as all the participating members have pointed out, recommendations, and have only the force of suggested arrangements such as to facilitate negotiations. You yourself have pointed this out to me. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be possible for China to accede to such interpretations as India unreasonably insists upon, so that the danger of provocations or of foreign intervention or of a deteriorating situation may be avoided.
I am grateful for your frankness in putting to me your view in China and Tibet, and I am taking care to study them and also your Government's position on the overall question of peace and war.
With good wishes and high regard, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell

Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 5.6.1963. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai states that the Chinese and Indian armed forces have disengaged and the border situation has eased.