China and the West

Russell, Bertrand. British policy in China [ID D28328].
The Chinese situation becomes, from the British point of view, more grave every day. In the present article, I shall deal only with immediate issues and immediate palliatives ; ultimate solutions are impossible in the present atmosphere.
The gravity of the situation is made evident by a long leader in the 'Times' of July 11th, apparently expressing the views of the Foreign Office. We are told in this article that we must not mind dissociating ourselves from the other Powers concerned by adopting a more vigorous policy, and that 'there is nothing in international affairs so immediately important as this menace in China'. Also that 'it has become obviously necessary to assure our naval strength in the Pacific, since the Chinese crisis is only a prelude to further complications in which British interests in the Pacific are vitally concerned. The present state of affairs in The Far East has an intimate connection with the discussion of the cruiser programme'. These words must be taken to mean that our Government contemplates fighting China and Russia simultaneously without securing any allies. I wish to suggest certain reasons for regarding this as an undesirable policy, from the standpoint of British interests ; also to point out the measures we must adopt if we wish to preserve our China trade.
First : any action in China which is to have any prospect of success must be international : the Consortium Powers, Great Britain, France, America, and Japan, must be united. If we take isolated action at the present moment, America and France will stand aloof, as their official acts already prove. Japan is likely to be actively hostile, since any increase in the influence of a white Power in China is against Japan's vital interests. Before the Washington Conference, we might have appealed to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ; since that date, we have attempted to replace it by an Anglo-American Entente. To secure this end, we funded the debt to American and created the Irish Free State. Our Government seems, however, to have failed to realize that a non-imperialist policy in China was another requisite of American friendship. An Japanese friendship has, of course, been rendered impossible by Singapore. Indeed, since the evacuation of Vladivstock, the Japanese have shown an increasing tendency to co-operation with the Soviet Government in Chinese affairs. Considering that the present trouble arose from out attempt to protect Japanese employers from the just fury of their employees, Japan's recent aloofness has been remarkable.
The Soviet Government, meanwhile, is prepared to support Chinese resistance with all its strength. In these circumstances, any action we may take in China must fail. Chinese anarchy is an asset to China, since the occupation of Peking would not compel the Chinese to negotiate, and any treaty concluded by the Peking Government might be repudiated in the Province. We cannot conquer China, and we cannot compel the Chinese to trade with us. Force, therefore, offers no solution of our difficulties.
But if we are not to use force, we must try to understand the issues, and to see them as they appear both to the Chinese and to other white Power. Here there are two questions which must be kept separate : first, the narrow and definite question of the Shanghai shooting ; secondly, the general question of what the Chinese regard as their grievances under the Treaties.
With regard to the Shanghai shooting, some of the facts are still in debate, others are now generally admitted. The following facts are not in dispute : the crowd outside the police station was unarmed ; no notice was given of the intention to fire upon them ; the order to fire was given in English, and therefore not understood by most of the crowd ; the firing began ten seconds after the order was given ; many of those who were hit were shot in the back, showing that they were trying to disperse, but were not given time to do so. Other crowds were fired upon during the next six days. Altogether about seventy people were killed, with a proportionate number of wounded. Every non-British person, and almost every British missionary, who has spoken about the affair has pronounced that the British authorities were not justified in their action. For example, Dr. J.W. Cline, formerly head of the missionary college at Soochow, who saw the whole thing, says : 'I was not expecting to see the police fire, was shocked when they did fire, and have been sorry about it ever since'. According to the French and Japanese newspapers, the commission of the diplomatic body which inquired into the matter recommended that the American Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council should be dismissed ('Times', July 11th). The incident aroused unprecedented indignation throughout China, and united all parties in that usually disunited country – not only the partisans of the Bolsheviks, but even the most conservative sections. The strength of popular feeling is shown by the fact that Chang Tso-lin dare not act, though his rival Feng is profiting by the situation.
It seems obvious that, if we are to recover any reputation for just dealing, not only with the Chinese, but with the rest of the world, we must agree to have this whole incident investigated by an impartial judicial tribunal, and to act upon its findings. A mistake was committed by an official in a state of nerves – at least this is the view of everybody except the British. If this view proves on investigation to be correct, the official in question ought not to be supported by the Government if it is not to become an accomplice. This is so evident that I cannot understand why British public opinion has not forced our Government to act in the only reasonable way.
The cry of Bolshevism has been very much overdone. Such influence as the Bolsheviks possess in China is not due to their communism, for very few Chinese are communists in the economic sense, and the country is obviously unsuited for such a régime. The influence of the Bolsheviks throughout Asia is due to the fact that they appear (rightly or wrongly) as champions against Western oppression. The Chinese indignation at the Shanghai shooting was natural and spontaneous, and had nothing to do with Bolshevism.
But, we say, why is the indignation directed specially against us ? Are not other Powers also responsible ! The answer is that the International Settlement in Shanghai is, in fact, governed by the British. The governing body is the Municipal Council, elected by the foreign ratepayers. (The Chinese are allowed to pay rates, but do not thereby acquire a vote). The Municipal Council consists of six British, two Americans, and one Japanese ; the Secretary, who has the executive power, is also British. Thus the responsibility for what happens in the International Settlement rests with the British.
Those who wish to see how the matter appears to eminent Chinese intellectuals who are by no means Bolsheviks should obtain a little pamphlet called 'China's case', published by the Union of Chinese Associations in Great Britain, and written by four of the leading men in the Chinese academic world – men as learned, as widely travelled, as worthy of scientific respect, as any to be found in England. (I speak from personal knowledge). To attribute what they say to Bolshevik influence is as absurd as it would be to attribute Mr. Keynes's 'Economic Consequences of the Peace' to that cause.
On the wider issues, such as extra-territoriality, it is not necessary to come to any precipitate decision. At the Washington Conference it was arranged there should be a Conference to consider tariff revision, &c. ; the American Government is urging that this Conference must be no longer delayed, and many people have suggested that its scope should be widened. To both these proposals our Government ought to agree. And, speaking broadly, it ought to adapt its Chinese policy to that of America, and to state with emphasis that it means to do so. The policy of America in China has always been more liberal than that of the European Powers. If we are to retain any position in China, it has become necessary for us to adopt the principles which have guided the American Government. And this course would also greatly improve our relations with America.
Finally, I wish to say a word about the extreme gravity of the issue. A war with Russia about China, which is apparently in contemplation, would be strongly opposed by organized Labour in this country, and would almost infallibly lead to defeat. In our difficulties Indian nationalism would see its opportunity. The Empire would collapse in disgrace, and a large part of our population would die of hunger, probably after making an attempt at revolution. The present Government fails to realize that our position in the world is not what it was before the war. Being no longer so strong as we were, it has become important for us to avoid such injustice and tyranny as will rouse the disgust of the civilized world. These are motives of self-interest. Of the further motives which must appeal to every person possessed of the faintest feeling of honour or humanity I say nothing.