China and the West

Leo Hermann studiert Chinesisch in Tianjin.

Fritz W. Kuck ist Lehrer der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule in Shanghai.

Russell, Bertrand ; Russell, Dora. Force in China : letter to the editor [ID D28420].
Sir, It becomes increasingly difficult to read with patience your commentaries and warnings on the present situation in China. Is it not time that all people of humane ideals and aims were frankly told that the dispatch of the large forces that have gone to China is not only likely but probably intended, to provoke a war between us and the Chinese, in which there would not be a shadow of right or justification on our side, nor any possible final issue but shameful and deserved defeat, involving the almost complete loss of our already fast diminishing trade with the Chinese. In these circumstances all those who do not demand the immediate recall of all British forces from China, and the recognition of Cantonese rights in all provinces where the Cantonese Government has jurisdiction, are doing a grave disservice, not only to the English people, but also even to the misguided British merchants out in China, who still hope to extend their trade at the bayonet point as they did at the time of the opium wars.
Not long since you were urging the Government to explain the Wanhsien incident. No English explanation has been given ; and now you speak of the necessity of large forces in order to avoid a 'repetition of the Wanhsien fiasco'. In what did the fiasco consist – in the fact that not more than one thousand Chinese were killed, and not more than one thousand Chinese houses destroyed ? Surely Mr. Chen's 'rodomontade' on Imperialism has a considerable 'bearing on the existing situation', when he is faced by the dispatch of more troops by a Power which has not hesitated to bombard without compensation or apology an open unfortified town. This act is against the laws of warfare, even where we at war with the Chinese.
The lives and persons of British nationals are in no danger. Persons of other nationality are walking about and doing business freely. It must be admitted, of course, that they have not seen fit to take part in the recent shooting of Chinese as we have done. But it is time that the six thousand odd British in Shanghai faced the situation like the British gentlemen they claim to be. They are free to return to England, or to move northward if they do not like the Cantonese regime.
The Cantonese are the accepted and functioning Government now of nine provinces, practically all th4e South and West of China. The treaty rights, about which we generously offer to 'negotiate', were force on China by war. No self-respecting Chinese Government could continue to accept them, and our trade and prestige in China stand to gain by their immediate abandonment. There is nothing outrageous or 'impossible' in the whole of the Cantonese demands. They are modern people, ready for peace and trade. They have not taken, nor will they take, unless bitterly provoked, the life of any foreigner not engaged in war with them. In fact they are a model of sweet reasonableness, in comparison with what the English would be like, had Chinese gunboats sailed up the Thames for a lark and bombarded Reading and Oxford.
Unless this Government is severely handled, telegraph agencies will soon be busy manufacturing 'riots in Shanghai', and the British troops privily engaged in the Chinese civil war, on the side of the North against Canton.
[Mr. and Mrs. Russell appear to have written their letter before Sir Austen Chamberlain spoke at Birmingham last Saturday. After reading his speech, would they still suggest that the Shanghai Defence Force is 'probably intended to provoke a war between us and the Chinese' ? Ed., Nation].

Russell, Bertrand. British folly in China [ID D28383].
London, February 8 (1927).
In all the long history of British blunders it would be difficult to parallel the present governmental policy in regard to China for immoral ineptitude. I say governmental policy, for the nation is emphatically not behind the Government as yet. One supposes that it will in time be influenced by means of a suitable diet of atrocities. It will be taught to believe that the Chinese eat corpses and mutilate children, and those who ask for evidence of these practices will be put in jail. As yet, however, feeling against China is confined to the Die-Hard section of the Conservative Party, and the Conservative Party, though a majority of Parliament, was a minority in the nation even in the 'Red Letter' election.
Labor, with the exception of a few leaders who have been hobbled, is vigorously and determinedly opposed to the policy of sending troops, and is demanding their recall in spite of discouragement from their own headquarters. Labor quite understands that what our Government dislikes about the Chinese Nationalists is their policy of favoring trade unionism and aiming at an increase in wages. Enormous and enthusiastic meetings are being held in every part of the country demanding the recall of the expeditionary force. Even the Liberals, taking their cue from Lloyd George, are exceedingly critical of the Government's action.
From the mere standpoint of British interests what has been done is so foolish that nothing but a lust for blood could have made anyone suppose it wise. The concessions which our foreign Office has offered to the Nationalist Government go beyond anything that would have been required to secure agreement if no forces had been dispatches. But because these forces are on their way, Mr. Chen rightly refuses to negotiate until this threat is withdrawn. The forces are being sent nominally to protect the International Settlement, but the Japanese, whose diplomacy is never caught napping, have intimated that they will not permit the troops to land in a region, where their rights are the same as ours, and where their citizens are not finding the need of armed protection. If the troops land on pure Chinese territory, this of course will be in itself an act of war, and will give legal validity to the protest of Dr. Wellington Koo on behalf of the Peking Government, which relies upon the Nine-Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations.
This protest and the dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen as Inspector General of the Maritime Customs Admiration are the first signs of the one good result to be expected of British folly, namely, the reunion of North and South in resistance to foreign aggression. It is to be expected that the reactionary generals, whom in spite of their illegalities and extortions the British Government is attempting to keep in power, will be abandoned by their own troops unless they make peace with the Nationalists. The British in China, absorbed as they are in ridge and polo, have not noticed that China has become a political nation, and have not stopped to reflect upon the asset which their policy affords to the Kuomintang in its party strife with Chinese conservatism. They have a curious inability to understand what sort of conduct people like and what sort they dislike. I listened the other night to an hour's address given to the Society for the Study of International Affairs, by a British diplomat lately returned from China, in the course of which he professed to explain why the British are not popular in China. He never even mentioned the massacres of Shanghai, Shameen, and Wanhsien, and when afterwards I asked him the reason for his omission he said that he did not consider they had been an important factor. The British in China are apparently unable to realize that Chinese civilians take no pleasure in being shot down treacherously without warning. Psychology is not taught at our English public schools or at Oxford.
The situation is of course one of the utmost gravity, for if once the troops land at Shanghai it is difficult to see how war can be avoided, unless by American or Japanese intervention, either of which our Government would presumably regard as an unfriendly act, though it would be welcomed by every sane man in Great Britain. If war breaks out it will entail the complete militarization of China and a prolonged struggle leading to the immediate cessation of the British-China trade, and an ultimate humiliation, even in a military sense, for though it may be easy to defeat Chinese armies it will be absolutely impossible to maintain control of China or any portion of it not within reach of naval guns.
The men to whom our Government is listening recall with pride our exploits in the Opium War, and point to the trade advantages thereby secured. They do not seem to realize that the republic of 1927 is different from the tottering Manchu empire of 1840. I could hardly have believed in the existence of such anachronistic ideas among persons with large interests in China had I not myself heard them expressed by such persons in debate.
Nor is the issue confined to China. Our Government contemplates breaking off diplomatic relations with Russia, and there is reason to think that the Poles are being incited to repeat their war of 1920. Our attempt to suppress China will of course have repercussions in India, and will increase the unrest in that country. In Great Britain itself a large proportion of those who fought in the Great War are determined never to fight again, whatever the issue. China is distant, and cannot be made to seem truly menacing.
The nation will not therefore throw itself into a struggle in the Far East with the wholeheartedness which it showed during the Great War. Unless our Government quickly comes to its senses, I foresee the loss of our Indian Empire and the accession to power in this country of a Labor Party with a very different temper from that of our Government of 1924. For the world at large the insanity of our present Government is likely to be a boon, but for England it is a disaster of the first magnitude.

Russell, Bertrand. Where is China going ? [ID D28382].
Immediate future of China is very doubtful, though it is certain that in the long run the nationalists will achieve complete independence for their country.
To an Occidental reader, misled by the propaganda which is being telegraphed from China, it may well seem as if that country were in a state of mere chaotic turmoil. That, however, is not the case, any more than it was in America in the years 1861-65 when the fate of slavery was being decided by force. But in order to understand the situation a few facts about Chinese history are necessary.
The Manchus, a warlike northern tribe of foreign conquerors, acquired Peking and the empire in 1644, but during the 15th century they fell gradually in disrepute, partly because they could not oppose a successful resistance to the foreigners (especially English and French), partly because of their extreme difficulty in coping with the Taiping rebellion, which cost as many lives as the Great War cost to all the belligerents together. The Boxer rising of 1900 was a blind outburst of anti-foreign conservatism, in which the most ignorant elements made a last frantic attempt to preserve the old order. The Empress Dowager, having finally sided with the Boxers, shared the disgrace of their fall.
The next move came from the South, which has long been the most progressive part of China. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, a new movement grew up, patriotic but progressive, anti-Manchu but not anti-foreign, and aiming at the regeneration of China by the adoption of Western ideas and institutions. In the Revolution of 1911, this party triumphed, the Manchu fell and China became (at least nominally) a democratic parliamentary republic, with Sun Yat-sen as first President.
Unfortunately, the price of victory was the placating of Yuan Shi-kai, Commander-in-Chief of the northern armies, who demanded and obtained the retirement of Sun Yat-sen in his favor. He soon quarreled with the Parliament and took to governing by military force. After his death in 1916, his lieutenants quarreled with each other and started the confused personal struggles between militarists which have continued ever since. In these struggles the military leaders have been guilty of every kind of depradation and violence ; moreover they have shown themselves willing to sacrifice the interests of their country in order to obtain assistance from foreigners. Foreigners (other than Americans) have continued in public to bewail the anarchy in China, while nevertheless some among them have kept it alive by timely surreptitious assistance to this or that Chinese general.
Meanwhile in the South the progressive democratic movement continued. After various vicissitudes, Sun Yat-sen was in 1920, declared President of the Republic of Canton, though at first the authority of his government extended no further than the one province of Kwantung. The British from the first bitterly opposed him, both because the development of Canton might injure the shipping interests of Honkong, and because in that part labor troubles developed as a result of the ferment produced by the pro-labor attitude of the Canton government.
After years of struggle, during which Honkong was nearly ruined by the Chinese boycott, the British had to give way so far as the relations of Honkong and Canton were concerned. But this experience made the British authorities more than ever desirous of preventing any increase in the area controlled by the Canton government, and thus led them into a general opposition to all that is liberal and progressive in China – an opposition as short-sighted as it is wicked.
Since the Washington Conference, only one Power has shown any sympathy with the best elements in China, or any understanding of China's needs. That one Power is Soviet Russia. America, from fear of Bolshevism, has hesitated to support the South, and while refraining from doing harm, has not taken any initiative in doing good. The restoration of Shantung to China as a result of the Washington Conference was a service of great importance for which the Chinese have to thank America ; but since that event active assistance has been left to the Russians.
Organization and propaganda have been largely directed by Borodin, a man who has had an adventurous career in many countries. From Spain he went to Mexico where he helped to bring about the present admirable regime. From Mexico, as a Mexican, he entered the United States ; thence he went to Glasgow, where he called himself Mr. Brown and took part in all the most advanced labor movements. The British Parliament deported him to Russia, and the Russian government sent him to help the Cantonese. No doubt his energy and skill in propaganda have contributed to their spectacular success in acquiring control of nearly all China south of the Yangtze, together with the great city of Hankow on its northern bank.
It must not be supposed that the contest is really one between North and South, though that is its genealogical form. In the North, as in the South, public opinion is on the side of the Cantonese ; no one is on the side of the northern generals except themselves and the foreigners. Propaganda has repeatedly succeeded in winning their troops to the side of the South and this, more than military prowess, has been the cause of the southern victories. It follows that if the Cantonese can win they can establish a stable popular government and unify China.
The Cantonese are not anti-foreign, in the sense in which the Boxers were. They are on the best possible terms with the Russians and are willing to be friends with any foreigners who will respect China's claims to independence. They are not communists and there is no chance to China becoming communistic : The alliance with Russia is only political. But their outlook on all domestic questions is completely enlightened. They do everything in their power to improve the status and remuneration of labor. They favor education on western lines. There is nothing in the programme that can be objected to by any decent person or approved by the present British government.
From the British imperialist point of view the struggle in China is part of the secular struggle between England and Russia for control of Asia. For ten years, from 1907 to 1917, this struggle was suspended to deal with the Germans ; but at the Bolshevik Revolution it broke out again, without waiting for the end of the war. Although the catchwords are new, the contest is essentially the old context between two imperialisms ; and it is noteworthy that, in spite of losses in the West, the Russian Empire is larger now than before the war. But whereas, before the war Russia stood for reaction, now throughout Asia, Russia stands for progress and for everything that enlightened Asiatics desire. Consequently England has been led by imperialistic motives into support of everything old, reactionary and corrupt, and into opposition to everything that represents new growth.
In the long run there can be no doubt whatever that the Chinese Nationalists will win and will achieve for their country the same independence of the West as is enjoyed by Japan. But it is impossible to foretell the immediate future. As I write, the British government is sending powerful natal forces to China, presumably for the protection of Shanghai. British interests in Shanghai are so important that they will certainly not be surrendered without a firs-class struggle. And Shanghai, unlike Hankow, can easily be held from the sea.
Whether it is possible to compel the Chinese to trade with us by shouting down a sufficient number of them, remains to be seen ; so far, the results of this policy have not been encouraging from a business point of view.
The Labor Party is doing its utmost to rouse public opinion against the government policy and it is still possible that it will succeed in preventing a war which would be as disastrous as it would be immoral. But the present British Government – which, I am happy to say, represents a minority of the votes cast at the last election – appears to be as blind to the true national interest as it is to considerations of decency and humanity. Fortunately, it has lost whatever popularity it once possessed and is likely to be swept away next year in a wave of indignation. Will that be too late to redress the evil that will have been wrought in China ? No man can say.

Alfred Baur beginnt chinesische Keramik und Jade zu sammeln.

Eduard Horst von Tscharner ist Professor an den Universitäten Qinghua und Beijing.

Anneliese Bulling studiert Kunstgeschichte, Ostasiatische Kunstgeschichte und Sinologie an der Universität Berlin.

Gustav Ecke ist Professor an der Qinghua Universität.

Werner Eichhorn studiert Chinesisch in Paris.

Eduard Erkes ist ausserordentlicher Professor für Chinesisch an der Universität Leipzig.

Otto Fischer ist Leiter des Kunstmuseums Basel und Professor für Kunstgeschichte in Basel.

Erich Haenisch macht Reisen in China und der Mongolei.

Walter Liebenthal studiert Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetisch und Chinesisch an der Universität Berlin.

Franz Michael studiert Rechtswissenschaften an der Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn und Chinesisch an Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen der Universität Berlin.

Alfred Salmony macht Forschungsreisen in der Soviet Union.

Philipp Schaeffer ist als Bibliothekar in einer später benannten Philipp Schäfer Bibliothek tätig. Er arbeitet an einem chinesischen Wörterbuch und ist Mitglied der Kommunistischen Partei in Berlin.

Erich Schmitt ist Professor für Sinologie am Sinologischen Seminar der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.

Dietrich Seckel studiert Germanistik und Kunstgeschichte an der Universität Berlin.

Hellmut Wilhelm macht Staatsexamen in Rechtswissenschaften an der Universität Frankfurt a.M. Er arbeitet als Jurist und ist Assistent am China-Institut.