China and the West

Dewey, John. We should deal with China as nation to nation [ID D28619].
In the recent number of the Survey dealing with Oriental problems in their connection with the United States, Mr. Lewis Gannett reports a conversation with General Chiang Kai-shek in Canton. According to Mr. Gannett, the Chinese leader said: 'Thinking men in China hate America more than they hate Japan . . . Japan talks to us in ultimatums; she says frankly she wants special privileges—extraterritoriality, tariff control—in China. We understand that and know how to meet it. The Americans come to us with smiling faces and friendly talk; but in the end your government acts just like the Japanese. And we, disarmed by your fair words, do not know how to meet such insincerity'.
I have no way of knowing how far such statements are representative of Chinese opinion. To some extent they are perhaps colored by local feeling at Canton, which resents the support given by the American government to the Peking government. But nevertheless it is significant that they are held by such a representative person as Chiang Kai-shek. Probably most Americans, including those sympathetic with China, will feel that the statements are unfair, and will incline to be irritated. I do not think they are fair either, but I quote them not to controvert them, but to indicate the great difficulty nations have in understanding each other. For I do not think that American opinion about China, and about the relations of the United States to China, are very fair either as a rule. Yet I do not think that on either side there is a desire to be anything but fair—leaving out the case of those who have something to gain by misrepresentations.
The conclusion I would draw is that official and governmental relations ought to be such that the misunderstandings and unfair statements which develop will do as little harm as is possible. I recognize the great truth in what is constantly said about the importance of nations' understanding one another, appreciating one another's Culture, etc. This is all true. But such understanding and appreciation is of very slow growth, and it will be a long, long time before it will develop to a point where it can be counted upon to regulate international relations. Persons of the same country, of the same culture and tradition, even persons of the same family, find great difficulty in properly understanding one another. We are not as yet sufficiently civilized or sufficiently scientific in our methods to understand one another. I do not believe that for a very long time the mass of Americans are going to see the Orientals as they see and feel themselves, nor do I know any reason why we should expect the mass of Orientals to judge us from the standpoint we take in estimating our own conduct.
It may seem harsh to say that we have to count, for a long time in the future, upon a large measure of misunderstanding between peoples. But I think a frank recognition of this fact would afford a measure of security and protection. It would lessen the amount of exasperation and irritation that grows up when a misunderstanding is revealed and patent. Above all, it would, as has been already suggested, indicate that the great thing is so to direct public policies that the inevitable misunderstandings will, when they arise, be shorn of power to result in practical harm.
It is because I believe that present American governmental policies in China tend to invest misunderstandings with power to work actual evil that I would see those policies changed. It is quite 'natural' that state departments and diplomats should follow traditional policies. One of these traditional policies is that western nations should unite and pursue a common policy in China instead of each nation conducting its diplomacy independently. It is easy to see how from a historical point of view the method grew up. The inertia of diplomacy, the desire to follow precedents, the feeling that it is risky to do anything new, all operate to induce the American state department to continue to act in concert with the foreign offices of other nations in dealing with China. But because I believe it increases international misunderstanding between China and the United States, because it clothes these misunderstandings with power to work practical evil, and because it prevents our state department from actively manifesting and executing what is at least the passive desire of most Americans, I am opposed to it. I think that we should at once deal with China as nation to nation, and leave other nations to pursue a similar independent course. A policy of complete non-intervention may not seem benevolent, but I do not believe that any nation at present is wise enough or good enough to act upon an assumption of altruism and benevolence toward other nations. Till conditions have changed, the great thing is to leave one another alone, and give each nation a chance to manage its own affairs, no matter how inadequate and incompetent the management may seem to us to be.
I think our present policy has also a tendency to prevent Chinese from facing frankly their own situation. As long as the unequal treaties exist, and as long as foreign nations encroach politically—or economically with political support—upon Chinese territory, the Chinese people will use this fact as an alibi. It will minimize its own responsibility for the bad condition of its own affairs and will throw all the blame upon foreigners. Only China can straighten out Chinese affairs. It seems to me that one reason they are not tackling the job with greater energy and persistence is because they can allege foreign policies, including that of the United States, as long as we engage in the diplomatic concert as an excuse. At present, in my opinion—and I recognize how readily opinion may be mistaken—thought and energy that should be directed by Chinese upon their own internal affairs are diverted largely to criticising and blaming foreigners. This is natural; we all love alibis and excuses. But the United States should, as far as it is concerned, abrogate all special privileges and onesided relations so that the attention of the Chinese may centre upon improving their own conditions.
Another reason which has great weight with me in making me believe that our government should change its policy is that when a certain result is seen to be sure to come about sooner or later in any case, it is the part of good-sense to anticipate that result, and see to it that it comes about earlier, and with the least possible disturbance and ill-will. In any case, the present onesided relations with China cannot continue indefinitely. I do not agree with those who think that they can be abrogated without some disturbance, and without some harm resulting to China itself. But with the growing development of national sentiment in China, these evils and disturbances are in my opinion slight in comparison with those which will take place if things are allowed to drift until China of her own initiative and without negotiation with other nations denounces the existing treaties and arrangements.