China and the West

Dewey, John. Shrewd tactics are shown in Chinese plea [ID D28495].
The Chinese proposals are both shrewd and wise. It was good tactics for the Chinese delegates to present their own case instead of having it first presented by either the United States or Japan, thus saving the susceptibilities of both Oriental countries. It was shrewd to conceive the 10 points in broad fundamental terms. No nation can object to points 1 and 2, for example, regarding the territorial integrity and political independence of China and regarding the open door. All nations have repeatedly put their assent on paper. But the formal reassertions by all nations at this time of joint conclave puts China in a position of vantage in calling attention to the specific points in which prior agreements have been violated.
It was shrewd not to make demands too immediate and to allow for compromise in time of execution, as for example, in Point 5, regarding removal of limitations on China's present freedom of action. It would not be of advantage to China itself to have an immediate abolition of extra-territorial rights nor to have the customs administrations turned over to her out of hand. She is entitled, however, to know the conditions under which these things will be done so she can have assurance that at a definite time in the future these things will be done, provided she takes certain specified steps.
Point 3 is a shrewd way of approaching the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Lansing-Ishii agreement, both of which concern China and in neither of which was she consulted. The proposition that she be notified of all engagements affecting her and be given a chance to share is so reasonable that a nation which declines to give assent at once puts itself under suspicion.
Wisdom, as distinct from good tactics, centres to my mind in Point 4, to which 6 and 7 are auxiliary, and 10, to which presumably g is auxiliary. For 'provisions for a peaceful settlement of international disputes' is mere Pickwickian verbiage, without provision for future conferences. Neither provision can be carried into effect without something which, in fact if not name, will be a permanent committee of reference and arbitration in which China will sit as a partner and not as a victim.
Point 4 contains the teeth of the document. It is a bold and just move to demand that all commitments, special rights, privileges, etc., be made public under the penalty of otherwise being voided, and that they and those already public be examined with reference to their validity and harmony with one another, and that they be construed strictly in favor of the grantor.
These clauses go to the root of the matter. They will bring to light all of China's grievances against Japan in particular and other nations in general. They make open diplomacy a reality. They abolish that atmosphere of secrecy and intrigue which has been China's greatest enemy within as well as without. It is a bold move, because if this point is accepted and full publicity follows it will expose something of China’s own weakness and official corruption as well as the cupidity and intrigues of other nations. It is a guarantee of better internal government in China as well as a safeguard against other nations. It undoubtedly goes much further than appears on the surface.
Nothing is said about the 21 demands. But it is impossible to harmonize some of the clauses of the treaties based on these demands with other commitments which China has made with other nations. The question of their validity brings up the state of duress under which the treaties were signed, an ultimatum with virtual threat of war.
Nothing is said about Shantung. But so far as China’s consent is concerned the occupation of Shantung rests upon the 21 demands, while it also is in conflict with the terms of China's treaty with Germany, which made German leases and privileges inalienable to any third nation. Any nation which openly objects to articles 4, 6 and 7 at once comes under suspicion of harboring unfair designs. To give assent means rectification of some of the worst wrongs from which China suffers. The more one studies these articles in the light of past events the more far-reaching they are seen to be. The danger is that they will be accepted 'in principle' and then whittled down in fact.
Coming to lesser points the Associated Press has reported that Point 8 is the one which most puzzles Japanese circles. Considering the point declares that China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in all future wars, and considering that Japan's wars with Russia and Germany were both fought in violation of Chinese neutrality, this puzzlement is not easy to understand. It becomes a little ominous in view of the accompanying suggestion that the point may mean that the powers guarantee China’s neutrality, reducing her to a Belgium, and that its enforcement along with other points goes back to a question of China's internal order and governmental unity.
It is too early to predict, but it looks as if Japanese policy were going to be an expression of general sympathy with China’s aims, while laying emphasis upon her lack of internal unity, her so-called chaos, and the argument that in order to secure an eventual realization of China's aims and aspirations she must be put for a period under some kind of international tutelage. In the latter case, Japan would become in virtue of propinquity the actual guardian and trustee in behalf of the powers. In that case Japan will have gained her point as regards China plus the blessing of the powers.