China and the West

Dewey, John. The real Chinese crisis [ID D28466].
I should like to emphasize the word 'real' in my title. The apparent crisis is that which fills columns in the daily press; foreigners killed, houses looted, security so threatened that foreigners are being concentrated in a few ports and warned to leave the country, the turmoil of war and the barbarities of civil war. Yet in all the rumor, gossip and facts that come to us, there is a frequent note struck, which is a sign, to the discerning, of the real crisis through which China is passing. The entire animus of the latent—in some cases flagrant—propaganda to which we are treated is directed against the nationalistic movement and forces. The Northern forces are invariably let down as easily as pos¬sible. Why?
The most direct way to get at the reality of the situation is to inquire what the tone of the news would have been, were it proved that the retreating Shantung troops—whose commander is an ex-bandit—had done the killing and the looting. The answer is that the incidents would surely have been glossed over; they would have been treated as unfortunate concomitants of civil war; it would have been noted that defeated armies were wont, on their retreats, to get out of hand. Doubtless, demands for indemnities would have been made in due course on the Peking government. But we should have had no appeals from Shanghai and London for concerted intervention, for blockades of Chinese ports. In other words, there would have been no clamor for us to take sides with the Cantonese against the Northerners. Just as the news has been colored against the Nationalists, it would have been smoothed over in favor of the Northerners. I cannot imagine anyone who has followed the course of events in China denying this statement.
Again why? What is the significance of this double method in reporting news? If it were true that the Peking government genuinely represents the unity and integrity of China against a band of outlaw rebels, it could be understood. If it were true that there is a stable government in Peking which maintains general and possesses moral and legal authority, the discrimination could be understood. If the Northern troops were, in general, better disci-plined and comported themselves in a more orderly way, it could be understood. But it is notorious that each of these suppositions is contrary to fact.
The Peking government has, for many years, been a blind crea¬ture in the hands of whatever military overlords happened to be in power. In common with many others, I have seen the President and Cabinet in power thunder against some general, de¬nounce him as a traitor, offer rewards for his head, and, a few weeks later, take it all back, and issue precisely similar edicts against the generals at whose behest the first pronunciamentos were made. I well remember my surprise, when, a newcomer in Peking, I was told by our minister, Mr. Reinsch, in a matter-of-fact way, that the Peking government would not last a month, save for the recognition of foreign powers. It did not take a long residence to convince me that he had revealed no secret of state. In the country at large, the Peking government commanded no authority. Its own supporters kept back its revenues for their own purposes, raised and supported their own troops for their own uses. And this was long before there was an organized pop¬ular rebellion against Peking.
No, the explanation of the tone and temper of the news we are receiving lies in the simple fact that the Nationalist government represents a national movement, and that, under the circumstances, any national movement in China is bound to be anti-foreign—against, that is, the special privileges which foreign nationals enjoy because of old treaties. It is not surprising that the mass of foreigners in commercial and industrial centres like Hankow and Shanghai are against the so-called Cantonese revolution. Nor is their opposition wholly to be explained on strictly economic grounds. The American economic stake in China is not large; yet in the large centres, outside of missionary groups, Americans generally share the feelings of the English residents, feelings which centre and flourish in the foreign clubs, where most of the correspondents imbibe their ideas and gather the news they send. The whole mode of life has become history comparable with it; possibly none in our own day, even the World War. Such a statement, given our habitual provincialism and racial snobbishness, may seem foolishness to the wise. But I doubt if most of the great changes of history were not obscured to their contemporaries by superficial froth and clamor. We think of Asia as outside of our world, and it is hard for us to recognize that any changes going on there are of great importance. But when the changes have produced their consequences, and are seen in historic perspective, it is certain that the reconstitution of the life of the oldest and most numerous people of Asia will stand revealed as at least as significant as the transition of Europe out of medievalism into a modernized culture. Such questions as the bearing of the changes upon the special privileges of a few thousand foreigners, the control of India by Great Britain, and the other features which are now conspicuous, will fall into place as paragraphs in a volume. It is not easy to take a long view of contemporary events. But without such a view, we shall see in the events in China simply sound and fury, a confused medley of passions. This result is not only intellectually unfortunate; it is practically dangerous. For it marks a disposition upon which race and color prejudice and deliberate propaganda operate disastrously. Our historic sympathy with China is in danger of being undermined; further untoward events in China might draw us, on the basis of inflammation of emotions due to misunderstandings, into support of European policies which are contrary both to our traditions and to our interests.